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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 23, 1993, during the early hours of the morning, a desperate
woman took a desperate action.' Tired of waiting for a court order,2 tired
of trying to remain committed to a husband who allegedly hurt and harassed
her, and tired of the helplessness and humiliation she felt when he
purportedly violated her for the very last time, she did the unthinkable. As
he lay sleeping, she slipped into the kitchen, retrieved a butcher knife and
returned to the bedroom where she severed his penis. Fleeing the apartment,
she discarded the severed part which 3was later recovered and reattached
during a nine and a half hour surgery.
While we as a society do not condone marital abuse, 4 neither do we
condone violent retribution.' The latter value was reiterated by Virginia law
enforcement officials when they filed criminal charges against the woman
above for aggravated malicious wounding. 6 As obviously vindictive as Ms.
Bobbitt's actions were against her husband, other men are routinely
wounded by vindictive women in less physical and more subtle ways. For
example, on any given day, a pregnant wife may (without notice to or
consent from her husband) unilaterally decide that his offspring will not be
born.7 This is a wounding to a man's right to associate with what could be
1. Donna Britt, A Wife, A Knife and Power, WASH. POST, June 29, 1993, at B01.
2. Marcia E. Odum, Woman Who Cut Husband Sought Restraining Order, WASH.
POST, July 31, 1993, at Col.
3. Marylou Tousignant, Woman Who MutilatedHusband had Told Neighborof Rapes,
WASH. POST, June 26, 1993, at D05.
4. VA. CODE ANN. Sec. 18.2-67.2:1 (a) (Michie 1986) (criminalizing marital sexual
assault by a maximum penalty of 20 years in prison); see Tousignant supra, note 3
(indicating existence of laws against marital rape in all states except North Carolina).
5. See generally State v. Schroeder, 261 N.W.2d 759 (Neb. 1978). In Schroeder, the
court convicted an inmate of assault with intent to inflict great bodily harm when he stabbed
a sleeping cellmate who threatened to harm him. The court held there was no threat of
imminent harm to the defendant. See also Rocco C. Cipparone, The Defense of Battered
Women Who Kill, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 427, 436 (1987) ("[But if,] as often occurs, a woman
has killed her batterer during a lull in the beatings--such as when he was asleep or when he
had his back turned--a claim of self-defense is likely to be unsuccessful.").
6. See Commonwealth v. Bobbitt, No. 93-CR-33821 (Cir. Ct. Va. filed Aug. 23,
1993) (charging wife with malicious wounding). See also Bobbitt v. Bobbitt, No. 93-CH34993 (Cir. Ct. Va. filed July 9, 1993) (documenting pending divorce).
7. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2830 (1992) (holding statute
requiring spousal notification prior to abortion unconstitutional); Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69-71 (1976) (holding statute requiring of spousal consent prior to
an abortion unconstitutional).
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his only child
Conversely, should a mother unilaterally decide to deliver a child, a
biological father who had no part in the decision to carry the child to full
term nonetheless becomes jointly responsible for its financial support. 9 In
addition, if the father loses his job and is thereafter unable to afford the
legal expense of having child support payments reduced, he risks being
imprisoned for failure to pay his past debts.' Since his nonpayment would
constitute civil rather than criminal contempt, in some states, the father may
not be entitled to a public defender" -- another unfair wounding, this one to
8. See generally Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding that a biological
father who has maintained a relationship with his illegitimate children has an essential civil
right to parent and raise them, and that he may not presumptively be denied such rights
solely on the basis of being an out-of-wedlock father).
9. See Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, 750 ILCS 5/505 (1994):
The Court shall determine the minimum amount of support by using the following
guidelines:
Number of children
Percentage of "net income"
1
20%
2
25%
3
32%
4
40%
5
45%
6 or more
50%
Id. at 5/505(1). See also Illinois Parentage Act of 1984, 750 ILCS 45/1.1 (1994) (recognizing
the right of children to the physical, mental, emotional and monetary support of their
parents).
10. See 750 ILCS 5/505 (5)(b)(2)(1994) (stating that a father may be subject to a
prison penalty of up to six months for contempt of court for failing to pay child support);
State v. Robertson, 859 P.2d 550 (Or. Ct. App. 1993) (holding state did not err in
imprisoning father for failure to pay child support arrearage despite trial court's inferring man
had present ability to pay support from his mere silence). See also Middleton v. Middleton,
620 A.2d 1363, 1368-69 (Md. 1993) (holding contempt and imprisonment for man's failure
to pay support arrearage is not imprisonment for a debt as decree for support is not a "debt");
Goodman v. Goodman, 260 N.E.2d 257, 260 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970) (holding man was not
denied a constitutional right against debtor's prison for being incarcerated for failure to pay
child support arrearage). Accord State v. Long, 719 S.W.2d 455 (Mo. 1986); Sword v.
Sword, 249 N.W.2d 88 (Mich. 1976).
11. See Albers v. Koffman, 815 S.W.2d 484, 485 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (holding trial
court lacked authority to appoint public defender to represent party in civil contempt
proceeding arising from alleged nonpayment of child support). But see Ex Parte Lopez, 7 10
S.W.2d 948, 953 (Tx. Ct. App. 1986) (finding father had right to counsel where evidence
failed to support finding that he could pay support and his nonpayment was willful). Cf In
re Harvey, 483 N.E.2d 397, 398099 (I1. App. Ct. 1985) (holding nonpayment of support
arrearage presents a prima facie case of indirect civil contempt which may be rebutted under
purging provision by showing father is too indigent to reasonably have present ability to pay
arrearage).
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a man's financial well-being and dignity.

In fact, it is conceivable that a biological father would not even know
2
he begat a child--as was true in the baby Jessica case' --and then years
later still be legally responsible for the economic support of a child he never
knew he fathered'--a wounding by deceit. Notably, under Illinois law, a
man has thirty days after the birth of a child he begat, to assert his parental
4
rights or lose all such rights to a couple wishing to adopt the child.' No
similar thirty day requirement or even a statute of limitations applies should
the child's birth mother decide to file a paternity suit on behalf of the minor
5
child for support payments. This is a wounding inflicted by unequal legal
standards. To add to a man's pain, a biological father who ordinarily would
entitled 6to visitation
be liable for support payments will not necessarily be
child.'
his
parent
rights, regardless of his ability to adequately
12. In re Baby Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 665-67 (Mich. 1993) (allowing biological
to obtain his
father to defeat foster couple's adoption of his daughter because they failed
rights).
waiver of parental
of
13. See Illinois Parentage Act of 1984, 750 ILCS 45/8 (1994). For purposes
paternity of
prove
to
which
in
time
years
two
has
father
putative
the
custody,
and
visitation
majorityany child he sires. Id. § 45/8(2). The child, however, has two years past the age of
support.
child
past
collect
and
paternity
-namely twenty years after birth--to prove a father's
1990).
Ct.
App.
(III.
375
N.E.2d
552
Beckett,
of
Id. § 45/8. See also In re Marriage
4
14. See Illinois Adoption Act, 750 ILCS 50/12a(2)(199 ) (quoting notice to biological
father, where notice is required):
I further understand that I am also obligated to establish my paternity pursuant to
the Parentage Act of 1984 within 30 days of my receiving this notice or, if the
child is not yet born, within 30 days after the birth of the child. This proceeding
is separate and distinct from the above mailing of initial declaration of paternity[.]
Id. (footnote omitted).
15. See People ex. rel. Redd v. Mulholland, 481 N.E.2d 307, 309 (III. App. Ct. 1985)
(finding that no statute of limitations applies during the minority of the child for the filing
also
of a paternity complaint by the child, or by the mother on behalf of the child). See
Parentage
Illinois
See
1989).
Ct.
App.
People ex. iel. Kelly v. Pasko, 540 N.E.2d 462 (111.
after
Act of 1984, 750 ILCS 45/8(a)(1)(1994) (barring the child's action to seek support only
App.
(III.
69
66,
N.E.2d
530
Palmer,
v.
Majidi
see
But
twenty).
of
a child reaches the age
Ct. 1988) (holding that the disparity between children's and their fathers' paternity actions
is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose of providing repose and avoiding
stale claims; therefore, distinction does not violate equal protection).
16. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121,23 (1989) (finding no fundamental
liberty right in a prior relationship an adulterous father and his child such that he could
the
obtain paternity rights superior to that of the non-biological father in whose marriage
found
court
The
1980).
Ct.
App.
(III.
497
N.E.2d
409
child was born). See also Hess v. Hess,
a father in civil contempt of court for not paying a $720 child support arrearage, while
of
simultaneously finding that the evidence was insufficient to hold the mother in contempt
violations
mere
that
court for failure to provide visitation. Id. at 500. The court concluded
of visitation terms will not excuse father's support obligations. Id.
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In essence, when it comes to reproductive rights, men are confronted
with a set of inequities and inconsistencies. As it stands today, the law
places an absolute economic burden on the man, 7 and then, figuratively
speaking, slices the male's reproductive capacity by affording him unequal
protection in deciding whether to bear or beget a child.' 8
This comment examines recent trends in the law and how these
developments affect men in the area of reproduction. More particularly, Part
III of the comment proposes means by which single men may acquire
equality in their constitutional right to avoid procreation, while Part IV
examines new means by which men who are fit and desirous of becoming
parents may protect their constitutional right to beget a child.
An analysis of what rights a man should have, logically begins with an
examination of what rights a man does have. A man presently has the right
not to be physically sterilized.' 9 This right is typically referred to as the
right to procreate. The counter-part of the right to procreate is the right not
to procreate. A man has the right to avoid procreation by purchasing and
utilizing contraceptives. 2" In addition, he can choose not to have a frozen
embryo which he took part in producing implanted into an adoptive
couple.2' These rights all relate to a man's ability to decide whether or not
to beget a child.
Thereafter, once a child has been born, the biological father has the
right to procedural due process prior to its adoption. 22 Similarly, a biologi17. See 750 ILCS 45/1.1 (1994) (statutorily requiring biological father to supply
physical, mental, emotional and monetary support to his children). See generally Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (relieving women of the post-birth burdens of raising children-be they physical, psychological or financial--by allowing a woman the right to an abortion).
18. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 92 (1976) (White, J. dissenting)
(stating that the Missouri statute allows a pregnant woman to essentially make a unilateral
decision over whether to bear or beget a child).
19. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 543-44 (1942) (invalidating statute
requiring sterilization of certain criminal offenders). But see Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207
(1927) (upholding sterilization of mental incompetents).
20. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (finding married couples
have a fundamental privacy right in the use of contraceptives). See also Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 446-47 (1972) (extending privacy right in the use of contraceptives to single
individuals).
21. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tenn. 1992) (indicating that the husband
had a "constitutionally protected right not to beget a child where no pregnancy hald] taken
place).
22. See 750 ILCS 5/12.1 (1994) (containing the Illinois Putative Father Registry, a.k.a.
the "Baby Richard law"). See also Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). The Court
found that in an adoption setting, "maternal and paternal roles are not invariably different in
importance." Id. at 389. Therefore, adoptive parents are required to obtain a waiver of
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cal father is entitled to certain procedural guarantees prior to the termination
of his parental rights.2a These rights are associational in nature and usually
24
require the father to have established a relationship with the child.
Notwithstanding such associational rights, a father's biological link to his
child does not necessarily guarantee that he will have the right to parent or
25
visit his child, especially if an adoption has taken place. He may also lose
his associational privileges if his child is born to the marriage of another
man.26 In essence, his rights in this area are limited by the "best interests
of the child".
Along with the above procreative and biologically-linked rights, a man
has other associational rights. For one, he has the right to enjoy the
28
27
anticipated "society" of his unborn or afterborn child. In addition, the
parental rights from both the mother and the father of a child. Cf 750 ILCS 50/10 (1993).
Accord In re Doe, 638 N.E.2d 181 (1994).
23. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972) (requiring the state to hold a hearing
to determine an illegitimate father's fitness prior to terminating his parental rights).
24. See id. at 651 ("The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired
and raised, undeniably warrants deference and ... protection.") (emphasis added).
25. See Rivera-Berrios v. Adoption Centre, Inc., 617 So. 2d 1067, 1068-69 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1993) (denying a natural father the ability to invalidate the adoption proceedings
of his child after the birth mother denied him notice by intentionally listing the incorrect
father on the birth certificate); Unwed Father v. Unwed Mother, 379 N.E.2d 467 (Ind. App.
Ct. 1978). The court denied custody to a natural father who was deceived about his child's
birth by the child's birth mother. Id. at 471. Since the child had been with the adoptive
couple for over two years, the court determined that, although the man had parental rights,
it would be in the best interests of the child not to invalidate the adoption. Id. at 471-72. But
1994) (the
see In re Doe, 624 N.E.2d 807 (III. App. Ct. 1993), rev'd, 638 N.E.2d 181 (Ill.
"Baby Richard" case, ordering a three and one half year old child to be given back to his
biological father); In re Baby Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 665-67 (Mich. 1993) (allowing
biological father to defeat foster couple's attempt to adopt his child, even though the child
had been in the foster couple's care for several years).
26. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (rejecting paternity claim and
visitation rights to a man who could prove with 98.07% certainty that he was the biological
father of a child born to the marriage of his sexual partner and her husband). But see Niesen
v. Niesen, 157 N.W.2d 660, 662 (1968) (requiring natural father to continue to pay child
support regardless of the fact that his children changed their surnames to that of their
mother's new spouse).
27. See Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 353 (1979) (allowing wrongful death cause
of action for illegitimate fathers only if they have statutorily legitimated their children).
28. In a landmark decision, the Illinois Appellate Court awarded tort damages to a
divorcing spouse who lost custody and visitation of his children for a period of almost five
years because of the negligence of his attorney. Person v. Behnke, 611 N.E.2d 1350, 1353
(Il. App. Ct. 1993). Recovery was based on a theory of wrongful interference with the
parent-child relationship which resulted in the father's temporary but substantial loss of
"society" in his children. Id. at 1355. Although loss of society damages are usually awarded
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common law gives a father the ability to control certain decisions affecting
his minor child's physical well-being.29
Nonetheless, despite courts' increasing willingness to grant men the
ability to make certain family-related decisions, the legal system has not yet
recognized that a man's constitutional right to decide whether to beget a
child should extend to procreative decisions made during pregnancy.30 In
particular, although the Supreme Court has struck down spousal consent and
notice statutes which would have required a pregnant woman to share
procreational decision-making with her husband,3' the Court has not yet
addressed the issue of how to deal with competing interests between private
individuals in such cases. The latter part of this comment discusses such
conflicts.
A final right men have deals perhaps
more with the lack of a right.
Although a child's mother may unilaterally waive her parental rights and
obligations by consenting to her child's adoption, 32 a biological father may

in wrongful death cases, a plaintiff father may pursue a cause of action for the loss of
his
child's love, affection, care, attention, companionship, comfort, guidance and protection
if
a spouse directly interferes with the parent-child relationship. See id. at 1354 (discussing
Dymek v. Nyquist, 469 N.E.2d. 659, 666 (Iii. 1984) (allowing father recovery for loss
of
society caused by his wife and her psychiatrist conspiring to brainwash the father's child
against him)).
29. Parents are allowed to decide what medical care is necessary for their minor
children. However, the parents' judgement must be in the "best interests" of the child. See
generally Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990) (affirming denial of illegitimate
father's petition to compel his twin daughters to donate their bone marrow to a half brother
dying of leukemia); People ex. rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769 (II. 1952) (forcing
child to have life-sustaining blood transfusion despite parents' objections on grounds of their
religious beliefs). Additionally, a parent must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
it would be in the best interests of a child to have life-sustaining support removed. See
generally in re L.H.R., 321 S.E.2d 716 (Ga. 1984).
30. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69 (holding that the "State
may not constitutionally require the consent of the spouse ... as a condition for abortion
during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy").
31. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (invalidating a Texas statute
criminalizing abortion and simultaneously declaring a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy as a fundamental right which may not be infringed upon by the states prior to fetal
viability). But see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2860 (1992) (abrogating
fundamental right status and replacing it with an undue burden standard).
32. See Illinois Adoption Act, 750 ILCS 50/9 (1994) (allowing birth mother to
irrevocably consent to adoption of her child if done no less than 72 hours after birth). But
see Dwyer v. Dwyer, 10 N.E.2d 344, 346 (III. 1937) ("The duty of a parent to support his
minor child arises out of the natural relationship, and while that duty may also be imposed
upon the adoptive parents by statutory enactment, the natural parent may, if necessity arises,
be required to perform that duty.").
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rights and obligations after the birth mother has
only waive his parental
33
So.
done
already
Generally, once a pregnant woman makes a decision regarding a fetus,
is completely bound by the consequences of her decision. This is
father
the
true despite the fact that the male progenitor was given no input into the
procreative decision,3 or despite the fact that he strongly disagrees with a
female progenitor's choices. The Supreme Court's grant to the woman of an
absolute veto power over the man's procreative decision creates two
problems. First, it is arguably an unwarranted deprivation of a man's
3
fundamental right to decide whether to beget a child 1--a deprivation which36
in Roe v. Wade
is facilitated by the Supreme Court's overly broad holdings
33. The rare exception to this statement would be the case in which a biological father
is awarded full custody of his child immediately after birth. See 750 ILCS 50/1. A natural
father may also be allowed to surrender his parental rights if his child's custodial mother has
died or was declared unfit. See generally Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
34. See generally Marshall B. Kapp, The Father's (Lack oJ) Right and Responsibilities
in the Abortion Decision: An Examination of Legal-Ethical Implications, 9 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 369 (1982) (advocating that a biological father should be absolved of any financial
responsibility for children he fathers, if he was unsuccessful in persuading his partner to have
an abortion.). But see In re Pamela P. v. Frank S., 449 N.E.2d 713, 716 (1983):
[R]espondent's constitutional entitlement to avoid procreation does not encompass
a right to avoid a child support obligation simply because another private person
[the mother] has not fully respected his desires in this regard. However unfairly
respondent may have been treated by petitioner's failure to allow him an equal
voice in the decision to conceive [and bear] a child, such wrong does not rise to
the level of a constitutional violation.
Id.
35. An unconstitutional violation of a man's fundamental right to procreate would
require state action which either deprives him of his liberty or provides him unequal
protection of the law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (containing Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses). A federal action could cause a similar violation of a man's rights. See
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (incorporating Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses into the Fifth Amendment). Notably, a court's decision may qualify as a state action.
See Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 431-33 n.1 (1984) (finding court's custody decision
constituted a discriminatory state action against an afro-american father). In a like manner,
a state's African discriminatory change to its constitution may also be an unconstitutional
state action. See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378-79 (1967) (striking down amendment
to the state's constitution, as the amendment was considered a state action encouraging
private discrimination). In applying these concepts to the Court's decisions in Roe v. Wade
and Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, it may be said that the Supreme Court has encouraged
the deprivation of a man's right to procreate by forbidding the states from intervening on his
behalf into the woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy prior to viability. See, e.g., Doe
v. Smith, 527 N.E.2d 177, 178 (Ind. 1988) (affirming the trial court's determination that "any
issuance of an injunction and the possible invocation of the court's contempt power would
sufficiently constitute state action, which was proscribed by Danforth").
36. 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (holding that the earliest point at which the state can
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and Planned Parenthood v. Danforth.7 Second, the pregnant woman's
ability to unilaterally decide to avoid parenthood is probably discriminatory
as that ability affects current child support obligations. In those ways in
which the genders are similarly situated, the Constitution demands that they
be treated alike.38 Presently, only a woman may avoid the consequences of
parenthood once a pregnancy has taken place.
This comment analyzes what reproductive rights men may be entitled
to and how those rights might be effectuated. In the area of avoiding
procreation, men may have constitutional rights under the substantive due
process and equal protection clauses. In the area of paternal rights, recent
legal developments suggest that men may have "societal" and proprietary
interests in their offspring grounded in state rather than federal law. Part II
of this comment sets forth a framework of time-honored legal presumptions
within which procreative decision-making could likely be made. Part III
analyzes the history and premises behind a man's right to avoid procreation,
while examining how enforcement of this right might affect public policy.
Part IV discusses the history of paternal rights and the ways in which
women's rights have traditionally trumped men's rights. Part IV also
discusses the ways in which society has changed over the past few decades,
suggesting that the laws should change to treat the genders equally in their
procreative decision-making. In addition, Part IV discusses means of
enforcing paternal rights and the predicted effects enforcement would have
on public policy. The comment concludes with a general overview in Part
V.
II. SUGGESTED SCOPE OF MEN'S REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
The key to discerning the inherent inequity of allowing a woman to
have a judicially created monopoly over reproductive decisions lies in the
fact that the intentions which motivate individuals to engage in sexual
interfere with a woman's decision to obtain an abortion would be viability). But compare
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2798 (1992) (the plurality opinion holding
that "viability marks the earliest point at which the State's interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic abortions.") with Id. at 2820
(recognizing that there is a substantial state interest in potential life throughout pregnancy).
37. See generally Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (holding that
a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy weighs heavier than her husband's right to
procreate and that the state may not delegate to the husband a power the state itself does not
have).
38. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No state shall ... deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."). See also Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
499 (1954) (incorporating Equal Protection Clause into the Fifth Amendment so as to also
forbid unconstitutional federal actions).
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3 9 The Supreme Court's
relations are often ambiguous and unascertainable

to
decision in Roe v. Wade related to a never-married woman who wished
40 Thus,
abort a fetus in which no parental interests were being asserted.
there was no intent to procreate by either the pregnant woman or the male

progenitor. 41 However, this is not necessarily true of every pregnancy.
A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PROCREATIVE PRESUMPTIONS

Two persons who consensually engage in sexual relations may have
they
more than one intention. They may intend to jointly create a child, or
42 The
activities.
may intend to merely engage in recreational sexual
3
individuals may also have mixed intentions. As a result, one or both of
the parties may view the pregnancy as either a fulfilled desire or an
individuals
unfortunate by-product."4 It seems most likely that if the two
45 especially if
are unmarried, they would have an intent not to procreate,

39. See Marjorie M. Shultz, Reproductive Technology and Intent-Based Parenthood:
for Gender Neutrality, Wis. L. REV. 297 (1990):
Opportunity
An
[Slexual relations are often either an end in themselves or a means to some end
other than procreation. Thus, procreation may be a goal or a by-product, or
anything in between .... Certainly from an outsider's vantage point, ambiguity
about intentions suffuses acts of sexual intercourse and reproduction by ordinary
coital means.
Id. at 308.
40. "Neither in this opinion nor in Doe v. Bolton do we discuss the father's rights if
in the constitutional context, in the abortion decision. No paternal right has been
exist
any
asserted in either of these cases. . . ." Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 n.67 (1973).
41. See infra note 260 (describing Jane Roe's intentions). See also SARAH WEDDINGthat Jane Roe might
TON, A QUESTION OF CHOICE 52-53 (Penguin Books (1993)) (suggesting
pregnancy was "an
her
saying
as
Roe
Jane
(quoting
256-58
at
id.
see
But
have been raped).
unplanned result of a casual affair").
42. See, e.g., Rivera-Berrios v. Adoption Centre, Inc., 617 So. 2d 1067, 1070 (Fla.
to vacate
Dist. Ct. App. 1993). In Rivera-Berrios a biological father was denied his request
in listing
deceit
mother's
the
despite
that
found
court
the
the adoption of his child because
received
father
the
once
adoption,
the
of
notice
giving
publication
a
in
him as unknown

actual notice of the adoption it was too late to vacate it. Id.Furthermore, according to the

court, the unmarried couple had merely engaged in "recreational sex." Id. at 1070.
risk
43. One commentator suggests that some persons view pregnancy as "an assumed
to
pregnancy
the
carry
to
consented
has
woman
the
thus
and
relations
of voluntary sexual
the
of
Model
term." Martin A. Kotler, Utility, Autonomy and Motive: A Descriptive
This
Development of the Tort Doctrine, 58 U. CIN. L. REV. 1231, 1251 n.74 (1990).
abortion.
to
exception
rape
a
for
allow
reasoning explains why some pro-life advocates
44. See Shultz, supra note 39 (indicating varying views of pregnancy).
45. That unmarried parties intend not to procreate is further bolstered by the Supreme
to
Court's willingness to extend the constitutional right of privacy in using contraceptives
extremely
being
while
(1972),
446-47
single individuals, Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,
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the participants are not of an age, level of maturity, or stage in their lives

where they have the financial or emotional capacity to be capable parents.
Conversely, a married couple (or partners to a common-law marriage) 46
would be more likely to have the intention to procreate. Although the above
intentions corresponding to marital status are not always present, one could
argue that there is a presumption not to procreate between casual sexual

acquaintances and a presumption to procreate between spouses--a presumption which is generally favored by societal norms and governmental interests
in family stability.47
hesitant to encourage intimate associations to relationships outside of marriage. In particular,
the Court has refused to recognize a fundamental right to engage in non-traditional
relationships. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-91 (1986) (finding no fundamental
right to engage in homosexual sodomy). Accord Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388, 1397
(D.C. Cir. 1984). See also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 121-23 (1989) (denying
custody to an adulterous biological father when his child was born within another man's
marriage); Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978) (finding no
fundamental privacy right to engaging in adultery). Cf. Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450
U.S. 464, 472-73 (1981) (validating criminal penalties for minor men who engage in sexual
intercourse with underage females); Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1 (1974) (finding that
a person does not have a fundamental right to live with whomever one wishes).
The Court has, however, been willing to extend a fundamental rights status to family
members who have biological links if the persons have attempted to establish a relationship.
See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972) (holding that an illegitimate father who has
lived with and supported his children has a fundamental right to their care, custody and
companionship); Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 353 (1979) (allowing a wrongful death
cause of action for only those unwed natural fathers who statutorily legitimate their children);
Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 504-05 (1977) (protecting the ability of blood
relatives to reside together); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979) (recognizing
a procedural due process right prior to the adoption of a child born to an illegitimate father).
But see Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 254-56 (1978) (refusing to allow an illegitimate
father to block his child's adoption where he had never legitimated the child nor sought to
acquire custody).
46. Some states consider a heterosexual couple to be married if the partners have
engaged in sexual relations and lived together with the intention of being married. Other
states do not recognize common-law marriage. See Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (III.
1979). But see Cartwright v. McGown, 12 N.E. 737 (III. 1887) (holding that the couple must
show an intent to be married: a court may not marry parties by mere presumption.)
47. See cases cited supra note 46, indicating the Court's reluctance to protect
relationships outside of marriage. See also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (holding
that the right to marry is "fundamental"); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)
("Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to
the degree of being sacred."); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) ("Marriage
and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race."); and Meyers
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) ("Without doubt, [liberty] denotes ... the right of
the individual ... to marry, establish a home and bring up children .... ).
A presumed intent that married couples desire to procreate may be further supported
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Applying such presumptions, one could argue that a couple has entered
into an implied contract either to procreate or not to procreate depending on
48
the couple's marital status. The married couple's intent to procreate could
49
be further established or negated by a signed pre-nuptial agreement. In
any event, as in most disputes, disagreements between the two parties could
50
parties to the agreement.
be governed by examining the intent of the
Notably, by virtue of the growing number of court cases in which unwed
See
by various requirements the law has traditionally placed upon couples wishing to marry.
those
provide
to
Illinois
of
State
the
(requiring
1994)
Supp.
&
(1993
5/203
750 ILCS
750
individuals obtaining marriage licenses with information on Fetal Alcohol Syndrome);
v.
Louis
also
See
consanguinity).
of
ILCS 5/212 (1993) (prohibiting marriages on grounds
going
fraud
husband's
for
annulment
(allowing
1970)
Ct.
App.
Louis, 260 N.E.2d 469 (III.
to one of the essentials of marriage--the desire and ability to consummate the marriage and
beget children).
48. See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 360-61 (Richard A.
law,
Epstein et. al. eds., 2d ed. 1988). "In family property law, as contrasted with public
laissezthe
in
Even
bargaining.
private
on
than
status
on
more
depended
always
rights have
have
faire atmosphere of the nineteenth century, marital property rights seem generally to
Leland
also
See
added).
(emphasis
Id.
moved counter to the general trend in other areas."
to which
v. Leland, 150 N.E. 270, 272 (III. 1925) (describing marriage as a civil contract
necessity
public
on
based
status
a
state;
the
and
wife
the
husband,
the
parties,
three
there are
v.
and controlled by law for the benefit of society at large). Accord People ex. rel. Healy
Case, 89 N.E. 638, 640-41 (III. 1909).
49. See Bergan v. Bergan, No. 89-10003, slip op. at 7 (Dakota Feb. 10. 1989)
(granting husband a temporary restraining order which would have required the wife to
when
continue her pregnancy because of a supposed pre-nuptial agreement) (order vacated
court determined the agreement did not exist).
50. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONTRACTS § 20:
(1) There is no manifestation of mutual assent to an exchange if the parties attach
materially different meanings to their manifestations and
(a) neither party knows or has reason to know the meaning attached by the
other; or
(b) each party knows or each party has reason to know the meaning
attached by the other.
Id. It may be argued in the case of reproductive rights that, in a state which has adopted the
Restatement position, a married woman should have reason to know that her spouse would
want her to continue a pregnancy, especially if the parties specifically spell out such an intent
in a pre-nuptial agreement.
Also, in recent studies by evolutionary psychologists, it was found that in "every
known hunter-gatherer culture, marriage is the norm--not necessarily monogamous marriage,
and not always lasting marriage, but marriage of some sort; and via this institution, fathers
help provide for their children." Robert Wright, Oiur Cheating Hearts, TIME, Aug. 15, 1994,
at 48. According to Wright, "the ultimate purpose of the wealth and power that men seek so
ardently is genetic proliferation." Id. at 50. See generally Bruce C. Hafen, The Constitutional
Status of Marriage, Kinship and Sexual Privacy--Balancing the Individual and Social
Interests. 81 MICH. L. REV. 463 (1983).

1994:1411

MEN'S REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS

fathers are seeking not to pay child support, a birth mother should have
reason to know that an unwed father likely intends to avoid procreation. 5
Utilizing the above presumed intentions, a man would be fiscally
responsible for a child when it is presumed that the man desired to beget
the
child;5 2 whether because the child was conceived as part of a marriage,
a
common-law marriage, or in accordance with a written contract or
prenuptial agreement. On the other hand, a man should not be fiscally
responsible to provide child support if he was single and the conception
was
unintended or the result of a birth control mishap--one of the main rationales
for a woman's abortion right.5"
In applying the above procreative presumptions, if a pregnant woman
acted contrary to the couple's presumed intentions, she would be in breach
of the parties' implied agreement. The married woman could rebut
the
procreative presumptions by demonstrating she was justified in aborting.
Similarly, a single woman could rebut the opposite presumption by showing
that her partner made certain assurances to her regarding the care of their
child, thereby estopping him from later claiming he should not
pay
54
support.
Beginning with a presumption of an intent not to procreate, if the
pregnant mother decides to bear the child contrary to the parties' presumed
intent, she would be in breach of the parties' presumed agreement not
to
procreate. Typically, a breaching party is not permitted to sue another
party

51. See State ex rel. K.A.G. v. T.D.G., 861 P.2d 990, 994 (Okla. 1993)
(seeking to bar
a paternity action against an unwed father by claiming he executed a valid
contractual waiver
of his parental rights and obligations with the birth mother of the child);
Erwin L.D. v. Myla
Jean L., 847 S.W.2d 45, 47 (Ark. Ct. App. 1993) (seeking to use birth
control fraud as a
defense to an unwed father's paternity suit); Beard v. Skipper, 451 N.W.2d
614 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1990) (seeking mitigation of father's support obligations by claiming
mother committed
fraud by misrepresenting contraceptive protection). Despite any ambiguity
in the parties
manifestations, these newer cases indicate that it is becoming less reasonable
for a woman
to claim that unmarried parties have not assented to an implied contract
not to procreate.
52. See Krause v. Krause, 206 N.W.2d 589, 594 (Wisc. 1973) ("This
court has
consistently held that a father's duty to support his minor children rests
upon not only moral
law but legally upon the voluntary status of parenthood which the father
assumed."). If this
statement is valid, it logically follows that a man should not be liable
for paying child
support if he involuntarily becomes a father.
53. See id. See also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2808
(O'Connor, J.,
plurality opinion) (declaring that Roe v. Wade sought to protect the
dimension of liberty
relating to a woman who, "despite her attempts to avoid it ....
has become pregnant").
54. Cf Graham v. Ashbury, 540 P.2d 656. 658 (Ariz. 1975) (holding
that a party is
prevented by his own acts from claiming a right to the detriment of another
party who was
entitled to rely on such conduct and acted accordingly).
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55
for damages unless the other party has somehow been unjustly enriched.
In the case of a woman who breaches an implied contract not to procreate
by giving birth, it is illogical to say that her partner has been unjustly
net income in child
enriched by being required to pay twenty percent of his
56 In fact, it might be
support for the next eighteen to twenty-four years.
asserted that the woman, who is predominantly in control of the decision of
whether to raise the child, should mitigate damages resulting from her
breach.57 As a result, she would either have a duty to abort the fetus, to
place the child for adoption, or to take whatever other measures would be
reasonably necessary to avoid incurring excessive expenses. Should she fail
to mitigate damages by deciding instead to raise the child alone, she should
not be entitled to recover the additional costs of raising the child from a
5
natural father who desired not to procreate. " Reciprocally, the man who
asserts he did not desire to procreate should not be entitled to59benefit from
the woman's breach by receiving custody or visitation rights.
On the other hand, with a presumption of an intent to procreate, if a
married woman notifies her husband that she desires to terminate a
pregnancy, and he wishes to parent the forming child, the father could claim

55. See generally Britton v. Turner, 6 N.H. 481 (1834).
See
56. See generally Illinois Marriage and Dissolution Act, 750 ILCS 5/505 (1994).
1994).
also Illinois Parentage Act of 1984, 750 ILCS 45/1.1 (1993 & Supp.
a
57. Thus, if a woman seeking support is seen as a party seeking damages, she has
(4th
301
F.2d
35
Co.,
Bridge
Luten
v.
County
Rockingham
duty to mitigate the damages. Cf.
costs it failed
Cir. 1929) (holding that a construction company was responsible for additional
N.E. 471
to mitigate when it had the opportunity to do so). But cf. Hussey v. Holloway, 104
accept
to
employee
(Mass. 1914) (finding it was unreasonable to require a discharged
damages).
mitigating
of
employment far below her abilities as a means
58. Accord Rockingham County v. Luten Bridge, 35 F.2d 301 (4th Cir. 1929).
59. Interestingly, the Supreme Court has had no difficulty in recognizing that a natural
who
father who has not taken the opportunity to develop a relationship with his offspring--or
See
adoption.
child's
that
to
prior
notice
has been deprived from doing so--is not entitled to
(1978).
246
U.S.
434
Walcott,
v.
Quilloin
(1983);
248
generally Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
the parental
In fact, some courts have even ignored notice requirements when determining
parental
their
assume
to
attempts
strident
made
have
who
fathers
biological
of
rights
617
Inc.,
Centre,
Adoption
v.
obligations and acquire their parental rights. See Rivera-Berrios
vacate
to
ability
father
putative
(denying
1993)
So. 2d 1067, 1068-69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
efforts to
adoption proceeding to which he was given no actual notice, despite his continued
(Ind. Ct.
471
parent his child). See also Unwed Father v. Unwed Mother, 379 N.E.2d 467,
in
couple
adoptive
from
child
his
App. 1978) (denying natural father the ability to remove
child
the
about
information
obtaining
from
spite of the fact that the father was prevented
and her
because of the mother's deceit in listing the wrong father on the birth certificate
in many
are,
courts
the
that
therefore,
seems,
It
procedures).
discovery
with
comply
to
failure
procreate.
instances, already presuming that an unmarried father does not have an intent to
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anticipatory breach of their implied contract to procreate.6 He could then
seek specific performance because, due to the uniqueness of the subject
matter of the contract, monetary damages would not adequately compensate
him for the breach. 6' If the mother has no justification to excuse her non-

performance, the man should be able to enjoin her from aborting.62 Should

she nonetheless proceed with the abortion, she should be liable to the man
for damages in tort and in contract.63 Damages could be assessed for
the
loss of "society" which the man would likely have enjoyed had his mate not
destroyed his developing child."
The implied contract approach would still allow a woman who is raped
or who is the victim of incest to make the ultimate decision of whether
to
terminate her pregnancy. 65 Since the woman who was the victim of rape
or incest was either forced to conceive under duress, or was unduly
influenced, the contract would be unenforceable. 66 Duress or undue
influence would be an affirmative defense to a breach, relieving the woman
of any contractual obligations to perform on the implied contract. 67
Similarly, requiring a woman to risk her own life or health for the sake
of

60. Cf. Leazzo v. Dunham, 420 N.E.2d 851, 854 (Iil. App. Ct. 1981)
(providing
example of one party advising another of its intent to breach a contract prior
to the contract
performance date).
61. Cf Van Wagner Advertising Corp. v. S & M Enters., 492 N.E.2d 756
(N.Y. 1986)
(describing that specific performance will be allowed when the object
of a contract is so
unique that monetary damages are inadequate).
62. See Bergan v. Bergan, No. 89-10003, slip. op. at 7 (Dakota Feb.
10, 1989)
(describing a case in which the trial judge initially allowed a husband to
obtain a restraining
order when the court believed the couple had entered into a pre-nuptial
agreement to carry
any pregnancies which developed during the marriage to full term).
63. See Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, 5 Eng. Rul. Cas. 502, 504
(1854) (holding
a party in breach responsible for those consequential damages that were known
or reasonably
foreseeable at the time that the parties entered into the contract). Although
wrongful death
damages would not usually be foreseeable for deciding to abort a fetus,
if a wrongful
termination of pregnancy cause of action were established in paternal
rights cases, or if an
actual written pre-nuptial agreement were signed, the man would have
a greater likelihood
of establishing such damages as "reasonably foreseeable" under Hadley.
64. See infra notes 380-81 (describing the modern civil damages and criminal
penalties
for one inflicting injury or death to a fetus).
65. See supra note 50 (describing the lack of mutual assent needed to form
a contract
if parties attach materially different meanings to their manifestations).
66. Cf Head v. Gadsden Civil Serv. Bd., 389 So. 2d 516, 519 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1980)
(holding duress is an affirmative defense which justifies an actor's breach);
Board of Regents
v. Yarbrough, 470 S.W.2d 86, 92 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (finding party
to a contract was
unduly influenced since he lacked the mental capacity needed to execute
a trust document).
67. Cf. supra note 66.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

68
fulfilling a contractual obligation would be considered unconscionable.
Thus, in the case of a woman whose life or health would be endangered by
continuing her pregnancy, the contract would probably not be enforceable
and the woman and her physician would ultimately be able to decide
69
whether she should continue her pregnancy.
Although certain family contracts, such as those providing a promise
7°
to marry, are generally not legally enforceable, other family contracts,
such as those pertaining to adoptions and surrogacy, are valid if supported

68. Cf.Remco Enters., Inc. v. Houston, 677 P.2d 567, 572 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984):
Unconscionability is a doctrine under which courts may deny enforcement of unfair
or oppressive contracts because of procedural abuses arising out of the contract
formation, or because of substantive abuses relating to the terms of the contract,
such as terms which violate reasonable expectations of parties or which involve
gross disparities in price.
Id. at 572. (citation omitted)
69. See infra notes 302 and 452 (discussing parts of Roe v. Wade and a state court
judge's view of accommodating the woman's interest in preserving her health).
70. Note that oral promises are generally unenforceable if all or part of the
consideration is marriage or a promise to marry. See ROBERT W. HAMILTON ET. AL, CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CONTRACTS 912 (2d ed. 1992). Moreover, although mutual promises of
two persons to marry are outside the Statute of Frauds, many states have abolished the cause
of action for breach of promise to marry. Id. In the states in which promises to marry can
be enforced, an agreement to exchange a service for marital property would probably need
to be in writing to satisfy the Statute of Frauds. In addition, the promise of the woman to
bear any children conceived during a marriage would probably need to be given as an
inducement for the promise to marry in order for the actual contract to be enforceable. The
inducement factor would be required because already existing legal obligations may not serve
as valid consideration for a contract. See, e.g., Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339, 343-44 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974). In Jones, a biological father's agreement
to pay for the support of his children could not serve as consideration in exchange for the
woman's implied promise to carry a conception to term. Id. The court rejected the biological
father's assertion that he and his sexual partner entered into an implied contract as evidenced
by his agreement to support the unborn child together with the fact that the couple engaged
in intercourse without the use of contraceptives. Id. The court found, instead, that "[a]ny
'consideration' for such a contract is simply nonexistent." Id. at 344. Hence, a husband's
agreement to provide child support would not, by itself, be adequate consideration for a
contract to agree to bear any child born to the marriage because state laws already impose
a duty to support one's children. See, e.g., 750 ILCS 5/505 (1993 & Supp. 1994) (requiring
a parent to pay child support upon a determination of paternity).
If, however, a man would agree to give something over and above what the law requires
as part of an inducement for the woman's promise to carry any conceived children to term,
the couple's agreement could possibly be valid and enforceable. See e.g., Bergan v. Bergan,
No. 89-1003, slip op. at 7 (Cir. Ct. S.D. 1989). Notwithstanding any writing, it may still be
argued that the implied agreement a couple makes when marrying nonetheless sets up a
presumption that the couple intends to procreate.
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by adequate consideration. 7' With an implied contract not to procreate, the

parties could have an option contract created by their single status.72 The
partners could each agree to engage in sexual activities only on the basis
that in the event a pregnancy ensues, they will not procreate and not assume
the responsibilities of parenthood. The woman could exchange her waiver
of parental privileges for the man's payment of all the costs involved in
avoiding procreation and subsequent parenthood.73 Hence, he could pay all

the costs of an abortion or an adoption, in exchange for the woman either

obtaining an abortion, or giving birth and consenting to the child's adoption

after it is born.74 The man's payment of all costs needed to not procreate

should be adequate consideration in exchange for the woman's bodily
services rendered in avoiding procreation.75
With the opposite contract, an implied contract to procreate, the
partners could each agree that if a pregnancy resulted from their sexual
activities, both parties would procreate. The woman could agree to bear any
child that she conceived, provided the man agreed to pay the costs
associated with the pregnancy, birth and care of the child after birth.76 The
man's full payment would appear to be adequate consideration for the
parties' implied contract to procreate." Although some might advocate that
71. See Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 784 (Cal. 1993) (confirming that a surrogate
mother's waiver of her constitutional right to parent an implanted child was a valid
contractual waiver).
72. Option contracts would typically require that the parties exchange some sort of
promise for valuable consideration. But see infra note 75 (holding that sexual services would
not be legally sufficient to constitute consideration). Cf infra note 485 (indicating than
no
consideration is required for a valid antenuptial agreement in states which adopt the Uniform
Premarital Agreement view).
73. Cf Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 784 (Cal. 1993) (holding that a surrogate
mother's contractual waiver of her constitutional right to parent the child she was carrying
was valid).
74. See Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 112 (Cal. 1976) (referring to a case in which

a woman's agreement to halt her career was sufficient consideration for her to enforce an

implied contract to share in her partner's property upon their separation).
75. See id. (holding that sexual services may not be utilized as consideration to support
an express or implied contract for property rights, however foregoing a career or other
detrimental reliance may be).
76. See supra note 70.
77. See supra note 70. If a father pays the statutorily required child support amounts
and any other costs needed to raise his child, his payments would likely be inadequate
consideration for his wife to agree to waive her constitutional right to terminate
her
pregnancy because he is legally required to provide for the needs of his family while
he
continues to be married. However, if he pays all costs involved in the pregnancy and also
makes arrangements for the subsequent care of the child, it may be argued that he is offering
over and above what the law requires of a father. This latter quid pro quo could therefore
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the parties share the costs in both settings, the woman's much greater bodily
contribution should absolve her from making any payments for either the
contract to procreate or the contract not to procreate since she will pay in
physical discomfort."
Although the above-mentioned contractual approaches seem to
exchange adequate consideration in support of either a contract to procreate
or one not procreate, the man is nonetheless confronted with a difficulty if
the woman breaches either type of contract. If she bears the child when the
the parties
couple is single, courts have consistently held that any agreement
79
void as
are
support,
child
pay
to
obligations
man's
make to waive the
child
the
abort
to
decides
against public policy. Similarly, if the woman
when the couple is married, the courts have consistently held that the
woman has a constitutional right to terminate her pregnancy prior to
viability.80 Both of these legal determinations intrude into the area of the
man's fundamental rights.8 '
In one case, a Wisconsin court described the father's duty to pay child
support as follows: "This court has consistently held that a father's duty to
serve as adequate consideration for a woman to contractually waive her right to terminate her
pregnancy.
78. See City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 474
(1983) (referring to the costs of a 24 hour waiting period) ("surely a small cost to impose to
ensure that a woman's decision is well-considered in light of its certain irreparable
consequences on fetal life, and the possible effects on her own.") (emphasis added)
79. In reality, this situation is more of a problem when a social services agency
decides to sue on behalf of a child, or if at some point the child decides to sue on its own
behalf. See Oklahoma Department of Human Servs. v. T.D.G., 861 P.2d 990, 994 (Okla.
1993) (holding unwed mother's contractual waiver of filing a paternity suit was void as
against public policy). Accord Department of Pub. Aid ex rel. Cox v. Miller, 586 N.E.2d
App. Ct. 1992)
1251, 1256 (III. 1992); Chiapelli v. Viviano, 589 N.E.2d 198, 201 (Ill.
(holding that the child's interest in obtaining support outweighed the father's interest in
finality of settlement). But see Department of Pub. Aid ex. rel. Spurgetis v. Newberg, 537
N.E.2d 384, 385 (III. App. Ct. 1989) (approving the validity of a man's court approved
settlement agreement with his former sexual partner).
80. See Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2811. See also Henry P. David & Zdenek Matejcek,
Children Born to Women Denied Abortion: An Update, 13 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 32, 33 (1981).
Cf infra note 296 (describing the paternal rights cases which have failed to prevent pregnant
women from continuing their pregnancies when the fathers involved have asserted a right to
procreate).
81. See supra notes 19 and 20 (describing a man's fundamental right to procreate and
his constitutional right to avoid procreation where no pregnancy has taken place). See also
supra note 23 (describing a father's fundamental associational rights). Cf Person v. Behnke,
App. Ct. 1993) (allowing a cause of action for a father's loss of
611 N.E.2d 1350, 1353 (111.
society which resulted when he lost all contact with his children for a period of ive years
because of his attorney's malpractice in mishandling a divorce action).
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support his minor children rests upon not only the moral law but legally
upon the voluntary status of parenthood which the father assumed."8 2
Apparently, the court is saying that a man voluntarily assumes the risk of
parenthood when he engages in intercourse. Yet, a woman may avoid the
risk of parenthood through abortion. 3 This is unequal.
Because of a man's supposed voluntary assumption of parenthood, both
the mother of an out-of-wedlock child and the mother of a child born in a
marriage have equal statutory rights to seek child support on behalf of their
children." In addition, a child itself has a statutory right to seek support
from a legitimate or an illegitimate father.8 5 However, not all illegitimate
fathers are entitled to all legal rights pertaining to their children. 6
In justifying existing child support laws, some courts have reasoned
that a mother may not agree to waive what a child is entitled to receive
because the child was not a party to the progenitors' agreement.8 7 (However, neither is a forming child a party to it's mother's decision to abort it.)88
Furthermore, state courts have generally declared that in matters of child
support, "public policy demands that the best interests of the child be
paramount."8 9 (Interestingly, no similar best interests of the fetus test is
used during the mother's pregnancy.) 9° Finally, most states claim to have
82. Krause v. Krause, 206 N.W.2d 589, 594 (Wis. 1973). See also Niesen v. Niesen,
157 N.W.2d 660, 662 (Wis. 1968).
83. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992): "[T]he inability to
provide for the nurture and care of the infant is a cruelty to the child and an anguish to the
parent ....
[Similar to the decisions regarding contraceptives,] [ilt was this dimension of
personal liberty that Roe sought to protect ..
" Id. at 2808.
84. See Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 103-04 (1982). Accord Klawitter v.
Crawford, 541 N.E.2d 1159, 1162 (Il. App. Ct. 1989).
85. See Illinois Parentage Act, 750 ILCS 45/8 (1993 & Supp. 1994) (granting child of
natural father its own cause of action for paternity). Cf Oklahoma Dep't of Human Servs.
v. T.D.G., 861 P.2d 990, 994 (Okla. 1993) (holding mother's contractual waiver of child
support void as against public policy). But see id. at 995 (Watt, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that a mother's right to seek support on behalf of the child was validly waived but the child
had rights of its own to receive support from its biological father).
86. See supra note 59 (concerning those cases in which biological fathers have lost
their parental rights).
87. See T.D.G., 861 P.2d at 993.
88. According to Roe, none of the sections of the Constitution indicates that any of the
protections of a "person" apply prenatally. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973).
89. See, e.g., T.D.G., 861 P.2d 990.
90. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821 ("A State may not prohibit any woman from making
the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy before viability."). But see Roe v. Wade,
410 U.S. at 158 (finding a compelling state interest at viability). Cf. In re Baby Boy Doe,
632 N.E.2d 326, 330 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994), emergency cert. denied, Baby Boy Doe v. Mother
Doe, 114 S. Ct. 652 (1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1198 (1994) (refusing to compel
the
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a fiscal interest 9' in not spending their limited entitlement funds on
children 92who have a parent that is able to pay for part of the child's
support.

abortion
In analyzing the inconsistencies between child support and
93 moral or
involuntary,
or
voluntary
is
what
statutes, and in considering
immoral, applicable to women or applicable to men, only one state goal
appears to be consistent--saving money." Accordingly, perhaps the real
reason the government demands that an illegitimate father pay child support
for a child he did not desire to beget is not morals or a voluntary risk--it is
economics. 95 Economics may also be the real reason the government96allows
women to abort those children they do not feel they can care for. If so,
of
pregnant mother of a viable fetus to undergo a cesarian section to increase the chances
preserving the life or health of a distressed fetus).
91. The state claims to have a "compelling interest in assuring that the primary
obligation for support of illegitimate children falls on both natural parents rather than on the
in Mills
taxpayers of the state." State v. Wood, 569 P.2d 1148, 1151 (Wash. 1977) (quoted
original).
in
v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 104 (1982)) (en banc) (emphasis
92. See M.D.H., 437 N.E.2d 119, 127-28 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that the
State's interest in protecting it's fiscal integrity outweighs its countervailing interest in
protecting against stale claims).
93. In a slightly different context, namely in the area of inheritance law, the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld a state statute which prevented non-legitimated out-of-wedlock
children from inheriting their natural fathers' estates. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
may
The Court upheld the statute as a rationally-related regulation, exhibiting what may or
to
not
chose.
he
child
a
to
estate
his
not have been the testator's intent to not bequeath
children
to
given
be
only
may
inheritances
Louisiana,
in
legitimate. Id. at 537. As a result,
whose fathers voluntarily undertake a parental status. Cf Kapp, supra note 34, at 375
(expressing his views that child support obligations should also hinge upon whether the
man's parental status is voluntary).
94. Not inconsistent with the Court's holdings on abortion and child support, the
holding in Labine, once again, relies upon economics. Whatever inheritance the state statute
fails to give to an out-of-wedlock child, goes to the state when there are no surviving
descendants. Labine, 401 U.S. at 534. See generally supra notes 91-93.
95. If, indeed, the state's interests are primarily economic, then the state, arguably,
has
should not have an interest in requiring an unmarried father, whose child's mother
father
natural
the
against
action
paternity
a
sustain
to
alone,
child
the
raise
to
sufficient funds
for child support. See, e.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982). In Mills, the Supreme
Court stated that "[t]he State's interest stems not only from a desire that 'justice is done,' but
also from a desire to reduce the number of individuals forced to enter the welfare rolls." Id.
at 103. (O'Connor, J., concurring) (footnote omitted) But see Department of Public Aid v.
Newberg, 537 N.E.2d 384, 385 (III. App. Ct. 1989).
96. Although the original abortion decisions contain sections that refer to the mother's
pain, her maternal health, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973), or stigma, Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179, 215 (1973), the abortion right itself could not be a right against pain, as such,
after
a right would be unprotected at the time when a pregnant woman's pain is the greatest,
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fiscal considerations should play a major role in determining how best to
effectuate men's rights.
Despite present state policies, a blanket requirement that both married
and unmarried fathers pay child support has the discriminatory effect of
placing an unequal burden upon some single fathers.97 Presently, all men
are fiscally responsible for children they shared in producing.98 Fiscal
viability. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. Similarly, the woman will undergo a certain amount of

pain whether she aborts or delivers. Indeed, if freedom from bodily pain is an absolute
constitutional fight, men should not be able to be forced into combat. But see Rostker v.
Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 78-79 (1981) (upholding as constitutional the requirement that only
men, and not women, be drafted for combat positions). In regard to reputation, the Supreme
Court, subsequent to Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton held that reputation alone, apart from
some more tangible interest, is not a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest.
-See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976). Therefore, of pain, stigma and health, maternal
health is the only constitutionally protected concern that currently remains protectable
throughout pregnancy. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
Aside from these three concerns, financial well-being appears to be an additional,
and likely more overriding, concern when maternal health is not at risk. See Roe, 410 U.S.
at 153 ("Maternity, or additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and
future... [and] the problem of bringing a child into a family already unable, psychologically
and otherwise, to care for it.") (emphasis added). See, e.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S at 179
(companion case to Roe v. Wade which contains Justice Douglas's concurring opinion in both
Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton). In Roe and Doe it was reasoned that women would be
"required to . . . abandon educational plans; sustain loss of income;
[and] forgo the
satisfactions of careers ..
" Doe, 410 U.S. at 215. In sum, fiscal concerns seem to be the
government's main concern after the health of the mother.
97. A recent increase in single men's claims that they were deceived into procreating
reenforces the presumption that single persons do not intend to procreate. Accord supra note
51. Although, when deciding whether a man voluntarily assumes parenthood, it could be
argued that both married and single men can involuntarily become parents, the presumptions
are stronger that a married man has intended to procreate because of the status relationship
he enters into when he marries. See supra note 50 (discussing statutory and social laws that
exhibit a married couple's intention to procreate). Therefore, a married man is more likely
to have voluntarily assumed the obligation to financially support his children. Accordingly,
child support statutes more likely work an unfairness toward single men--especially, those
single men who have not shown a voluntary intent to become parents by statutorily
legitimizing their offspring.
98. See 750 ILCS 5/505 (1993 & Supp. 1994) (establishing child support percentages);
750 ILCS 45/1.1 (1992) (recognizing the fight of every child to the physical, mental,
emotional and monetary support of its parents). See also In re Tilliski's Estate, 61 N.E.2d
24 (I11.1945) (allowing adopted child to inherit from a natural parent). Cf. Dwyer v. Dwyer,
10 N.E.2d 344, 346 (111.1937) (holding that a biological parent has a continued obligation
of support even after the adoption of his child). Accord Lingwall v. Hoener, 483 N.E.2d 512,
516 (III. 1985) (granting biological grandparents the right to visit their grandchild despite the
fact that their child's (the grandchild's parent's) parental rights were terminated through
adoption).
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responsibility attaches regardless of the man's original intentions to beget or
not beget the child. 99 In contrast, women are fiscally responsible for only
those children they choose to bring to term. This is pure gender discrimination.' °° Thus, if the child support statutes themselves can be shown to be
unconstitutionally discriminatory toward unwed fathers who choose not to
beget their children, those portions of existing child support statutes could
be stricken. 10 ' Alternatively, if the statutes are not changed, putative
fathers who have not legitimized their children should be entitled to
procedural due process prior to being deprived of their right not to
procreate. 0 2 This approach would provide men with equal protection
99. Even in the adoption context, natural parents may continue to be held financially
responsible for a child they bore or begat. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Dwyer, 10 N.E.2d at 346:
An adoption of a child does not work a complete severance in the relationship
between the child and its natural parents. The duty of a parent to support his [or
her] minor child arises out of the natural relationship, and while that duty may also
be imposed upon the adoptive parents by statutory enactment, the natural parent
may, if necessity arises, be required to perform that duty.
Id.
100. Pure gender discrimination is distinguishable from non-pure gender discrimination.
In pure gender discrimination, a statutory burden applies to only one sex or the other. But
see Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484,494 (1974) (holding that the disallowance of pregnancy
benefits to female state employees was not gender discrimination since male employees with
pregnant wives were equally affected). See also Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442
U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (holding that although a statute favoring the hiring of Veterans first had
the impact of hiring men first, the statute did not discriminate against women since some
women are veterans). Both Geduldig and Feeney are examples of non-pure discrimination.
Note, however, that only women can legally avoid parentage after conception because only
a woman may become pregnant and seek an abortion.
101. This author would not advocate removing any of a married father's obligations
regardless of his intentions. As noted earlier in this comment, the law places certain
obligations upon men who voluntarily enter into status relationships such as marriage. See
supra note 48. His obligations are based upon his married status.
Also, in terms of the legal validity of providing procedural due process to some unmarried
fathers and not to others see Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 537 (1971), which upheld a
state inheritance law which differentiated between legitimated and non-legitimated decedents
as a means of demonstrating the testator's intent in the event that he was to die intestate. See
also Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 352-53 (1979) (differentiating between fathers who
have and those who have not legitimated their out-of-wedlock children as a pre-requisite for
the father maintaining a cause of action for wrongful death of his child).
102. For example, the Constitution requires that the government provide its citizens with
procedural due process prior to the deprivation of a liberty or property interest. U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV. Accordingly, prior to an adoption of a biological father's child, or as a part of
the termination of parental rights, a parent must be given notice and a opportunity to respond.
See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 (1972); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-45
(1976) (formulating a balancing test). Similarly, as a means of protecting a man's right to
avoid procreation, a single man should be entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard

1994:141]

MEN'S REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS

under present child support laws. As a result, unmarried men (not intending
to procreate) would be able to enforce their implied contracts not to
procreate by legally terminating their parental rights and obligations prior
toviability, as women are presently allowed to do through abortion.0 3
An equal protection and fundamental rights analysis must also be
applied when addressing a man's right to actually beget his child.'" To
before a child is born. If his intentions are known prior to the child's birth, and he.chooses
not to procreate, a woman carrying a fetus he did not intend to create would have the
assurance of knowing that the putative father's parental rights would be terminated prior to
the birth of the child, thus rendering any decision she would make regarding a subsequent
adoption by a spouse or an adoptive couple significantly more secure. See, e.g., In re Doe,
638 N.E.2d 181 (III. 1994) (The Baby "Richard" case). Cf 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (1994) (the
"Baby Richard law").
103. See generally supra note 96 (discussing that a woman's financial concerns are
likely a main reason for her right to terminate a pregnancy). Analogous concerns may apply
to an unmarried man, but the courts have given men no analogous right. See Monica
Fountain, Tape of Schivall Shows 'Hit' Setup, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 17, 1994, Chicagoland, at I.
As a recent example, a nineteen-year old Chicagoland youth was charged with
attempted murder and attempted intentional homicide of an unborn child for allegedly trying
to have his pregnant girlfriend shot in the stomach. See Monica Fountain, Man Charged in
an Attempt on Fetus' Life, CH. TRIB., August 16, 1994, Chicagoland. at 4. Contrary to
Schwall's wishes, the girlfriend, whom he had dated for about nine months, would not agree
to have an abortion or place the child up for adoption. See id. at 8. See also Steve Mills &
Monica Fountain, Wihnette Suspect Had Big Dreams, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 12, 1994,
Chicagoland, at 7.
On a videotape, Schwall said the pregnancy was going to ruin "18 years of [his]
life." Fountain, Tape of Schwall at 8. A local police officer involved with the case stated that
"In his mind, I think [Schwall] just ran out of options of what to do." Mills, Wihnette
Suspect Had Big Dreams, at 7.
The boy was described as being "hard-working," "devoutly religious" and a person
who "couldn't stand the thought of killing." Fountain, Tape of Schwall at 1. According to the
boy's father, "[Schwall] couldn't figure out how he could go to school and earn enough
money to pay the bills for the baby.... He was backed into a corner. He snapped." Id. Mills
& Fountain, Wilmette Suspect Had Big Dreams at 1.
104. In both Supreme Court dicta and several lower court opinions, the judiciary have
relied on Roe as establishing an individual fundamental right to refuse to terminate a
pregnancy, a right derived from the right to terminate one. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
112 S.Ct. 2791, 2811 (1992). See also id. at 2840 n.3 (Steven, J.,
concurring in part) ("[A]
state interest in population control could not justify a state-imposed limitation on family size
or, for that matter, state-mandated abortions."). Accord Arnold v. Board of Educ. of Escambia
Co., 880 F.2d 305, 311-12 (11 th Cir. 1989) (holding that state officials violate the state and
federal Constitutions when they force minors to have abortions); Avery v. County of Burke,
660 F.2d 111, 115 (4th Cir. 1981) (forbidding a county agency from forcing an unwanted
sterilization upon a teenage girl). Equal protection would require men to have a similar right
to refuse to have the government interfere in reproductive decision-making either for or
against procreation.
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enforce such a right, the Supreme Court would need to recognize that
present federal abortion laws deprive married men of equal protection in
their fundamental right to procreate. With such recognition, state courts
would be allowed to issue and enforce injunctions protecting a man's
procreative interests. "35
The above-mentioned implied contracts and their suggested remedies
set forth the scope of men's reproductive rights proposed in this comment."1 6 For the states to have the ability to effectuate these rights, the
government would be required to intervene in two main areas. First, the
government would need to legislate a means by which eligible men would
have procedural due process so that they could legally waive their parental
rights and obligations prior to viability of the fetus (or at least shortly after
birth). 107 Second, the Supreme Court must grant state courts the authority
to issue injunctions preventing married women from unjustifiably terminating pregnancies in which their husbands have asserted an interest in the
developing offspring.'
Both governmental interventions would require interfering with existing
rights; one, with the child's statutory right to receive monetary support from
a biological father; °9 and the other, with a pregnant woman's right to seek
105. See infra note 417 for a legal argument that could be utilized to strike those
portions of present abortion statutes which deprive men of their right to procreate.
106. See generally Part A.
107. Compare In re Baby M., 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. 1987) with Johnson v. Calvert, 851
P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993). In Baby M., the court suggested that in some instances it would
violate public policy for an individual to terminate parental rights prior to the birth of a child
where there was an adoption statute which required a mandatory waiting petiod after the
birth of a child but prior to its adoption. Baby M. at 1157. In Johnson, however, the
California Supreme Court ruled that a surrogacy contract which allowed a surrogate mother
to waive her rights to raise the child she bore, was not "on its face, inconsistent with public
policy." Johnson, at 783. The Johnson court declared that the surrogate was not the genetic,
biological or natural mother of a child she bore to term. Id. at 778. Therefore, the California
Supreme Court held the surrogate's contractual waiver of the right to raise the child she bore
was valid. Id. at 778. Notably, any right to raise the child had been contractually waived
prior to the birth of the child. Id.
108. See generally infra note 417. Also, it is assumed in this section that the husband
is the biological father of the fetus. However, even if the husband is not the natural father,
it might still be claimed that the father could have an interest in any child born to his wife
during their marriage. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D.. 491 U.S. 110, 124-25, 127 (1989).
But see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2828 (suggesting that many women who
would not notify their husbands of an abortion would do so because the pregnancy was the
result of an extramarital affair). Resolution of the issue of whether a married man would have
rights to a fetus he did not produce are beyond the scope of this comment.
109. E.g., 750 ILCS sec. 5/505 (1994) (listing guidelines for child support payments in
the State of Illinois).
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an abortion."' The state, nevertheless, is capable of depriving private

citizens of what otherwise would be a constitutional or a statutory right,

provided the state gives an appropriate quid pro quo". for the warranted
deprivation of the person's liberty interests. In sum, where an unmarried
couple has the presumed intent not to procreate, or where a married couple
has the presumed intent to procreate, the government should be entitled to
enforce the couple's implied reproductive agreements provided certain quid
2
pro quo conditions have been met."
B. PROVIDING WOMEN WITH A QUID PRO QUO

In order to fairly effectuate men's reproductive rights, a woman must
be given some sort of quid pro quo" 3 for the state's requirement that she
forego either the right to an abortion (if she was married and presumably
intended to procreate) or the right to file a paternity suit on behalf of her
child (if she was single at the time of conception and the couple presumably
intended not to procreate)." 4 For example, the state could fairly require
110. See generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); Planned
Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
111. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983) (allowing the state, as a
public safety measure, to confine a mental patient who committed a crime for a period longer
than a prisoner would have been confined for the same crime). But see Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307, 316-18 (1982) (requiring the state to provide individuals who are involuntarily
committed with reasonably safe conditions of confinement, freedom from unreasonable bodily
restraints and minimally adequate training as a condition of their confinement). See also
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 675-76 (1977) (holding that students are not entitled to
notice and hearing prior to corporal punishment by public school officials, as local commonlaw remedies assure adequate constraints on the 6fficials); Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308,
320 (1975) (allowing public school officials the discretion to deprive students of a free public
education by suspending them from school, so long as the officials' acts are not malicious).
Cf. Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 268 (1984) (allowing the pretrial detention of juveniles
based on a finding that there is a serious risk of the youth committing what would be
considered an adult crime should the juvenile be released).
112. See supra note I I I (describing valid deprivations of otherwise fundamental rights).
113. Id. Black's Law Dictionary defines quid pro quo as follows:
"What for what; something for something. Used in the law for giving one valuable thing for
another. It is nothing more than the mutual consideration which passes between the parties
to a contract, and which renders it valid and binding." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1248 (6th
ed. 1990).
114. It is substantially easier for a biological father to claim he owes no support duty
to a former sexual partner who has become pregnant contraceptives have failed than it is for
him to claim that the resulting child itself is not entitled to support. See generally Oklahoma
Dep't of Human Serv. v. T.D.G. 861 P.2d 990, 994 (Okla 1993). It is assumed that innocent
parties should not be punished for the conditions in which they find themselves. Cf Plyler
v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). In Plyler, an illegal alien's right to a free public education (an
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the following exchange: that a single pregnant woman release a paternity
claim against a single biological father in exchange for his payment of the
mother's medical costs associated with the pregnancy, her lost wages and
all other costs needed to compensate her for either an abortion or the
adoption of the child." 5 If a man were given notice and an opportunity to
waive his parental rights and obligations prior to viability, the above
exchange would provide a male progenitor with a right equal to that of the
6
pregnant woman in both the abortion and the adoption settings." Furthermore, the pregnant woman would retain the ability to decide whether or not
to bear the child."17 Moreover, if she did bear the child, but decided to
place it up for adoption, adoptive couples would have greater security in the
finality of the adoption because they would have received both biological
parents' consent to adopt." 8 This comment will refer to the single man's
entitlement) was at stake, not the deprivation of another party's constitutional rights (the
father's right to avoid procreation).
A more reasonable approach to take in child support matters would be to have rights
and responsibilities correspond with one another. See, e.g., Arthur Corbin, Legal Analysis
and Terminology, 29 YALE L.J. 163 (1919-20) (describing tort correlatives of right and duty;
privilege and no-right; power and liability; and immunity and disability). Notably, in some
jurisdictions, only a father who legitimizes his child has certain rights to that child. See, e.g.,
Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. 347, 353 (1979). Therefore, it logically follows that only those
men who have rights should have the duties associated with those rights. One dissenting
justice in a recent opinion agreed. See Oklahoma Dep't of Human Serv. v. T.D.G., 861 P.2d
at 994. "Because T.D.G. and K.A.G. were never married, there was no legal presumption that
T.D.G. was the father." Id. at 996. (Watt, J., dissenting) He never adopted the child, nor had
he.ever been declared its father. Id. T.D.G. had no legal rights to the child, therefore he
should have had no support obligations. The same should hold true for any man who would
choose not to procreate.
115. Compare supra note 111, listing other deprivations which are warranted provided
certain safeguards are afforded.
116. For instance, a pregnant woman may absolve herself of her parental duties by
aborting a fetus prior to its viability, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
or by consenting to the child's adoption after it is born. See generally 750 ILCS 50/1-24
(1994).
117. A pregnant woman clearly has the right to refuse medical treatment. See In re
Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326, 330 (III. App. Ct. 1994) (relying on Cruzan v. Director Mo.
Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990)).
118. See Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. at 266. The Court in Lehr stated that the
following were valid state interests: "the best interests of the child," protection of the "rights
of interested third parties" and "promptness and finality" in the adoption process. Id. In
addition, recent legal battles over the validity of adoptions point to the crucial importance
of adoptive parents obtaining a valid consent to adopt (or declaration of unfitness) from both
biological parents and not just from the mother. See In re Doe, 624 N.E.2d 807 (Il. App. Ct.
1993). reversed in 638 N.E.2d 181 (1994) (the infamous baby "Richard" case, in which the
Illinois Supreme Court ordered that a three and one half year old child be given back to a

1994:1411

MEN'S REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS

ability to waive his parental rights and obligations as the "male abortion
option".
Legislating a "male abortion option" could serve three purposes. First,
it could create a means by which an impoverished woman could afford to
abort a fetus or pay for the prenatal care needed to place her offspring up
for adoption if she neither intended to procreate nor could afford to raise the
child herself." 9 Second, the "male abortion option" could place the costs
of caring for a child with the party who ultimately decides (and who most
may avoid) bringing the child to term--the child's mother. 20 Finally, the
"option" could allow for equal application of the right not
to procreate, as
well as equal application of child support obligations, regardless of a
person's gender.
As a corollary requirement, when a couple is married and presumed to
have intended to conceive a child, the state will have a much more difficult
task providing a quid pro quo for a woman who is required to carry her
pregnancy to term. The difficulty arises because of the holdings in Planned
,Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 21 and Planned
Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth. 22 The Supreme Court, in the
two preceding cases, made it clear that a state may not require a woman to
give notice to her husband, 23 or to require his consent 24 prior to an
abortion. Hence, as long as a woman remains silent, or a man in no other

biological father the child has never met because the lower courts erred in declaring the
father unfit); In re Baby Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649, 660 (Mich. 1993) (the baby "Jessica"
case, requiring foster parents to return "Jessica" to her biological parents because the father
never validly waived his parental rights). But see Rivera-Berrios v. Adoption Centre, Inc.,
617 So. 2d 1067 (Fla. 1993) (refusing to allow. a natural father to invalidate the adoption of
his child when the birth mother deceitfully listed the wrong father on the birth certificate);
accord Unwed Father v. Unwed Mother, 379 N.E.2d 467, 470 (Ind. App. Ct. 1978).
119. This purpose is generally supported by the Supreme Court's societal interest in
saving the government's limited entitlement funds. See, e.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S.
91, 103 (1982). The state has an interest in "reduc[ing] the number of individuals forced to
enter the welfare rolls." Id. at 103.
120. While both a man and a woman may utilize contraceptives, only a woman can
prevent the eventual birth of a child and the subsequent decision of whether to parent it.
Moreover, while impoverished women do not have the resources to obtain an abortion,
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 308-09 (1980) (finding that entitlement programs were not
required to cover the cost of abortions regardless of the fact that they may cover the cost of
childbirth), they nonetheless still retain the ability to consent to an adoption of children they
are unable to raise.
121. 112 S.Ct. 2791 (1992).
122. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
123. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2831.
124. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 71.
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way acquires knowledge that he may be allowed to assert his rights, a
woman's constitutional right to privacy and autonomy in decision-making' protects her in deciding whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
On the other hand, if she voluntarily informs her husband, or if he obtains
constructive knowledge of her condition, as a matter of equal protection, he
to procreate. 26
should be permitted to assert his constitutional right
27
Significantly, he should be able to protect the "society"'1 of his future
offspring with a restraining order. Since the Danforth and Casey holdings
only apply to blanket vetoes created by statutory notice or consent
provisions, 12 1 these provisions do not necessarily address the valid interests
who asserts he has already received notice of a pending
of a husband
29
1
pregnancy.
In order to protect a man's right to procreate and comply with the
rationales in Roe v. Wade and PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, concerning the
30
social and economic equality of women,' a state court would have to
guarantee that the putative father would incur all costs associated with his
wife's pregnancy, labor and delivery, as well as provide for the physical
131
Similarly, in the
care and financial support of the child after birth.
that the father32
assure
to
duty
a
have
child's best interests, the state would
in the fetus.
interest
superior
a
him
granting
would be a fit parent before
125. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).

126. See infra note 417 (discussing an argument for the equality of reproductive rights).
127. See cases cited supra note 28 (describing various associational rights a father has
regarding his unborn child).
128. See W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS sec. 3 (5th

ed. 1984): "In tort law, as in other fields, courts are obliged with exceptions founded in
constitutional law, to follow statutory mandates. Every statute, however, leaves gaps [with]
...unanswered questions [for] the courts [to resolve]." Id. at 19. Accord Rose v. Lundry,
455 U.S. 509, 516-18 (1982).
129. See generally infra Part C of this comment.
130. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2089; Roe, 410 U.S. at 215.
(Douglas, J., concurring in Doe v. Bolton).
131. In essence, he would be adopting his own child to relieve his wife of the
imposition of the physical, psychological and emotional burdens of child care. Cf Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 215 (1973). Accordingly, he could also reap the rewards of his child's

society. Whether a woman in such a situation would then retain any of her parental rights

and obligations is beyond the scope of this comment. It could probably be argued that if she
were compelled to carry a child to full term she would have been deprived of her right not
to procreate. Therefore, she should not have any parental obligations. Nonetheless, if a
married man retains his support obligations because of his marital status (regardless of what
his procreative intentions might have been), it would be unequal to allow a married woman
to completely terminate her parental obligations because she was required to give birth to a
child she did not intend to procreate.
132. It would be of sufficient concern to the state to require that a man be a fit parent
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These requirements could likely provide the quid pro quo needed to address
the social and economic concerns raised by the Supreme Court when it gave
its rationale for a woman's right to decide to terminate her pregnancy. 33
Unfortunately for married men, it appears that the man's right to
procreate and his right to the "society" of his future child might more easily
be asserted in a divorce context than it would within marriage.' 34 As a
matter of practicality, it would be difficult for a man to assure a court that
all child-rearing responsibilities after birth would fall upon the man if he and
his wife cohabited and remained married. He would actually have to hire a
care-giver or post bond for the costs of child-care to prove to the court that
the quid pro quo proposed in this comment would be met.' 35 On the other
hand, if the couple were. divorcing, the man could more easily assure the
court that the child would not live in a hostile home environment in which
a mother was forced to bear and raise a child against her will. 136
Before a state could, legislate a "male abortion option" or issue a
restraining order enjoining a pregnant woman from wrongfully terminating
her pregnancy, the state courts and legislatures would have to provide legal
justifications for their actions. 37 The remainder of this comment explores
before a pregnant mother could be asked to carry a child to term. If she were required to give
birth, and he were subsequently declared unfit, she would risk having to raise the child
herself in the event that an agency did not approve the child's adoption. See Ruth H.
Axelrod, Note, Whose Womb is it Anyway: Are Paternal Rights Alive and Well Despite
Danforth?, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 685, 706 (1990). See also Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207
(1927) (holding that protecting the state from being glutted with the children of misfit parents
is a legitimate state interest). Cf infra note 302, point no. 11 (regarding criteria suggested
by one trial judge for balancing maternal and paternal rights).
133. See infra notes 333-36 (discussing the social and economic premises surrounding
a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy). See also supra note 96 and Part IV. B of this
comment (concluding that a pregnant woman's predominant interests are economic and
health-related).
134. Although the converse might also apply, since a divorcing woman would probably
be more likely to need employment, therefore making a pregnancy a definite obstacle to her
obtaining work. Also, a pregnancy which occurred during a pending divorce or separation
may have occurred when the parties were desiring to be single and therefore had no intent
to procreate.
135. Such proof would not be impossible to provide since courts routinely require
parties to show what provisions will be made for children as a matter of deciding custody
disputes.
136. See supra note 131 (leaving open the question of whether the father, who now
would have custody of the child, could seek support from the child's mother, or whether he
could place the child for adoption without her consent).
137. See, e.g., Conn v. Conn, 526 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. 1988) (Pivarnek, J.dissenting)
(stating that the "ultimate decision [of whether the state courts may issue such orders] rests
with the United States Supreme Court.").
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the legal justifications for men's reproductive rights.
III. A MAN'S RIGHT TO AVOID PROCREATION
A. ORIGIN
38
Constitutionally, men have a fundamental right both to procreate'
and to avoid procreation.' 39 An example of a man's right to avoid procre14
in the relatively recent in-vitro fertilization 0 case of
ation can be found
41

Davis v. Davis.

1

Davis addressed a divorcing couple's complicated legal dispute
42
regarding the disposition of their frozen pre-embryos.1 Mrs. Davis, who
143
frozen embryos,
the
producing
in
clearly contributed the greater efforts
desired to have them implanted into an infertile adoptive couple.'" Mr.
Davis, on the other hand, not wishing to have the psychological burden or
that might
possible future financial responsibility for the child or children
46
destroyed.
result, 4 5 desired to have all seven pre-embryos

138. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 543-44 (1942). See also Buck v. Bell, 274
U.S. 200, 207 (1927).

139. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 589 (Tenn. 1992). A man has a "constitutionally protected right not to beget a child where no pregnancy has taken place." Id. at 589.

140. In-vitro fertilization is a procedure by which a woman's egg is removed from her

body around the time of ovulation and joined with a man's sperm. See generally Davis v.
Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 591 (Tenn. 1992). The joinder usually takes place in a petri dish
where, if successful, a pre-embryo is formed. Id. The pre-embryos are frozen and later
inserted into the woman's uterus. If implantation takes place, the woman becomes pregnant.

Id.

141. Id.
142. Id. at 589.
143. Id. at 601. In discussing the physical distress and emotional discomfort women

experience during the in-vitro procedure ("IVP"), the court stated, "it is fair to say that
women contribute more to the IVP process than men." Id. See also id. at 604 (mentioning
the lengthy IVP procedures Mrs. Davis underwent, in vain). Accord Seibel, A New Era in
Reproductive Technology; In-Vitro Fertilization, Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer, and
Donated Gamete and Embryos, 318 NEW. ENG. J.OF MED. 828, 829-30 (1989) (describing
the painful, expensive and emotionally burdensome procedure involved in egg "harvesting",
which requires a woman to undergo daily monitoring during the period prior to the egg
retrieval procedure and bedrest for two to three days following each laparoscopy).
144. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 590 (Tenn. 1992). Originally, Mrs. Davis wanted
the frozen pre-embryos implanted into her own uterus after her divorce from Mr. Davis was
final. Id. at 589. Mr. Davis, on the other hand, needed to decide "whether or not he wanted
to become a parent outside the bounds of marriage." Id.
145. Id. at 603. As a child, Junior Davis endured considerable psychological trauma as
the result of being separated from his parents. Id. at 604. When Junior Davis was five years
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In deciding who should receive the pre-embryos, the trial court awarded
sole possession to Mrs. Davis. 47 On appeal, however, the intermediate
court reversed, noting that the two parties "share[d] an interest in the seven
fertilized ova."' 48 The appellate court, in effect, awarded "joint custody"
of the pre-embryos to both parties. At the state supreme court level, the
Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed the Tennessee Court of Appeal's
underlying decision, but ruled that, under the circumstances, Mrs. Davis did
not have a sufficient interest in giving the pre-embryos up for adoption
which would supersede her husband's competing constitutional right not to
procreate. 4 9 Consequently, the Tennessee Supreme Court ruled in favor
of the man's right not to procreate by allowing the pre-embryos to expire
by remaining frozen beyond their usable capacity."S The United States
Supreme Court denied certiorari to review Tennessee's decision.5
An important rule of law which Davis sets forth is that a man "has a
constitutionally protected right not to beget a child when no pregnancy has
taken place."'152 As part of this right, it is significant to note that, in Davis,
the man's decision not to beget a child superseded that of the woman's
desire to donate the pre-embryos to an adoptive couple. 53 The man's
triumph in this case is especially important because under one legal theory-the "sweat equity" theory'"--in a couple's dispute over the disposition of
old, his parents divorced and his mother subsequently suffered a nervous breakdown. Id. at
603. He and three of his five siblings were placed in a home for boys where, although Junior
Davis had monthly visits with his mother, he only saw his father on three occasions before
his father died in 1976. Id. Junior Davis testified that it was "especially hard to leave his
mother after each monthly visit" and that he "suffered because of his lack of opportunity to
establish a relationship with his parents and particularly because of the absence of his father".
Id. at 604. Understandingly, Mr. Davis was "vehemently opposed to fathering a child that
would not live with both parents." Id. Similarly, to allow his offspring to be placed for
adoption would "rob him twice" because he would lose his procreative autonomy and his
relationship with his offspring. Id.
146. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 590. Junior Davis testified that if the embryos were allowed
to develop into children, he would have fought for custody. Id. He preferred however that
they be destroyed before they be placed for adoption with a childless couple. Id. at.589.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 589.
149. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
150. Id. at 605.
151. Stowe v. Davis, 113 S. Ct. 1259 (1993).
152. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589. "[lit is sufficient to note that, whatever its ultimate
constitutional boundaries, the right of procreational autonomy is composed of two rights of
equal significance--the right to procreate and the right to avoid procreation. Undoubtedly,
both are subject to protections and limitations." Id. at 601.
153. Id. at 604.
154. John A. Robertson, Resolving Disputes Over Frozen Enmbryos, 19-6 HASTINGS
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their frozen embryos, the woman's decision should always prevail.
According to the "sweat equity" theory, since as between the two spouses,
the woman provides the greater bodily contribution to the in-vitro process,
she should have the superior right to decide how to dispose of the couple's
frozen embryos.' Similar reasoning is given by the Supreme Court when
it generally confers an overriding power to5 6 a pregnant woman to decide
whether or not to bear a child to full term.1
57
equity" theory.
The Tennessee Supreme Court rejected the "sweat
Instead, it concluded that the parties' possessory rights should be determined
on a case-by-case basis. 58a Prior to deciding which party would prevail, the
court considered the parties' interests in the pre-embryos rather than the
59
parties' biological efforts in the creation of the pre-embryos., In the end,
prevailed.160
Mr. Davis's more compelling interests in avoiding procreation
The constitutional right to avoid procreation where no pregnancy has
taken place is derived from earlier U.S. Supreme Court decisions which
guaranteed the right to procreate. 16 ' The right to procreate was first clearly
established in Skinner v. Oklahoma 62 where the Court determined that
"marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival
of the race."'' 63 Later, in Griswold v. Connecticut,'" the Supreme Court
broadened the right to include a right not to procreate. This was done by
CENTER REP. 7, (Nov.- Dec. 1989).
155. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604. See also supra note 143 and accompanying text
(discussing the discomfort and inconvenience a woman goes through during the in-vitro
process).
156. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976) ("[A]s it is the
woman who ... is more directly ... affected .... the balance weighs in her favor."):
157. "We conclude, instead, that we must weigh the interests of each party to the
dispute, in terms of the facts and analysis set out below, in order to resolve that dispute in
a fair and responsible manner." (emphasis added) Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 591.
158. Id. at 591, 603.
159. id. at 604. The Tennessee Supreme Court concluded that it would resolve frozen
embryo disputes in the following order: (I) by looking at the preferences of the progenitors;
(2) by considering any prior agreements between the parties; and (3) by considering the
relative interests of the parties in using or not using the pre-embryos. Id. Ordinarily, the party
desiring to avoid procreation should prevail, unless the other party cannot procreate by any
other reasonable means. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 601. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). See also Buck v.
Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
162. Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.
163. Id. In invalidating a statute that authorized the sterilization of certain classes of
criminals, the Supreme Court referred to the right to procreate as "one of the basic civil
rights of man." id.
164. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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invalidating a statute prohibiting married individuals from using contraceptives.'o The right to avoid procreation was further broadened in Eisenstadt v. Baird'66 when the Court extended the right to unmarried individuals
as well as to spouses.' 67 The Eisenstadt Court stated:
the marital couple is not an independent entity with a
mind and heart of its own, but an association of two
individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional
make-up. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the
right of the individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child.' 6
Therefore, if it is the individual that the fundamental right to procreate
or avoid procreation was made to protect, no individual should be entitled
to automatically veto another's procreative decisions. However, as the law
exists today, women have acquired precisely that right--an automatic veto
over the man's decision." Because of this veto, under certain circumstances, when men and women disagree, the results of the women's decision
may be to impose a burden upon the man which the woman herself may not
be required to suffer. Below is a discussion of the discriminatory effects of
child support statutes on single men who do not wish to procreate, but
whose sexual partners decide otherwise.
B. DISCRIMINATORY EFFECT OF CHILD SUPPORT STATUTES

When a pregnant woman decides to carry a fetus to full-term while the
biological father has absolutely no desire of becoming a parent, she
unilaterally vetoes the man's decision to avoid procreation. 7 This veto of
the man's constitutional right alone does not constitute state action.
However, the government's requirement that a man pay mandatory child
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id.
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Id. at 453.
Id.
See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 93 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)

(opposing a woman's unilateral decision-making power in abortion situations). But see Davis
v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588. 604 (Tenn. 1992) (requiring the courts to balance the parties'
interests on a case-by-case basis when determining the disposition of frozen pre-embryos).

170. But see Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 591, 604 (Tenn. 1992) (suggesting the court

consider prior agreements, preferences of the progenitors and the parties' relative interests,
rather than merely deciding in-vitro disputes on the basis of a "sweat equity" theory in which
the woman would prevail in every case).
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support for children he did not choose to beget, while only requiring a

woman to financially support those children she actually decides to bear, has
the effect of placing an unequal statutory burden upon a man who desired
not to procreate. 7 ' The man in such an instance is deprived of his fundamental constitutional right to avoid procreation and is denied the same equal
protection given to all women who choose to terminate their pregnancies."'
If a man claims that a state child support statute is discriminatory, the
state would likely seek to rationalize its legislation by maintaining that the
child support statute is a facially neutral economic regulation that applies
73
equally to both men and women. The resulting effect of child support
statutes, however, is still that women will only be responsible to support
those children they have chosen to bear, while men are responsible for both
74
those children they have and those they have not chosen to beget.
75
Hence, these statutes have a discriminatory effect.'

171. For a statute to be discriminatory, a particular state action must burden the
complaining party on the basis of that party's protected classification status alone.
Furthermore, if the state is merely withholding a benefit from a class of persons rather than
imposing a burden upon them, the state's conduct is constitutional. Cf McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426-27 (1961) (deciding that a state action which withheld an
exemption from the Sunday work prohibition was constitutional); McDonald v. Board of
Election, 394 U.S. 802, 810-11 (1969) (deciding that withholding the right to a detained
prisoner's "absentee ballot" was the withholding of a benefit, not the unequal imposition of
a burden upon a protected class).
172. Cf Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-200 (1976) (requiring that the government
treat men and women equally where they are similarly situated)., Although one could argue
that a pregnant woman and a nonpregnant man are not similarly situated, a woman whose
birth control fails is identically situated to a man whose birth control fails, in that both will
become parents.
173. Cf generally Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (regulating the
licensing of optometrists as an economic function and holding that it was not discriminatory
to treat optometrists and ophthalmologists differently).
174. Men may usually only be absolved of their parental duties if they consent to their
child's adoption. Even in Illinois, a child's mother must consent first, Edmond v. Edmonds,
406 N.E.2d 231, 234 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980), be declared unfit, Markham v. Markham, 365
N.E.2d 308, 310 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977), or voluntarily give the child to the natural father before
he may seek to have it adopted out. See generally 750 ILCS 50/ID (1984). Furthermore, an
adoption may not necessarily relieve him of future support obligations. Dwyer v. Dwyer, 10
N.E.2d 344, 346 (11. 1937).
175. Cf Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 547-48 (1896) (holding that separate but
equal schooling was not discriminatory). But cf Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
493-94 (1954) (holding that separate educational facilities are inherently unequal because of
their discriminatory effects).
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In addition to claiming that the statutes are neutral, states would
possibly claim that child support statutes are enacted without a discriminatory intent.' 76 The state might assert that the discriminatory effects of the
legislation are coincidental, or de facto,"' and are part of the natural result
of a woman being able to legally terminate her pregnancy. 178 However,
a
woman may also terminate her support obligations by deciding to place
her
*child up for adoption. 79 The biological father may only employ such
an
option if the birth mother has been declared unfit, has already consented
to
an adoption of the child, or has died.' 80 Therefore, present child support
statutes are an intentional punishment to single men who do not desire
to
procreate, especially for those men whose contraceptives have failed.
No
similar punishment is directed towards women.'
Despite the discriminatory and punitive effects of child support statutes
on men, a representative of the state might suggest that the statutes
are
remedial or benign in nature so as to reverse the effects of long-standing
discrimination against women.8 2 However, child support may be awarded
to a woman regardless of her wealth or social position.18 3 Additionally, the
child support statutes tend to reinforce the stereotype that single men
are
irresponsible sexual aggressors who force upon unwed mothers the care and
custody of unwanted children.'" Such perceptions, combined with the lack
176. Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976) (requiring that disparate
effect
be caused by intentional discrimination on the part of the government
rather than by some
defacto effect actually caused by other factors).
177. Id.
178. The Illinois Parentage Act is gender-neutral when it speaks of a child
being entitled
to support from its parents, not just its father. 750 ILCS 45/1.1 (1984).
179. See supra note 174 (listing conditions under which a man may
consent to an
adoption of his child). See also 750 ILCS 45/8 (1984) (allowing a man two
years to establish
paternity or be barred from receiving visitation or custody rights).
180. See generally Illinois Adoption Act, 750 ILCS 50/1-24; Edmonds v.
Edmonds, 406
N.E.2d 231 (111.App. Ct. 1980); Markham v. Markham, 365 N.E.2d 308 (111.
App. Ct. 1977).
181. Some have argued that pregnancy, in and of itself, is a punishment.
See, e.g.,
Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464, 472-73 (1981). Nevertheless,
a woman may
avoid this burden through abortion. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112
S. Ct. 2791, 2807
(1992).
182. Cf Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977) (upholding a benign
Social Security
classification which favored female wage-earning recipients over male recipients
on the basis
of a history of past wage discrimination).
183. Cf Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 278-79 (1979) (striking down Alabama
laws which
required alimony payments of only men for similar reasons to those presented
in the above
text).
184. Although child support obligations apply to either parent, and not just
to the father,
the fact remains that our legal system has typically favored custody in
the woman, which
therefore logically leaves support obligations for the man. See Garska v.
McCoy, 278 S.E.2d
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of control men have in reproductive decisions, tend to create hostility

between the genders." 5 To avoid such tensions, men and women should
be treated equally, and child support obligations should only apply to those
men who legally or voluntarily undertake to become parents and not to
single men who assert a constitutional right to avoid procreation."'

Parte
357, 362-63 (W.Va. 1981) (favoring custody in the primary caretaker). See also Ex
tender-years
Alabama
the
that
(finding
1981)
(Ala.
695-96
686,
2d
So.
398
Devine,
in custody
presumption was unconstitutional gender discrimination for favoring women
Trenker,
R.
Thomas
(1978);
321
Q.
L.
FAM.
II
matters). But see Foster, Life with Father,
70
Cases,
Custody
Child
in
Presumption
or
Rule
Preference
Maternal
Modern Status of
District of
the
including
states,
four
twenty
1976
of
as
that
(indicating
(1976)
262
A.L.R.
for Women v.
Columbia, still favored the tender-years presumption). Cf. Mississippi Univ.
of allowing
policy
school's
nursing
a
down
Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725-26 (1982) (striking
the
reinforce
to
served
only
which
classification
gender
-a
being
as
only women to attend,
464, 472-73
U.S.
450
Ct.,
Superior
v.
M.
Michael
nurses);
be
should
women
that
stereotypes
minor females).
(1981) (subjecting only minor males to prosecution for statutory rape and not
dissenting),
P.J.,
(Tully,
1993)
Cf. also In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 663-64 (111. App. Ct.
(1994):
181
reversed in 638 N.E.2d
The laws [pertaining to parental] unfitness ... were originally written to protect
women at a time in our history when single mothers were deserted or abandoned
after impregnation and out of a lack of economic resources and societal taboos
were forced to sign away their parental fights to a 'proper family.' We are now,
for better or worse, in the era of Murphy Brown, where many women are choosing
single motherhood and either deserting the natural father or abrogating any rights
of the father by signing adoption consents or raising the child without ever
informing the father of his legal status.
In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d at 664. If the above quote is accurate, is it then fair for a single
to seek
woman who decides to keep a child, regardless of her sexual partner's 'decision,
herself?
child
the
support from him if she someday cannot afford to raise
185. See Vincent Rue, Forgotten Fathers: Men and Abortion. Life Cycle Books (1986).
Dr. Rue describes the inequities in reproductive decisions as having the "potential to breed
displaced male aggression via child abuse, spousal abuse or self-abuse." Id. at 2. In his
clinical experience, "men become hostile when they have been excluded from decisionmaking and when they discover they have been deceived and manipulated." Id. See also
Lance Morrow, Men, Are They Really That Bad?, TIME, Feb. 14, 1993, at 53 (depicting a
The
pig dressed in a suit on the cover-page): "What explains male violence toward women?
The
Mother?
at
anger
fact men can get away with it so often? Some residual infantile
58.
at
Id.
powerlessness?"
of
sense
their
inherent viciousness of men? Or, more plausibly,
youth
Wilmette
(describing
103
note
supra
see
For a timely example of such aggression,
charged with attempted murder of a fetus).
186. This proposed interpretation would make child support statutes consistent with
interpretations regarding out-of-wedlock fathers in other areas of the law, such as in the areas
of wrongful death, inheritance and child custody. See generally Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S.
347 (1979); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110
(1989).

1994:141]

-994:141

IMP'

Dl DDn'%")l,.nr

,,,L.,,IL.I1JL

nt

l,

)

177

C. THE "MALE ABORTION OPTION"

One proposed method of protecting a man's right to avoid procreation
is for the state to require a pregnant single woman who will be seeking
child
support to, sometime prior to viability, notify the putative father
of her
intent to carry the pregnancy to full-term.8 7 Upon notice, the father
could
decide whether or not he also wishes to beget the child. If so, he could
then
begin to seek custody, visitation or any other rights to which he
may
be
entitled.' 88 However, should the male progenitor decide instead
that he
does not wish to beget a child, he could waive his parental
rights and
obligations by paying the appropriate fees for a "male abortion."' 89
The
man could be required to make his decision prior to viability
so that if his
decision to "abort" affects the woman's decision, she
may still have

sufficient time to decide whether or not to terminate the pregnancy.' 9°
The
"male abortion option" would allow both single men
and women to have
similar fundamental rights. Both genders could avoid procreation
without the
man or the state forcing a woman to undergo unwanted medical
treatment. 91
187. If a birth mother wants nothing to do with her child's father,
she need not contact
him for support. Although this does not solve the baby "Richard"
dilemma, see supra note
184 (dissenting opinion), it may serve to protect the privacy of a woman
who has been raped.
188. Requiring a pregnant woman to provide actual notice of her
intent to seek child
support prior to a child's birth would address some of the concerns
the dissenting justice in
the baby "Richard" case had about men whose rights are being abrogated
in many adoption
cases. See In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 663-66 (1994). See also
20/20 (ABC television
broadcast, Aug. 19, 1994). In an interview between Barbara Walters
and the adoptive parents
of baby "Richard", the couple stated they were told that in approximately
50% of all adoption
cases, a biological father has not consented to the adoption of his
child. Since the initial
writing of this comment, Illinois enacted the Putative F"ather Registry.
See 735 ILCS 5/21401 (1994); 750 ILCS 50/1 (1994). Registry forms may also be acquired
by calling 1-800420-2574.
189. See generally supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text,
outlining the proposed
requirements for the "male abortion option."
190. Requiring the man to make his procreative decision prior to
viability would also
save a pregnant woman the trouble of attempting to discern whether
she would be spending
fruitless time and energy seeking to collect child support and
establish a parenting
arrangement with a person who does not want to be part of her
or her child's life. Armed
with such knowledge, she may instead choose to abort, place
the child for adoption, or
proceed to have another man marry her and adopt the child without
further formality. But cf
750 ILCS 5/9 (1993) (allowing a biological father 72 hours after
his child's birth to revoke
his consent to the child's adoption).
191. A man would likely never be able to force a woman to have
an abortion because
of her right to refuse medical treatment. See, e.g., Doe v. Doe,
632 N.E.2d 326, 330 (III.
App. Ct. 1994) (refusing to compel a pregnant mother to undergo
a cesarian section). See
also supra note 104.
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D. ENFORCING THE OPTION

One anticipated problem with enforcing a "male abortion option" would
be that of discerning who the father was if a woman had been sexually
active with several men. Nevertheless, borrowing from other areas of family
law, notably adoption and paternity actions, a system could be established
whereby all putative fathers would be given notice and an opportunity to
9
respond within a prescribed period of time." If the mother refused to give
notice, she would waive her right to file a paternity suit, and would
93
therefore be responsible for the full monetary support of her child.
Similarly, if the father failed to respond, he would waive the ability to waive
his parental rights and support obligations and would thereafter be liable for
the usual statutory child support amounts unless the child were placed for
adoption. "
In practice, each suspected progenitor could retain his abortion option
by posting a bond
by placing the appropriate "abortion" fee in escrow, or
95
Once a sample of
aborted.
were
fetus
until the child were born or the
body, the court
woman's
the child's blood became available outside the
96
could determine who the actual father was by DNA testing, and those
97
men who were precluded from paternity could have their fees returned.

to
192. See, e.g., Illinois Adoption Act, 750 ILCS 50/12(a)(2) (1994) (requiring notice
putative father prior to adoption of his child).
193. If a birth mother is indigent, the Supreme Court has founda compelling interest
This
in having both natural parents support their out-of-wedlock child. See supra notes 91-92.
natural
between
differentiate
which
holdings
Court
Supreme
other
with
inconsistent
is
holding
supra
parents who have, and those who have not shown an intent to be parents. See generally
note 186.
346 (III.
194. See 750 ILCS 5/505 (1994). But see Dwyer v. Dwyer, 10 N.E.2d 344,
have a
to
continue
may
out
adopted
are
children
whose
parents
natural
1937) (holding that
support obligation if the need arises).
195. E.g., 65 ILCS 5/9-2-140 (1994) (requiring a party wishing to appeal a judgment
to post a bond).
see,
196. Although the reliability of DNA testing may still be a question for the jury,
find
generally
experts
e.g., People v. Mehlberg, 618 N.E.2d 1168, 1195 (Ii. App. Ct. 1993),
v.
Aroonsakul
See
identification.
and
the tests to be reliable for purposes of paternity
1987).
Ct.
App.
(III.
4
Flanagan, 507 N.E.2d I,
Testing
197. This author would advocate only returning the fees for the "abortion" itself.
in
engaging
by
fees would be the result of an assumed risk a man would undertake
pregnancy,
of
burdens
emotional
unprotected sexual intercourse, just as the physical and
abortion or adoption are the risks a woman undertakes when she engages in unprotected
sexual intercourse.
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E. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

It could be argued that legislating the "male abortion option" would be
poor public policy because it would encourage unmarried men to abandon
long-term responsibility for children they participated in creating. Nonetheless, the same assertion holds true for women who assert their abortion
rights--the purpose of which goes toward providing the progenitor with
an

alternative to childbirth and the post-birth burdens of parenthood if birth

control fails. 98
One might also suggest that the "male abortion option" would increase
entitlements needed to support single mothers and their out-of-wedlock
children if the mother chooses to bear the child despite the man's exercise
of his "option."' 99 The state, however, would not necessarily be required
to increase entitlements. Although such a policy might seem to be hard
on
the single mother, it would place the financial burden on the person
who
made the decision to bear the child and the one more able to prevent
the
child's actual birth.200 The "male abortion option" might actually reduce
entitlements and illegitimacy by encouraging single women to utilize
more
effective birth control. 22 The option might also lead single women
to be
198. Most women seek abortions to avoid having a child born at a particular
time in
their lives, not to avoid the process of pregnancy and childbirth itself.
See Aida Torres &
Jaqueline D. Forrest, Why Do Women Have Abortions?, 20 FAM. PLAN.
PERSP. 169 (1988).
199. An increase in entitlements is unlikely. The trend has been toward
finding means
to reduce such payments. For instance, in 1991, the government spent
1.8 billion dollars
under the Child Support Enforcement Program to collect 1.9 billion dollars
worth of unpaid
child support. By doing so, the government recovered 10.7% of what it
had paid out through
AFDC. See U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Serv., Office of Child
Support Enforcement,
Annual Report to Congress, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1993
(113th ed. Wash.
D.C. 1993) at 386. Present AFDC payments are insufficient to support
the recipient families.
See Kathryn Edin, Surviving the Welfare System--How AFDC Recipients
Make Ends Meet
in Chicago, 38 SOC. PROBS. 462 (Nov. 1991).
200. See supra notes 32-33, 98-99, 116. See also Barbara Vobejda,
Welfare Reform
Debate is Shifting to Radical Changes, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 1994, at
A23 (describing the
proposed "Personal Responsibility Act" in which unwed mothers under
the age of eighteen
would be denied all welfare benefits).
201. Although the government will not pay for abortions, there is a trend
toward welfare
agencies providing free long-term contraceptives to qualified indigent individuals.
Telephone
interview with Marvin Hazelwood, Manager of Pharmeceutical and Ancillary
Serv. Prog., Ill.
Dep't Pub. Aid, (Oct. 1, 1994) (confirming that although no published
regulation exists,
Illinois Public Aid covers the cost of Norplant insertion and removal
within its drug
formulary).
In addition, there is a current push toward conditioning receipt of governmental
benefits on the use of contraceptives. See David Orentlicher, Requirements
or Incentives by
Government for the Use of Long-acting Contraceptives, 267 JAMA 1818
(1992) (discussing
the use of Norplant as a condition for release of women convicted of
child abuse).
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20 2 or place
more inclined to abort fetuses conceived out-of-wedlock,
children they cannot afford up for adoption, rather than rely upon the state
and the biological father to help finance the costs of raising whichever
20 3
children the women decided to bear.
In fact, the "male abortion option" could be considered fiscally sound
some
and socially desirable for a number of reasons. It could be argued that
to
of the indigent women who most desire abortions are sometimes2°forced
add
bear unwanted children because they cannot afford an abortion. To
to
inability
their
endure,
to the physical and emotional pain these women
they
as
suffer
obtain an abortion perpetuates the poverty and despair they
while
are excluded from certain educational and employment opportunities
203
child.
unwanted
they attempt to single-handedly raise an
be
As a result of the mother's resentment for what she perceives to
never
she
child
a
abuse against herself, a mother who is forced to raise
the
wanted, because she lacked the money to obtain an abortion, may abuse

afford to pay
202. With the "male abortion" funds, an indigent mother could perhaps
clinics
abortion
four
of
survey
random
a
for an abortion which public aid does not cover. In
interviews
Telephone
$2275.
to
$240
from
ranged
in the Chicago area, costs for an abortion
Abortion Access
with the following abortion providers in Illinois revealed the following rates:
rate if 4-9
discount
($240
1994)
12,
(Aug
Center
Medical
Women's
American
Hotline of
awake,
$265
less,
or
weeks
(13
weeks gestation); Abortion-Aid, Chicago (Aug 12, 1994)
doctor's
with
($2275
1994)
12,
(Aug.
DesPlaines
$305 asleep); Abortion Assistance Hotline,
on public aid,
fee, depends on gestation, would give a $260-$390 courtesy rate to persons
Grove
Downers
Ltd.,
single parents and those without insurance); Access Health Center
(Aug. 12. 1994) ($2000 regardless of gestation).
child
203. In 1991, 25% of all never-married women below the poverty level received
34%
constituted
payments
support
child
average,
on
households,
such
support payments. In
women
never-married
percent of the household income. Surprisingly, a higher percentage of
remarried (67%)
(69%) received child support payments than did both divorced (66%) and
that only
advocates
author
This
385.
at
199,
women of the same income level. Supra note
"male
the
utilize
to
allowed
be
procreate
to
not
right
single men who assert a fundamental
100%
to
close
as
be
should
men
married
for
figures
collection
Accordingly,
abortion option."
as possible.
have an
204. "When a single working mother has to decide whether to pay the rent or
true
any
by
choice
a
not
is
that
year,
next
the
rent
the
pay
to
able
abortion so that she will be
Abortion:
Clash
Continuing
The
Tribe's,
Lawrence
Mahoney,
Joan
word."
the
of
meaning
Maher v.
The Clash of Absolutes, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 1231, 1245 (1991) (book review). See
the state
although
abortions
of
funding
Medicaid
Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977) (refusing
federal
and
state
(allowing
(1980)
315
297,
U.S.
448
McRae,
v.
Harris
funds childbirth);
the "Hyde
under
abortions
necessary
medically
even
for
payments
refuse
to
governments
Amendment").
a Trail
205. See Steve Johnson & Colin McMahon, 61 Young Victims Leave Behind
in
parents
single
(describing
6.
at
1
§
1994,
2,
Jan.
of Anger, Abuse and Blame, CHm. TRIB.,
"overwhelmed").
being
as
these situations
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181

child she felt forced to bear.2" If these women were given the "male
abortion" funds, they may become empowered to break the chains of
poverty. The end result could be the reduction in the frequency of child
abuse.207
The "male abortion option" might also reduce court congestion over
paternity suits and the unceasing string of support judgments and enforcement measures that usually follow. 208 There would be much more of an
incentive for men' to pay the "male abortion option" than to pay child
support. The man could eliminate his future support obligations with one
"abortion" payment, which would probably be less time-consuming, 2°9
less
expensive 2 10 and more predictable than paying eighteen or more years of
child support payments based upon a percentage of net future earnings.2 1'
In addition, the option would lend more predictability to the finality of
adoptions. 1
Although, concededly, the end effect of the "male abortion option"
might be an increase in the overall number of abortions, it is equally
206. Henry P. David & Zdenek Matejcek, Children Born to Women Denied
Abortion:
An Update, 13 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 32, 33 (1981).
207. BORN UNWANTED: DEVELOPMENTAL EFFECTS OF DENIED ABORTION
(Henry P.
David et a]. eds., 1994).
208. In 1991, 1.804 billion dollars were spent by social service agencies to collect
6.894
billion dollars of child support. Of the amount collected, 381 million dollars worth
of support
went to AFDC families. The rest went to reimburse AFDC for entitlements
it paid to these
families. The government was able to recover 10.7% of the amount it paid to
single women
from formerly non-paying fathers. In addition, these agencies also collected 34
million dollars
worth of child support for families that were not receiving entitlements. U.S.
BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1993, Washington,
D.C., at 386
(13th ed. 1993).
209. According to court records at the DuPage County courthouse in Illinois,
the
average time period to try a civil lawsuit from filing to verdict was 28.8 months
in 1994,
30.6 months in 1993, 26.47 months in 1992, 22.72 months in 1991, and 22.6 months
in 1990.
The average time required to complete a paternity suit, for the year available,
was 1.22 years.
210. In 1992, the average annual income in the State of Illinois was $18,914.
See U.S.
BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT

OF THE UNITED STATES 1993, Washington, D.C., at 449 (13th ed. 1993).
Assuming the
average man would have a net income of $15,000, over a period of 18 years,
20% of his
income (for child support) would amount to a debt of $54,000 as compared
with a $265$2275, supra note 202, cost for the "male abortion option." (Note, because
of the costs of
prenatal care, the "male abortion option" would be somewhat higher than
the $265-$2275
amount if the child were to be born and then subsequently placed for
adoption, unless
adoptive parents covered some of the costs).
211. 750 ILCS 5/505 (1994).
212. See generally supra notes 25, 59 and 118 and accompanying text (describing
adoptions which have been invalidated for lack of proper notice to the putative
father or for
erroneous rulings of unfitness).

.
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up
possible that some women would simply choose to place their offspring
21 3 Either way, there would likely be a decrease in impoverfor adoption.
ished single motherhood and the concomitant economic and social burdens
14
such families place on society.
Departing from a situation in which a man is asserting a right not to
beget a child, to one in which he is asserting a right to beget a child instead,
by a
a biological father's procreative right is again rendered impotent
215
and
men's
describes
IV
Part
woman's current reproductive rights.
rights,
those
of
women's rights in paternal rights cases, past interpretations
seek to
current societal changes and theories by which a married man may
to
prevent his wife from non-therapeutically aborting a child he desires
21 6
beget.

IV. A

MAN'S RIGHT TO BEGET A CHILD

One of the inherent paradoxes of a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy," 7 is that in protecting the individual privacy of a woman from
218
and by allowing her to make the ultimate
governmental intrusion,
21 9 the Supreme Court has
decision of whether or not to bear a child,
or
effectively intruded into the man's fundamental right to decide whether

high price for a
213. Although the emotional turmoil of losing a child to adoption is a
who are
couples
many
are
there
youth,
of
indiscretions
the
or
woman to pay for indigency
Path to
the
On
et al.,
willing and able to adopt these children. See Christine A. Bachrach
1991);
(Aug.
705
FAM.
Adoption: Adoption Seeking in the United States, 53 J. MARR. &
POLICY
49
Adoption,
of
Barriers
the
Charlotte L. Alen, Special Delivery: Overcoming
REVIEW 46 (Summer 1989).
illegitimacy was
214. See Johnson, supra note 205. In a recent Chicago Tribune article,
ills, from crime
other
many
drives
that
"engine
the
is
which
crisis"
described as a "mounting
in the City
killed
been
had
to poverty." Id. In that article, more than 80% of the children who
they were
while
pregnant
become
had
of Chicago last year were children of mothers who
teenagers. Id.
Court's
215. More specifically, state courts have generally held that the Supreme
have.
might
man
a
right
decision in Danforth prevents them from enforcing any procreative
See infra note 308.
216. See Part IV. E for proposed causes of action.
.. .isbroad
217. Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (".[Tlhe right of privacy
pregnancy.").
her
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate
State may
218. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2821 (1992) ("[A]
before
pregnancy
her
terminate
to
decision
ultimate
the
not prohibit any woman from making
viability.").
that since
219. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976) (holding
balance
the
pregnancy,
a
continue
the woman is most affected by the decision of whether to
weighs in her favor).

1994:141]

MEN'S REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS

not he will beget a child.22 ° The man's right to beget a child should not
be superior or subservient to that of the pregnant woman. 221
He should
have an equal say as to whether or not fetal development will
continue.222
However, because the woman is more directly affected by a
pregnancy,
there likely will always be a presumption in favor of her being
able to
2
terminate the pregnancy.

23

Despite the fact that both men and women have a constitutional
right
to decide whether or not a child will be born, 224 cases that have
dealt with
paternal rights illustrate that the lower courts are reluctant to
compel a
woman to continue her pregnancy when a husband or biological
father
asserts his right to beget a child. 225 The courts rely primarily
on the
Supreme Court's holding in Danforth in ruling that an injunction
against a
pregnant woman would constitute governmental intrusion into her
decision
to terminate her pregnancy, particularly if done during the first trimester 226
--a period of time during which the state, in the past, had no
compelling
interest in the fetus. 227 Nonetheless, recent changes in men's roles, 221
states' powers 229 and fetal rights, 230 suggest that in the future
be more willing to issue and enforce an injunction against courts may
a pregnant
woman which would require her to maintain the status quo 23 until
her and
220. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying quote (discussing
the fundamental right
to procreate and to avoid procreation).
221. Caban v. Mohommed, 441 U.S. 380, 389 (1979) (In an adoption
setting, "maternal
and paternal roles are not invariably different in importance").
222. The law provides individuals with equal protection on the
basis of gender in the
adoption, alimony, child custody and child support settings. As
a matter of consistency, it
should provide equal protection in procreational decision-making
as well. Compare supra
notes 9, 23, 221 & Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (discussing
areas in which the Court
changed its views from favoring women, to treating the genders
equally) with supra note 104
(establishing a fundamental right to refuse an abortion or prevent
the state from compelling
one).
223. But see Conn v. Conn, 526 N.E.2d 958, 961 (Ind. 1988) (Pivarnek,
J., dissenting)
(referring to the trial judge's assertion that in balancing rights
between a husband and his
wife, there would be a presumption in favor of the wife having
the right to terminate her
pregnancy, a presumption which a husband would have to overcome).
224. See generally supra note 104 (discussing the fundamental
right to refuse an
abortion).
225. See infra note 308 (listing paternal rights cases which have
failed).
226. Id.
227. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976).
228. See supra note 184 (pertaining to changes in mores concerning
unwed motherhood).
229. See generally Part IV. D. iii of this article.
230. See Part IV. D. ii of this article.
231. Cf Martin v. Eggert, 528 N.E.2d 386, 390 (I1. App. Ct.
1988) (setting forth
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her husband's child could be born. Below is a discussion of these changes
and various legal rights and principles a court might consider to justify an
opinion in favor of a man asserting a right to his developing offspring.
A. A CLUSTER OF RIGHTS

The constitutional right to beget a child is intertwined with a combination of other fundamental rights. The word beget means "to sire, father,
232
'
give rise to" or "produce a child." After a man has produced a child, he
automatically acquires a host of parental rights. He has the right to associate
with his child,233 the right to the child's care, custody and companionthe
ship, " and the right to make certain important decisions regarding
237
6
23
Prior to
and physical well-being.
child's rearing,235 education
238 Therefore, in
society.
child's
the
birth, the man also has the right to
actuality, the man's right to procreate is the man's ability to enjoy parentage
and the various rights associated with it.
In defining a man's right to procreate, the troublesome question is
whether his right to beget is merely a right to retain the ability to someday
become a parent,239 or whether it includes the man's ability to parent a
particular forming child he was a part of creating. If to procreate means only
to retain the ability to someday become a parent, neither a man nor a
woman should have a constitutional right to decide the disposition of a
24 For example, laboratory destrucfrozen embryo they have conceived.
requirements for an injunction).
232. See MACMILLAN DICTIONARY 87 (1977).
233. U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
234. See generally Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
235. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
236. Id.
237. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584 (1979) (allowing parents to involuntarily
"voluntarily" commit their children to a psychiatric hospital). See also supra note 29 and
accompanying text (discussing parents' authority to decide what medical treatments are in
the best interests of their children).
238. See, e.g., Simmons v. University of Chi. Hosps. & Clinics, 617 N.E.2d 278, 282-83
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
239. One court interpreted the right to procreate as being the right to "someday beget
a child." See Rothenberger v. Doe, 374 A.2d 57, 59 (N.J. 1977). It reasoned that if a wife
may be sterilized without her husband's consent, her ability to abort their joint conception
would no more affect his ability to procreate than her sterilization would. Id. This view,
however, fails to take into consideration pre-existing conception which may be present when
a woman becomes sterilized.
240. See Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) (suggesting that a
progenitor who wishes to avoid procreation should not prevail by destroying or not utilizing
a frozen pre-embryo if the other progenitor has no other "reasonable possibility of achieving
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tion of the embryos or adoptive implantation of the embryos into another
couple would usually not destroy the couple's ability to conceive another
embryo in the future. Holdings in Davis?24 ' and other in-vitro cases,242
however, negate the "ability to someday reproduce" view of procreation.243
Instead, these in-vitro decisions 2 "4 and other recent developments
with
frozen sperm 2 4 suggest that the progenitors have a proprietary right
or
special interest in their jointly conceived embryos, as well as their reproductive capacities, if one or both of the progenitors actually seeks to
later
become a parent to their conception. 2 "
If the right to procreate is not limited to the man's ability to someday
reproduce," it more likely relates to his ability to parent a particular
forming child. 24 8 Returning for a moment to the procreative presumptions
suggested at the beginning of this comment--that single persons have
an
intent not to procreate, and that married persons have the opposite intent
to
parenthood by means other than use of the pre-embryos in question.") Although
Davis states
a rule that the progenitor seeking to avoid procreation should ordinarily
prevail, it clearly
states that this "rule does not contemplate the creation of an automatic
veto of the other
progenitor's interests" in acquiring custody of the frozen pre-embryos.
Id. at 604.
241. Id. at 589 (holding that the court must weigh the interests of the
parties involved).
242. See id.; York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 424-25 (E.D. Va.
1989) (finding
laboratory had a 'duty of reasonable care as a bailor of a frozen
embryo); Del Zio v.
Columbia Presbyterian Medical Center, No. 74-3558 (S.D.N.Y.
filed Apr. 12, 1978)
(awarding woman attempting to procreate $50,000 in tort damages for
an IVF laboratory's
wilful destruction of non-conceived eggs and sperm in a petri dish).
243. See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604 (analyzing whether Ms. Davis
could ever parent
another child if these particular frozen embryos were not used--an analysis
tending to support
the "ability to someday have a child" approach). But compare id. at
604 (analyzing her
interests in placing the embryos for adoption as not being greater than
her husband's desire
to avoid procreation) with id. at 604 where the court states in dicta that
although the party
wishing to avoid procreation should normally prevail, "[tihe case would
be closer if [the
mother] were seeking to use the pre-embryos herself" rather than
donating them to an
adoptive couple.
244. See supra note 242.
245. See Hecht v. Kane, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 283 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993) (holding that
a deceased man's frozen sperm was "property" in which girlfriend had
a 20% interest upon
the man's death). See also Ike Flores, Newlywed Dies in Crash, but Hopes
for Children Live
in Extracted Sperm, Los ANGELES TIMES, July 3, 1994, AI at 10 (describing
wife who had
sperm removed from her husband's corpse shortly after his tragic death
from an automobile
accident). Accord Knight-Ridder, Widow Hopes Frozen Speinm Allows
Husband to 'Live on,"
CHI. TRIB., June 3, 1994, News, at 25.
246. See infra notes 251-56 (describing property or other interests
in reproductive
matter).
247. Rothenberger v. Doe, 374 A.2d 57, 59 (N.J. 1977) (comparing
abortion to
sterilization when deciding upon a right to procreate).
248. Cf Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992).
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parent a particular
procreate 249--an appropriate candidate for the right to
2 ° The assertion that
man.
married
a
be
forming child would most likely
a married man has a right to parent a specific forming child is further
supported by analogizing it to a number of other important rights and
2
For instance, if a
responsibilities spouses acquire upon marriage. 1
interest or some
property
marital
of
conception could be viewed as a type
25 2 it is possible that a married man could
other type of marital interest,
enjoin his spouse from terminating the pregnancy by asserting that the court
2 3 or converting 2' his portion
must prevent her from committing waste
of a marital asset or interest.
If the right to procreate allows a married man to prevent his wife from
destroying his interests, in some instances, the right may also extend to a
single man.255 For example, if a single man were willing and able to
249. See generally Part II. A of this text.
250. See infra note 399 (quoting Justice Pivarnek's dissent in Conn v. Conn, 526 N.E.2d
958, 962 (Ind. 1988)).
251. In certain states, partners to a marriage have rights to each other's property upon
death, and sometimes while still alive. These property rights are typically called Dower or
Curtesy. In re Miller's Estate, 100 P.2d 908, 911 (N.M. 1940) (dower); Hopper v. Gurtman,
18 A.2d 245, 246, 250 (N.J. 1941) (describing curtesy initiate and curtesy consummate-interests husbands may acquire in their wives' estates if a child had been born that is capable
of inheriting). In addition, in community property states, a spouse acquires a one half share
in all property obtained during the marriage. See, e.g., CAL. FAMILY CODE, § 751 (West
1994). See also Illinois Probate Code, 755 ILCS 5/2-8 (1994) (describing a spouse's right to
renounce under a will and receive an elective share of the deceased spouse's estate).
Other rights are found under the Married Women's Property Acts or under state
statutes which have adopted the Uniform Marital Property Act. See generally Sawada v.
Endo, 561 P.2d 1291 (Haw. 1977) (describing the rights women may assert to marital
property); Farid-es-Sultaneh v. Commissioner, 160 F.2d 812 (2d. Cir. 1947) (requiring a
husband or wife who transfers property pursuant to a divorce or other transfer to calculate
tax gains based upon his or her spouse's basis at the time the property was acquired)..See
generally Cantwell, The Uniform Marital Property Act: Origin and Intent, 68 MARQ. L. REV.
383 (1985).
252. For example, there may be property rights in reproductive material itself. See
Hecht v. Kane, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 276 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (finding a woman had a
property interest in 20% of her deceased boyfriend's frozen sperm devised to her). See also
York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 424-25 (E.D. Va. 1989) (finding laboratory had a duty of
reasonable care as a bailor of frozen embryos).
253. See generally Baker v. Weedon, 262 So. 2d 641 (Miss. 1972) (requiring a party
to act in a reasonable manner so as not to destroy the interests of another party who has a
joint property interest).
254. Conversion is "[any unauthorized act which deprives an owner of his property
permanently or for an indefinite period of time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 332 (6th ed.
1990).
255. Note in Hecht that it was a girlfriend and not a wife who was entitled to a portion
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undertake all of the obligations of parenthood, and could show that the
couple had an intent to procreate, there is a possibility that a single man
could also prevent his girlfriend from destroying his interests.256 Predictably, however, a single man would have a stronger presumption to overcome
than a married man would in order to prove that his rights should supersede
those of the woman he impregnated--especially if the view is adopted that
an unmarried couple is presumed to have had an intention not to procre257
ate.
Married or single, if one judge's balancing formula were adopted, a
man's interests would have to be greater than those of the woman he
impregnated for him to prevent her from aborting his offspring. 25" To
determine whether a man's right would ever be superior to his partner's, one
must first analyze the strength of a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy.
B. THE EFFECT OF A WOMAN'S RIGHT TO TERMINATE HER PREGNANCY

A woman's right to terminate her pregnancy was
established in Roe v.
Wade. 259 Roe v. Wade involved a single woman 260 who desired to have
an abortion, but was prevented from doing so because of a Texas statute2 6'
which criminalized abortions in all cases except when the mother's life was
endangered by continuing the pregnancy.262
The Court in Roe v. Wade had difficulty describing the exact nature of
the right. Justice Blackmun found that a woman's right to decide whether
or not to terminate her pregnancy was a "fundamental" 263 right within a
of her boyfriend's sperm. Hecht, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 276.
256. See id. at 283 (implicitly basing its decision upon the testator's intent).
257. See generally supra notes 45 and 51 (providing examples of why, in most
instances, there is a presumption that a single man does not intend to procreate).
258. See, e.g., infra note 302 (listing I I balancing factors suggested by the trial court
which originally issued a temporary restraining order).
259. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
260. Id. at 120. Jane Roe was actually Norma McCorvey, an unwed waitress who could
not earn enough money to support herself, let alone a new baby. See SARAH WEDDINGTON,
A QUESTION OF CHOICE 51-53 (Penguin Books 1993) (hereinafter WEDDINGTON). Norma
was a high school drop-out who had already given birth once before to a baby girl that
Norma's mother had taken from her. Id. at 52. Because Norma rarely saw her first daughter
and feared being fired from her waitress position, she desired to have an abortion. Id.
261. 15 TEXAS REV. CRIM. STAT. ch. 9, arts. 1191-1194 and 1196. See Roe, 410 U.S.
at 117-19.
262. Roe, 410 U.S. at 118.
263. Id. at 152 (Blackmun, J.)("[Olnly personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty'. . . are included in this guarantee of
personal privacy.") (citations omitted). See also id. at 153 ("The right of privacy ... is broad
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zone of personal privacy under the liberty branch of the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause.264 This right, however, was not absolute 265 and was to be balanced against various compelling state interests
2
at different stages of the pregnancy. 6 The Court specifically rejected the
assertions made by several amici, that a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy was a bodily integrity right which allowed one to have "an
2 67
Instead, the Court
unlimited right to do with one's body as one pleases.
2' should be free to decide to
concluded that a woman and her physician

enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.").
264. Id. at 152.
265. "The Court has refused to recognize an unlimited right [to do with one's body as
one pleases] in the past." Id. at 154.
266. Id. at 163. During the first trimester, the state has no sufficient interest in
regulating abortions. Id. During the second trimester, the state's interest in the mother's
health becomes compelling to the point that the state may regulate medical procedures
relating to abortion. Id. Similarly, during the third trimester (or beginning with viability), the
state's interest in the potential human life of the fetus becomes compelling to the extent that
the state may preclude abortions altogether, except where the mother's life or health is at
risk. Id.
267. "The privacy right involved ... cannot be said to be absolute.... l]t is not clear
to us that the claim asserted by some amici that one has an unlimited right to do with one's
body as one pleases bears a close relationship to the right of privacy previously articulated
in the Court's decisions." Id. at 154.
This author proposes that it is unlikely that the woman's right to decide whether to
terminate a pregnancy is a bodily integrity right because the right does not logically
correspond to the bodily changes that occur during pregnancy. The right established in Roe
v. Wade is greatest during the first trimester, the time period during which a pregnant
woman's body is least affected by the fetus. Conversely, the woman's right to decide to abort
may be completely precluded by state interests during the latter part of pregnancy, the time
period during which the woman's body typically undergoes the most significant changes such
as large weight gains, labor and delivery of the child.
If the woman's right, however, is viewed as a privacy interest, the pregnant woman's
privacy in deciding whether to abort would usually be most important during the beginning
stages of pregnancy when most persons--sometimes including the woman herself --would not
know she is pregnant. Similarly, it would seem that a woman's privacy would be less of a
concern during the latter stages of pregnancy when it is usually obvious that she is pregnant.
By the end of a pregnancy, in most cases, a woman's desire to maintain her privacy and
avoid the stigma of unwed motherhood might be waived because of the "constructive notice"
others would have of a visually evident pregnancy. Accord Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112
S. Ct. 2791, 2817 (1992).
268. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
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terminate her pregnancy up until the time of viability, 269 completely
unhindered by state regulation seeking to ban the procedure.
In concurring opinions, Justice Stewart viewed the right to an abortion
as a "liberty ' interest protected by the Due Process Clause, while Justice
Douglas 271 viewed the abortion right as a privacy right that rests in the
Ninth Amendment and the Preamble of the Constitution and has been
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment concept of liberty. 22 Like
the majority opinion in Roe, Justice Douglas's opinion allowed a state to
criminalize abortions at a compelling point, however, language in his
opinion suggests he would have chosen quickening rather than viability as
the compelling point.273
In subsequent cases, the Court continued to struggle to define the exact
liberty that a woman's right to decide to terminate her pregnancy protects.

269. Id. at 163. Viability is defined as the point at which the fetus "is potentially able
to live outside the womb, albeit with artificial aid." Id. at 160. The original time frame for
viability was approximately 24-28 weeks of gestation. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112
S. Ct. 2791, 2811 (1992). More recently, viability has been found to take place as early as
23 weeks, but likely no sooner, as science has not yet been able to duplicate those conditions
required for the lung maturation needed for independent life. See WEDDINGTON, supra, note
260, at 212-3. Viability is to be determined by the physician and is subject to change as
medical technology advances. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2817.
270. Roe, 410 U.S. at 170 (Stewart, J. concurring): "[T]he right asserted by Jane Roe
is embraced within the personal liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment." See also id. at 169 (quoting Justice Harlan in Poe v. Ullman. 367
U.S. 497 (1961)). "This 'liberty'.

.

. is a rational continuum which ...

includes a freedom

from all substantial arbitrary impositions and purposeless restraints ....
"Id. (emphasis
added).
271. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (containing Justice Douglas' concurring
opinion in both Doe v. Bolton and its companion case, Roe v. Wade).
272. Id. at 210-11 (Douglas, J., concurring). Justice Douglas considered the woman's
liberty to be comprised of First Amendment rights and the "freedom of choice in the basic
decisions of one's life respecting marriage, divorce, procreation, contraception, and the
education and upbringing of children." Id. at 211-14. He also considered the woman's liberty
to be part of a "freedom to care for one's health and person, free from bodily restraint or
compulsion," similar to one's "freedom to walk, stroll, or loaf." Id. at 211.
273. Id. at 215 ("The State has interests to protect .... The woman's health is part of
that concern; as is the life of the fetus after quickening.") (emphasis added). Quickening
occurs approximately two months prior to viability (16-18 rather than 24-26 weeks). See Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 132. It is the time when the pregnant mother first feels motion inside
the womb. Id. Quickening was traditionally used in England and during the early years of
American history to mark the time after which abortions were forbidden. Id. at 133-36.
Scholars are in dispute as to whether a post-quickened abortion was murder or a misprision,
however, in either case, it was a crime during the early periods of common law notwithstanding some precedents to the contrary. Id.
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274
Justice O'Connor,
For instance, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey,

writing for a plurality of the Court, approached the woman's right from

various lines 275 of cases. She declined, however, to decide which line
protected the right. Although Justice Blackmun called the abortion right a
' 276 a concurring
"long recognized right[] of privacy and bodily integrity,
opinion written by Justice Rehnquist described the right as a sui generis
277 The general consensus
liberty interest guaranteeing personal privacy.
seems to be that the right to terminate a pregnancy is a privacy right which
lies within the liberty branch of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause. Regardless of where the right may lie, Justice O'Connor concluded
that even if the Roe v. Wade holding had been in error, it would only go
"to the strength of the state's interest in fetal protection, not to the...
woman's liberty. 278
Before addressing how the state's interests have changed since Roe, this
comment briefly examines how courts in the past have sought to balance
men's and women's constitutional rights when there was a dispute between
sexual partners as to whether or not a pregnant woman should be allowed
to have an abortion. It is instructive to consider the parties' rights by
reviewing two main areas: (1) where the Supreme Court has addressed
husband's rights in abortion statutes; and (2) where state courts have decided
paternal rights cases.

274. See generally 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992) (deciding the constitutionality of various
provisions in a Pennsylvania abortion statute).
275. Id. at 2810. Justice O'Connor described the right as either falling within the
Griswold line of cases, which protects liberty relating to intimate relationships, the family,
and decisions whether to beget or bear a child; or within the line of what Justice O'Connor
described as "a rule (whether or not mistaken) of personal autonomy and bodily integrity .
See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279 (1990)
I
.." Id.
(assuming arguendo that a person has the right to refuse medical treatment). Alternatively,
Justice O'Connor felt that the right could be "sui generis" or "different in kind from the
others that the Court has protected under the rubric of personal and family privacy and
autonomy." Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2859.
276. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2846. But see supra notes 265 and 267, in which Justice
Blackmun previously rejected the proposition that one could do with one's body whatever
one pleases.
277. Id. at 2859. According to the justices endorsing Rehnquist's concurring opinion,
the woman's liberty interest is not "fundamental," since the Griswold line of cases does not
"endorse any all-encompassing 'right of privacy"' and "[u]nlike marriage, procreation and
contraception, abortion 'involves the purposeful termination of potential life."' Id. (quoting
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980)).
278. Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2810-11. Liberty would includelhe "'interest in independence
without unjustified governmental
certain kinds of important decisions'.
making
in
interference." Id. at 2811.

1994:141]

MEN'S REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS

C. PAST JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS

1.

Men's Rights Within Abortion Statutes

The first Supreme Court case that dealt with fathers' rights in the
abortion context was Planned Parenthoodv. Danforth. 9 In that case, the
State of Missouri enacted an abortion statute requiring a married woman to
obtain her spouse's consent prior to an abortion.2 80 Although, just prior to
Danforth, similar consent provisions were declared unconstitutional when
minor children were seeking abortions,28 ' the Danforth Court and several
courts that followed upheld parental notice and consent provisions 282 under
the reasonable assumption that minors would "benefit from consultation with
their parents and that children will often not realize that their parents have
their best interests at heart. 28 1 Inconsistent with its decisions regarding
minor consent provisions, however, the Danforth Court would not uphold
the statutory requirement that a wife obtain her husband's consent prior to
obtaining an abortion on the grounds that the state could not delegate a
blanket veto power to the husband if the state itself was prohibited from
exercising that same power during the first trimester.2 84 According to the
Danforth Court, "[ilnasmuch as it is the woman who physically bears the
child and who is the [one] more directly and immediately affected by the
pregnancy, as between the two, thebalance weighs in her favor."28 ' This
is a rationale similar to the "sweat equity" theory the Tennessee Supreme
Court rejected 286 in the Davis in-vitro case.

279. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
280. Id. at 58.
281. See generally Wolfe v. Schoering, 541 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1976); Doe v.
Zimmerman, 405 F. Supp. 534 (M.D. Penn. 1975).
282. See Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 514 (1990); Bellotti v.
Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979) (Bellotti 11).
283. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2830.
284. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 68-69. The Danforth decision never explains why the state
may statutorily delegate its power to the parents of minor children during the time period
when the state is not allowed to regulate abortions, but the state may not delegate the
equivalent power to the husband of a pregnant wife who is seeking an abortion. In a
subsequent case, however, the Court attempts to correct its apparent inconsistency by
declaring that it cannot be assumed that husbands, like parents, have the "parallel ... best
interests" of their wives at heart. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2830.
285. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 71.
286. See generally supra notes 154-60. The Tennessee Supreme Court considered the
competing parties' interests in their pre-embryos, not the woman's greater bodily participation
in the in-vitro process. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 603-04 (Tenn. 1992).
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The dissenters in Danforth, however, clearly articulated that the state
was not attempting to delegate an interest in the future life of the fetus
which the state did not have during the first trimester. Rather, the state was
recognizing that the husband has an interest of his own in
the life of the fetus which should not be extinguished by
the unilateral decision of the wife. It by no means follows,
from the fact that the mother's interest in deciding
'whether or not to terminate her pregnancy' outweighs the
State's interest in the potential life of the fetus, that the
husband's interest is also outweighed and may not be
protected by the State. A father's interest in having a
child--perhaps his only child--may be unmatched by any
other interest in his life. 287
The dissenters' disagreement with the majority regarding the state's ability
to enforce one of its citizen's rights despite the state's inability to assert the
right itself, was perhaps part of what Justice O'Connor was referring to in
'2 88
Casey when she spoke of the "strength of the state's interests." Not only
did the Danforth dissenters believe the state had the power to act on behalf
of the husband, they further explained that the mother's interest in Roe v.
Wade was not an interest in controlling her body, but rather an interest in
28 9
avoiding the post-birth burdens of raising a child.
In more recent years, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality
of a state statute that only required spousal notice rather than spousal consent. 2 ° In a lengthy explanation, supported by substantial testimony on
marital abuse, the Supreme Court held that mandatory spousal notification
prior to all abortions performed on married women would be "tantamount
to the veto found unconstitutional in Danforth," especially for those women

287. Danforth, 428 U.S. at 93. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130 (1973) (noting
that some historical prohibitions of abortion were based on the concept of the father's right
to his offspring).
288. See infra notes 388-415 and accompanying text (discussing the likely change in
the power of the state's interests if, as suggested in Casey, the holding in Roe were in fact
in error).
289. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 143, 153 (1973). See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 215
(1973). The Court in Doe v. Bolton discusses the possibility of a woman experiencing the
pain and discomfort of pregnancy. It suggests she may lose a preferred lifestyle, be
compelled to live an undesired future, have to abandon educational plans and lose income
or the ability to pursue a career. It also discusses the possible physical and mental burdens
of providing child care, as well as the possible stigma of unwed motherhood. Id.
290. See Pennsylvania Abortion Control Act of 1982, 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 3203-20
(1990) as amended (1988) (1989).
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in homes with a history of domestic violence or other marital abuse. 29'
Therefore, both the spousal consent and spousal notice provisions were
deemed unconstitutional.292
In essence, the Supreme Court has concluded that because some
husbands do not have the best interests of their wives at heart and because
some husbands are abusive, a statute requiring all wives to obtain consent
from, or give notice to, their husbands would "unduly burden ' 293 some
women faced with the decision of whether to have an abortion. The court
reasoned that an "undue burden" for even a few women made the statutory
requirements unconstitutional. Therefore, the spousal consent and notice
provisions were stricken from the statutes involved. Nevertheless, decisions
such as Danforth and Casey fail to address situations in which a pregnant
woman either voluntarily notifies a non-abusive biological father, or where
he finds out by some other means, that she intends to have an abortion.294
In such a situation, it may be said that the woman is no longer acting
privately, and that she has, in a manner of speaking, consented 295 to state
intervention on behalf of the man who seeks to protect the "society" of his
unborn child and his fundamental right to procreate. Accordingly, a
resolution of the conflict between the man and the woman would more
appropriately be decided by a state court because the Danforth and Casey
rationales would not apply.
2.

State PaternalRights Cases
State courts have sought to balance the interests of two competing
parties by utilizing a number of approaches. In several paternal rights cases,

291. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2828 (1992). The Court also
recognized that in some instances the woman may wish to terminate her pregnancy because
she knows she was not impregnated by her spouse. Id.
292. Id. (interpreting the statute listed in supra note 290).
293. Id. at 2833.
294. Cf.Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2829. Approximately 20% of all abortions are performed
on married women. Of that 20%, 95% of the women notify their husbands. Id. Of the 19 out
of 20 husbands who are notified about their wives' abortions, it is unknown exactly how
many husbands disagree with their wives' decisions. See id. The paternal rights cases,
however, are an indication that even with voluntary notification, disagreements occur. See
infra notes 296-97 (listing representative examples of paternal rights cases and the actions
and holdings associated with them).
295. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2817 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) ("In some broad
sense it might be said that a woman who fails to act before viability has consented to the
State's intervention on behalf of the developing child."). Id. Might it not also be said that
a woman who voluntarily notifies the biological father of her pregnancy is consenting to the
state's intervention on his behalf?
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29
lower court judges have initially issued temporary restraining orders or
injunctions297 ordering the women involved to refrain from obtaining
29
abortions. Unfortunately for the men involved, each case failed. ' An
analysis of why the paternal rights cases have failed suggests what other
avenues a father may still pursue to save his unborn child from permanent
destruction.
In one paternal rights case, 29 the trial court sought to balance the
rights of a biological father vis-a-vis those of his pregnant girlfriend.
According to the facts of that case, a biological father sought a restraining
order to prevent a woman he had impregnated from having an abortion
because he had a sincere interest in raising the child. By contrast, the
woman carrying the fetus wanted to obtain an abortion so that she could
look good in a bathing suit, so that she would not be pregnant during the
summer, 300 and so that she would not have to share the father with the
baby.3 °1
The Indiana trial court issued a temporary restraining order against the
woman who desired the abortion until the court could balance the parties'
interests and arrive at a final determination of whose interests should
prevail.3 °2 The restraining order was vacated at the appellate level, fol-

296. See generally Conn v. Conn, 526 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. 1988) (affirming decision of

the Court of Appeals in summarily denying a temporary restraining order); Doe v. Smith, 527

N.E.2d 177 (Ind. 1988) (reversing previous temporary restraining order issued by the trial
court); Coleman v. Coleman, 471 A.2d 1115 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (affirming order
denying temporary restraining order); Rothenberger v. Doe, 374 A.2d 57 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1977) (denying application for an order to show cause with temporary restraints). See
also Axelrod, supra note 132, at 697 n.49 (listing additional unpublished paternal rights
cases).
297. See, e.g., Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339, 343-44 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974) (affirming order denying claim for injunctive relief).
298. See generally Axelrod, supra note 132 (discussing at length why men lose paternal
rights cases).
299. In re Unborn Child H., No. 84C01-8804-JP-185 (Vigo Cir. Ct.) (Ind. Apr. 8, 1988)
(as cited in Axelrod, supra note 132, at 702 n.71).
300. See id. slip op. at 2 (as cited in Axelrod, supra note 132, at 702 n.71).
301. Id. (as cited in Axelrod, supra note 132, at 702 n.71).
302. One trial court suggested the following balancing factors be utilized: (1) whether
the mother has consulted with a physician who agrees with her need for an abortion; (2) the
likelihood of the child being born with grave physical or mental defects; (3) whether the
woman would suffer any medical, emotional or psychological harm if required to carry the
child to term; (4) whether continued pregnancy and childbirth would interfere with the
woman's employment or education; (5) whether an abortion would harm the man
emotionally, psychologically or otherwise; (6) whether the wife is sincere in her desire to
abort and the husband sincere in his desire that she bear the child; (7) whether the wife will
properly care for herself during the pregnancy; (8) how the expenses for prenatal care and
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lowed by the Indiana Supreme Court summarily adopting the Court of
Appeals' decision as its own. The Indiana Supreme Court held that the
"issuance of an injunction and the possible invocation of the court's
contempt power would sufficiently constitute state action, which was
proscribed by Danforth."' 03
In a companion case 3' 4 dealing with a married rather than a single
father, the trial court attempted to overcome the balancing dilemma created
in Danforth by interpreting the "balance weighs in her favor" language as
creating a rebuttable presumption in favor of a pregnant wife having the
right to an abortion. 0 5 With the presumption established, the trial court
would have allowed the man to rebut the presumption by presenting
sufficient evidence that he had a superior right to procreate, 3" or, perhaps
more appropriately, a superior right to the "society" of his offspring. On
appeal, the Indiana Supreme Court vacated the restraining order using the
same reasoning as it did in Doe v. Smith.30 7
All other paternal rights decisions have relied on similar reasoning to
invalidate restraining orders or deny injunctions to putative fathers seeking
to prevent their co-progenitors from aborting their offspring.30 8 Because
delivery costs will be paid; (9) whether the pregnancy and birth will cause a
financial
hardship on the other party or their families; (10) whether the father is capable of
fathering
other children; (11) whether the father is likely to be fit and willing to raise the child
after
birth. Conn v. Conn, 526 N.E.2d 958, 961 (Ind. 1988).
303. Doe v. Smith, 527 N.E.2d 177, 178 (Ind. 1988).
304. Conn, 526 N.E.2d at 961.
305. See id. at 959-61 (Pivarnek, J.,
dissenting). Taking into consideration the majority
holding in Danforth, the judge at the trial level in Con asserted that "there
[was] a
presumption the wife had the better of the argument and the husband would
need to
overcome that presumption." Id. at 961.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 958.
308. See Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339, 344 n.6 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) (stating
that
"[flor this court to restrain the natural mother from terminating her pregnancy during
the first
trimester would be tantamount to the type of state interference or infringement proscribed
by
Roe v. Wade"); Doe v. Smith, 567 N.E.2d 177, 178 (Ind. 1988) (stating that "[biased
upon
this Court's decision in In re Conn, we now affirm the judgement of the trial
court.");
Coleman v. Coleman, 471 A.2d 1115, 1119 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984) (relying on
Danforth
in ruling that the husband was constitutionally prohibited from enjoining his wife
from
aborting his child); Rothenberger v. Doe, 374 A.2d 57, 59 (N.J. Super Ct. Ch. Div.
1977)
(quoting Danforth in declaring that "[ilnasmuch as it is the woman who physically
bears the
child and who is the more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as
between
the two, the balance weighs in her favor").
Each of the above cases was decided by a state court. No official opinion has been
rendered by the Supreme Court on the issue of a father's right to his unborn child
in the
event that the mother desires an abortion. In addition, neither the Supreme Court's
ruling on
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of the reasoning presented in those cases, an attorney representing a putative
father must overcome the assertion that all state action is forbidden prior to

viability3" in order to succeed in obtaining an injunction. Several argu-

ments could be presented for that purpose.
First, he could suggest that Danforth and Casey do not proscribe 3all
3 °
actions ",
state action prior to viability, " but only those state legislative
31 2 over a pregnant
veto
that would give the biological father a blanket
v.
woman's decision. This is the reasoning the trial court used in Conn
Conn when it suggested balancing the parties' interests by using a rebuttable
presumption in favor of the woman having a right to decide to terminate her
provision
the statutory spousal notice provision in Casey, nor the statutory spousal consent
pregnancy
individual
an
in
rights
father's
a
of
in Danforth specifically addresses the issue
Ct. 2791,
of which he has already been notified. Cf Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.
(1976).
68-72
52,
U.S.
428
Danforth,
v.
Parenthood
2826-31 (1992); Planned
action
309. Although the Danforth Court specifically spoke of a prohibition against state
trimester
the
with
away
did
Casey
during the first trimester, see Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69,
prior to
framework and, instead, generally forbids unwarranted state regulation of abortions
2816.
at
Ct.
S.
112
viability. See Casey,
that
310. The Casey plurality held that the Supreme Court may invalidate state actions
Casey,
abortion.
an
have
to
place an undue burden upon a woman's decision whether or not
if
112 S.Ct. at 2821. "An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid,
an
seeking
woman
a
of
path
the
in
obstacle
its purpose or effect is to place a substantial
at 2820,
abortion before the fetus attains viability." Id. at 2821 (emphasis added). But see id.
orders.
court
not
regulations,
and
statutes
invalidating
to
refers
only
Court
the
where
311. See, e.g., Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2811. (O'Connor, J., plurality) ("[V]liability marks
to
the earliest point at which the State's interest in fetal life is constitutionally adequate
added).
(emphasis
abortions.")
justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic
312. Id. at 2831. The Court stated:
Whether the prospect of notification itself deters such women from seeking
abortions, or whether the husband, through physical force of psychological pressure
or economic coercion, prevents his wife from obtaining an abortion until it is too
late, the notice requirement will often be tantamount to the veto found unconstitutional in Danforth.
consent
Id. Compare the above quote to rationales given by various courts regarding statutory
Court's
the
to
pertaining
Danforth
in
language
provisions. Id. at 2869-70 (quoting the
at all").
reason
no
for
or
whatsoever
reason
"any
for
power
veto
concern about a husband's
a
unconstitutional
(holding
1976)
Cir.
(6th
525
523,
F.2d
541
Schoering,
v.
Wolfe
Accord
"no
for
decision
woman's
the
statutory provision allowing a spouse's or parent's veto over
Pa.
reason or an impermissible reason"); Doe v. Zimmerman, 405 F. Supp. 534, 537 (M.D.
from
spouse
a
preventing
of
means
a
as
provision
consent
1975) (invalidating a spousal
"capriciously" withholding his consent for "many reasons or no reason at all"). Nonetheless,
the judicial bypass procedure in Casey was held to be constitutionally sufficient to overcome
See
the concerns of arbitrary parental conduct in abortion statutes requiring parental consent.
bypass
judicial
and
requirement
consent
Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2832 ("[Tlhe one-parent
procedure are constitutional.")
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pregnancy. 3 Despite the balancing approach and a presumption in favor
of the woman, some state courts may still interpret the holdings in Danforth
and Casey as not only forbidding legislative action, but as also forbidding
all state action (including the issuance of injunctions) prior to viability.
Since an injunction could be considered state action, a state court which
accepts the view that all state action prior to viability is forbidden would
probably assume the state is prohibited from issuing an injunction against
any pregnant woman prior to viability. A state adopting this view might be
persuaded by another approach.
As a second approach, a putative father may take would be to suggest
that Danforth cannot possibly be read as prohibiting all legislative regulation
of abortions prior to viability, because the Danforth court itself upheld the
state's legislative authority to grant a veto power to the parents of minors
seeking abortions. 3a 4 This argument might some day allow men asserting
paternal rights to acquire a notice or consent provision if a judicial bypass
provision were incorporated into the statute. However, it still would
probably not allow a state to issue an injunction on a man's behalf.3 15
A third argument in favor of allowing an injunction to issue would be
that the right of privacy derived from Eisenstadt v. Baird only prohibits
"unwarranted governmental intrusion. 3 1 6 A proper balancing
of interests
would be a warranted intrusion because the court must justly decide whose
rights should prevail between two'competing parties.31 7 In fact, it could
be
asserted that the Court's prohibitions against state action prior to viability
313. Conn v. Conn, 526 N.E.2d 958, 961 (Ind. 1988).
314. See, e.g., Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2866 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment
in part and dissenting in part). The "undue burden" standard "does not in any way
supply the
distinction between parental consent and spousal consent;" rather, it merely allows
the Court
to "impart its own preferences on the States in the form of a complex abortion
code." Id.
315. See id. at 2831 ("A state may not give to a man the kind of dominion over his
wife
that parents exercise over their children."). Ironically, the result of this statement
is that a
father may prevent one of his daughters from having minor surgery by deciding that
she will
not have an abortion. The same man, however, would be powerless to protect
a second
daughter from being completely destroyed because he has no legal authority to
be advised
of, or withhold consent to her being aborted.
316. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
317. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2831 (1992) ("The Constitution
protects all individuals, men and women alike, from unjustified state interference,
even when
that interference is enacted into law for the benefit of their spouses."). Therefore,
the act of
the Supreme Court in Danforth, in declaring prohibitive all forms of state regulation
prior
to viability of the fetus--including lower court adjudications of constitutional
disputes
between a pregnant woman and the father of her conception--is a direct infringement
individual man's ability to vindicate his rights if the woman is exercising her on the
right to
terminate a pregnancy for reasons other than those furthered by Roe and its progeny.
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are themselves unconstitutional deprivations of the man's liberty to decide
how
to procreate. This argument may be further supported by examining
fundamental
woman's
societal changes have affected the nature of a
'liberty" so as to justify an exception to the general abortion rule applied to
31
past paternal rights cases.
D. THE NEED TO ADJUST TO SOCIETAL CHANGES

1.

Modern Parenting Trends

if there
One societal change a court should consider when it decides
right is how
should be a paternal rights exception to a woman's abortion
9 Historically, men and women have
men's roles in society have changed.
has
been treated according to certain gender stereotypes. Society generally
children,
assumed that women would want to marry and then bear and raise
support
financially
to
women
these
while it has expected men who married
320 To reinforce these expectations,
the women and any family created.
wives or
society defined most women according to their roles as men's
and to
2
children's mothers.3 ' The best way for society to foster such roles
from
perpetuate the stereotypes the roles created was to exclude women
323 were devote,
to
allowed
certain activities.322 Hence, women were not
324 and were only allowed to work in the
nied educational opportunities,
traditional nurturing fields such as teaching, nursing, child care, etc.
582, 646 (1949)
318. Cf. National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S.

(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). "Great concepts like

. .

. 'liberty' . . . were purposely left to

of social and economic
gather meaning from experience. For they relate to the whole domain
only a stagnant society
that
well
too
knew
fact, and the statesmen who founded this Nation
should be viewed
rights
men's
Accordingly,
remains unchanged." Id. (emphasis added).
since Roe
changed
have
society
of
facts
economic
and
social
the
from the standpoint of how
v. Wade and Danforth were decided.
Family Work
319. See generally L. Suzanne Dancer & Lucia A. Gilbert, Spouses'
(Feb. 1993)
127
ROLES
SEX
28
Level,
Participation and Its Relation to Wives' Occupational
have been
may
work
family
in
participation
unequal
(suggesting that past statistics on
families).
dual-career
in
overstated, particularly
the social condition of women
320. See WEDDINGTON, stupra note 260, at 19 (describing
shortly prior to the time of Roe).
321. Id. at 18.
322. Id. at 19, 22-25.
allow women to vote
323. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIX (amending the Constitution to
the right).
given
first
were
beginning in 1920, fifty years after african-americans
when obtaining
inequities
gender
(noting
25
at
260,
324. WEDDINGTON, supra note
credit or educational recommendations).
U.S. 718 (1982).
325. See generally Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
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These deprivations gave birth to the women's movement.326 Over the
decades, as the movement progressed, women increasingly demanded
equality in education and employment.327 However, to best achieve such
equality, women needed to be able to control their reproductive lives32
since it was the woman's role as mother and child-care provider that most
affected her ability to equally participate in society. 329 To complicate
matters, during the 1960's and 1970's, many Americans, both married and
single, became involved in the Sexual Revolution.330 With an increase in
sexual activity and a general lack of reliable birth control, the predictable
result was that many women were left with unwanted pregnancies.3"3' Once
pregnant, the only means these women had of immediately regaining control
of their lives was to either obtain an abortion or place the child up for
adoption.332 Notably, abortion was illegal and unsafe.333 It was in this
climate that Roe v. Wade was decided.
In Roe v. Wade, a woman's right to decide to terminate her pregnancy
was grounded upon various premises. 33 4 It was thought to be violative of
the woman to inflict her with additional offspring or with a distressful life
and future. 335 Her mental and physical health could be taxed by child-care
326. See generally Anne. N. Constain & Steven Majstrovovic, Congress,
Socialmovement and Public-Opinion--Multiple Origins of Women's Rights Legislation,
47 POL.
RES. Q. 111 (1994). Although a first wave of women's suffrage began before
the turn of the
century, the height of agitation on behalf of modem women's rights generally
occurred
between the years of 1950 and 1986. Id.
327. WEDDINGTON, supra note 260, at 25 (describing national setting which
called for
change during the time period when Roe v. Wade was decided).
328. Id.
329. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2809 (1992) ("The
ability of
women to participate equally in the economic and social life of the Nation
has been
facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.").
330. See, e.g., Mark Clements, Sex in America Today, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 7, 1994,
Parade
Magazine, at 5 (estimating that the sexual revolution "had been in full swing
for more than
a decade" as of 1984 and few people were aware of AIDS). See also id. at 6
(describing the
"drastic changes" singles have made in their sexual behavior).
331. See supra note 184, quoting dissenting Justice Tully, who describes how
single
motherhood has changed in our society. See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
165 (1973)
(referring to the "profound problems of the day" at the time Roe was decided).
332. WEDDINGTON, supra note 260, at 26 (describing abortions). Because of the
stigma
involved in either being married and placing one's child for adoption, or being
an unwed
mother, abortion seemed the preferable alternative. Id. But see supra note 184
for the more
modern view of single motherhood.
333. Roe, 410 U.S. at 140 (explaining that one third of the states had enacted
less
stringent abortion statutes but that two thirds of the states still outlawed abortion).
334. Id. at 153.
335. Id.
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responsibilities. 36 Similarly, the Court was concerned about a woman
concerned
bringing a child into -a family that could not support it and37was
At this point,
about the stigma that might attach to single motherhood.
if the
it is worth noting that most of these concerns are not present
the
undertake
to
able
is
and
biological father of a child seeks custody
fathered
has
he
child
financial and child-care responsibilities of raising a
decision which
after it is born. Similarly, sections of the Roe v. Wade
lifestyle or
hypothesized that a woman would be deprived of her preferred
also do
future
undesirable
would be forced to live a radically different and
338
Furthermore,
it.
not apply if the father of the child chooses to raise
nation predomisociety has changed radically since 1973. No longer is the
revolution.339
sexual
a
of
midst
nantly populated by adolescents in the
control have
Moreover, since that time, many more forms of effective birth
340
become available.
falls
No longer can it be assumed that the child-care burden necessarily
4' Men are taking on increased child-care
upon an abandoned woman.
their children
responsibilities and more fathers are being awarded custody of
even some
342
in divorce actions. In fact, the trend in many custody cases,
343 In addition,
involving unwed parents, is to treat the sexes equally.
earnings of
various federal and state statutes seek to protect the careers and
344 Furthermore, larger companies have begun to sponsor
pregnant women.
336. Id.

424 U.S. 693 (1976) (holding,
337. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153. But see Paul v. Davis,

protected liberty interest).
subsequent to Roe v. Wade, that reputation is not a constitutionally
concurring) (as cited in
J.,
(Douglas,
338. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 214 (1973)
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973)).
of wedlock were born to
339. In 1970, 50% of the total number of children born out
teenage motherhood. See U.S.
teenagers. By 1991 only 31% were--a 19% drop in unwed

THE UNITED STATES: 1994 80 (114th ed.
BUREAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF

1994).
time of Roe, birth
340. See WEDDINGTON, supra note 260, at 60 (citing that at the
birth control pill
today's
to
compared
as
rate
failure
40%
to
20
a
it
control carried with
which is claimed to be 99% effective when used properly).
App. Ct. 1993) (Tully, J.,dissenting)
341. See Ihre Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648, 664 (I11.
era of Murphy Brown, where many
the
in
worse,
("We are now living, for better or for
the natural father or abrogating
women are choosing single motherhood and either deserting

[his] rights.").

of Women, I FEM. &
342. P. Chesler, Mothers on Trial--The Custodial Vulnerability

7 COUNS. & PsYC. 60
PSYC. 409 (Oct. 1991); Robert H. Woody, Fathers with Custody,
(1978).
Dist. Ct. App. 1987). See
343. See generally Barnes v. Frazier, 509 So. 2d 401 (Fla.
also Florida Shared Parental Responsibility Law, § 61.13(2)(b)(2)(1985).
The Equal Employment
344. See, e.g., The Pregnancy Discrimination Act as it amended
pay, conditions and
like
(guaranteeing
(1978)
Opportunities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-(k)
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programs to lessen the child-care burden for both men and women by
providing employee benefits such as on-site day care,345 flex-time,346
job-sharing, 7 and tax-sheltered cafeteria plans.348
Because of these modern changes, today a woman in the same situation
as Jane Roe may not necessarily be required to face the same hardships she
did.3 49 In addition, the original fact-situation in Roe v. Wade, namely that
of a young unmarried Woman who was left to deal with a pregnancy and the
responsibility of raising a child by herself,35 is factually distinguishable
from a situation in which a natural father asserts an interest in the forming
child of his pregnant wife. Therefore, unless a similar underlying premise
can be found, Roe v. Wade should not apply to paternal rights cases as it did
to Jane Roe. 351 If Roe did apply to such cases, it would act as a blanket
veto over a man's right to procreate and his right to the "society" of his
future child--a situation the Court in Roe v. Wade explicitly refused to
address.352 Furthermore, the Supreme Court's subsequent rulings on men's
rights in the abortion context, 353 deal with across-the-board statutory

benefits to pregnant employees). But see Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 738
(7th Cir. 1994) (holding the Pregnancy Discrimination Act does not require employers to
offer maternity leave or take other steps to make it easier for pregnant women to work, but
only requires that the employer ignore the pregnant employee's pregnancy and treat both
pregnant and non-pregnant employees similarly).
345. See generally Ellen E. Kossek & Victor Nichol, The Effects of On Site Child-Care
on Employee Attitudes and Performance, 45 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 485 (1992).
346. See Sylvia Ann Hewlett, Tough Choices, Great Rewards, CHI. TRIB., July 17,
1994, Parade Magazine, at 5 (praising the compressed work week model and flexible
workhour options offered by American Express and Johnson & Johnson). Hilary Silver &
Frances Goldscheider, Flexible Work and Housework: Work and Family Constraints on
Women's Domestic Labor, 72 SOCIAL FORCES 1103 (Jun. 1994).
347. Patricia G. Pershun, Job Sharing--2 Who Made it Work, 92 AM. JOUR. NURSING
75 (1992); Walter L. Polsky & Loretta D. Foxman, Can Job Sharing Work for You, 66
PERSONNEL J. 31 (1987); Elizabeth Maret, Job-Sharing: A New Pattern for Quality of Work
and Life - Meier. G. S., 9 CONTEMP. Soc. J. REV. 848 (1980).
348. See Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 125 (1993).
349. See Hewlett, supra note 346, at 5 (suggesting broadened jurisdiction for the Family
Medical Leave Act).
350. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED

STATES: 1993, at 26, Washington, D.C. (I 13th ed. 1993).
351. Id.
352. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973).
353. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976) (invalidating spousal
consent requirements); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2830 (1992)
(invalidating spousal notice requirements).
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man may have a legally
requirements--not with whether an individual
354
offspring.
enforceable right to his forming
many
The women's movement's search for equality has brought about
35 5
Because
men.
most
changes, not the least of which is a changed role for
of the many women who have entered the work force, men are being
required to participate in the domestic chores that were once typically
3 6
relegated to women alone. " The ripple effect of the women's movement
is that many men are taking an increased interest in their children and
homes.357 This new environment leaves some men asking, "Where is my
equality?" Indeed, if a man can show that he is willing and able to be a
physical and financial child-care provider, he should be able to decide that
a child he has participated in forming be born.
2.

Evolution of Fetal Protections

A second societal change the Court should consider when deciding
whether to create a paternal rights exception to the abortion right, is the
358
amount of protection the law now gives fetal life. For example, when
Roe v. Wade was decided, there was historic precedent suggesting that the
point
Court might choose quickening rather than viability for the compelling
359
Howevlife.
human
potential
protect
at which the state could choose to
er, to justify3 ° the Court's selection of viability, it first examined other
354. See supra note 287 and accompanying text (suggesting the fallacy of Danforth).
See also infra note 399 (quoting why one Indiana Supreme Court justice believed that state
courts should be allowed to decide disputes between spouses' competing interests in paternal
rights cases).
355. See Hewlett, supra note 346, at 5.
356. Id.
357. See, e.g., Hewlett, supra note 346. "Women are no longer able to take the entire
responsibility for family life. Husbands and fathers, employers and government, all have to
pull their weight in this business of nurturing." Id. at 5. Cf.Heather M. Little, What Price
Paternity?, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 26, 1995, WOMANEWS, at I (describing the increase in fathers
taking paternity leaves to care for their newborn infants).
358. See infra notes 379-82 for significant changes in modern criminal and civil laws
pertaining to fetal protections.
life
359. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132-34 (1973) (describing various times at which
Christian
the
"quickening;"
on
focusing
law
common
was theorized to begin: Bracton and the
of
church finding male life to begin at 40 days of gestation, and female life at 80 days
Stoics
life:
of
beginnings
the
on
theories
describing
(further
160
at
id.
also
See
gestation).
and most of the Jewish faith believing life begins at birth; Aristotle believing in a point of
"mediate animation," sometime between conception and birth; and Catholics, some nonat
Catholics and many physicians believing in the "ensoulment" theory, placing life
conception).
360. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 2816 (1992) (stating that "We
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areas of the law in which the fetus did or did not have legal rights. 36' As
of 1973, the only legal rights that fetuses had prior to viability were in the
areas of inheritance362 and wrongful death.363 These areas dealt specifically with the parent-child relationship, providing rights only in those areas
in which a parent might have had an interest in the fetus, or the fetus had
an interest in a parent's estate. In addition, as of 1973, these rights were
conditioned upon live birth. 36 Since no paternal interests were being
asserted 365 in Roe v. Wade, and since Jane Roe herself obviously had no
interest in bearing her child to term, 36 the Court more appropriately
considered only those areas of the law that protected fetuses in whom no
person was asserting an interest.
At the time of Roe, outside the areas of tort and inheritance law, a
court could only provide a fetus with legal rights if it was "quickened,"
viable, or in the alternative, born alive.367 Because only a viable fetus
must justify the lines we draw.").
361. See Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128, 131-32 (Mass. 1974) (finding that civil
remedies
for fetal harm were not developed, nor were they necessary prior to 1973,
because of the
criminal statutes that were then in place).
362. Roe, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (allowing appointment of guardian
ad litem in
inheritance cases).
363. See id. (discussing what, at the time of Roe v. Wade, the Court called
"generally
opposed" new legal developments allowing a parent a cause of action for the
loss of society
of a child wrongfully killed in utero). Contra Simmons v. University of Chi.
Hosp., 617
N.E.2d 278 (Iii. App. Ct. 1993) (allowing $1.6 million in damages for loss
of society in a
wrongful death cause of action for harm to a viable fetus). The court in Simmons
stated that
"[i]nherent in the parent-child relationship are the intangible benefits of the society
that each
derives from the other." Id. at 283. Accord Smith v. Mercy Hosp. & Med. Ctr.,
560 N.E.2d
1164, 1168 (III. App. Ct. 1990) (finding state legislature intended for there to
be a wrongful
death cause of action for a fetus regardless of its gestation).
364. Roe, 410 U.S. at 161.
365. See supra note 40 (stating the Supreme Court's view).
366. See WEDDINGTON, supra note 260 (describing the actual Jane Roe).
367. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. at 157 (finding that in attempting to protect
a fetus as
a "person" under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court was required to look
at existing law
such as the Constitution, in which nearly all references to a "person" concerned
persons who
were already born). See also id. at 161 (explaining that although the traditional
rule of tort
law denied a fetus recovery for prenatal injuries even though the child was
born alive, more
recent tort law allowed for recovery if the child had been viable, or at least
"quickened," at
time of injury). Cf id. at 162 (finding that in some wrongful death suits parents
had a legally
enforceable interest in the potentiality of the child) (emphasis added). The
reader should be
reminded that parental interests did not matter in Roe v. Wade because Jane
Roe had no
parental interest in keeping the child she was being deprived from aborting,
and no man was
asserting a paternal interest. In fact, there were statements made by Jane
Roe (Norma
McCorvey) both before and after trial that she had been raped. See WEDDINGTON,
supra note
260, at 53. The rape statements, however, are dubious because of conflicting
versions Norma
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could possibly survive birth, and thereby take on the "person" status
as the
required by the Fourteenth Amendment,'" the Court chose viability
to
sufficient
were
compelling point at which the state's own interests
constitutionally protect the potentiality of human life by criminalizing
abortions. 69
of those
The Roe v. Wade Court, however, decided only on behalf
370 to Jane Roe, a single woman who was fighting
women similarly situated
balance the
the state itself. As such, the decision in Roe v. Wade sought to
interests in
"liberty" interests of a pregnant woman alone against the state's
37
to balance two
its future citizenry. ' The Roe opinion did not attempt
to privately
right
Roe's
separate individuals' constitutional rights--such as
decide with the advice of her physician whether to terminate her pregnancy,
to associate
balanced against a biological father's First Amendment right
37 2 combined with his Fourteenth Amendment right to
with his offspring,
to legally
procreate.373 In effect, the Roe ruling gave the states discretion

has recounted. Id. at 256-57.
enforce any law which
368. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No State shall make or
nor shall any State
States;
United
the
of
citizens
of
immunities
or
shall abridge the privileges
.... ).
law
of
process
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
state's interests
for
point
compelling
the
369. Reasons for continuing to use viability as
where Justice
(1992),
2817
2791,
Ct.
S.
112
Casey,
are defended in Planned Parenthood v.
to show
knowledge
medical
current
and
Wade
v.
Roe
from
decisis
O'Connor relies upon stare
be the
[could
life
second
. . .
that viability is the "realistic [point at which an] independent
id. at
see
But
woman."
the
of
fair] object of state protection that ... overrides the rights
intervention
State's
the
to
consented
has
2817 ("[A] woman who fails to act before viability
on behalf of the developing child.").
370. Roe, 410 U.S. at 120 (amending complaint to class action).
ability to proscribe
371. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2817 (articulating that the state's
on "behalf of the
intervening
state
abortions only after viability is reasoned upon the
interests).
father's
a
developing child"--not on behalf of
a biological father's
372. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (establishing
v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d
Doe
interest in the companionship, care and custody of his children);
128, 134 (Mass. 1974) (Hennessey, J., dissenting):
Constitution; they
But the father has rights. They are familial. They antedate the
of his
potentiality
main
a
in
center
They
itself.
civilization
as
are about as old
meaning
have
marriage: the birth and raising of children. Few human experiences
surely among the
comparable to parenthood. The father's rights asserted here are
Constitution.
the
fundamental rights protected by
of some abortions as
Id. See also Roe, 410 U.S. at 130 (referring to historical prosecution
v. Behnke, 611 N.E.2d 1350
being a "violation of the father's right to his offspring"); Person
of society incurred when
loss
for
(I11.App. Ct. 1993) (allowing monetary recovery to a parent
and visitation rights).
custody
father's
a
loses
his attorney, through malpractice, negligently
right to procreate
fundamental
man's
the
(reinforcing
104
and
19
373. See supra notes
in both the sterilization and forced abortion settings).
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protect all fetuses after viability (by criminalizing abortions), as a means of
protecting the state's own interests in the fetus.374 In so ruling,
in situations similar to that of Ms. Roe, the Court engaged in a federal
governmental action which deprived only non-viable fetuses of their
future lives.
Notably, these were fetuses in whom nobody but the
state itself was
asserting an interest.375 Since non-viable fetuses were not
legally "persons," 376 and since the Court in Roe was considering no other
interest in
the fetus except that of the state's ability to generally protect
human life,377
the Supreme Court's action was not an unconstitutional deprivation
of life
to a "person. "378
Today, however, outside the abortion context, several states
provide
legal protections to the unborn both before and after viability
if the fetus is
part of a parent's interest.379 In those states, a fetus has protection
from
certain types of civil 8 ° and criminal wrongs3"8' committed
against it by
374. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
375. See generally supra notes 365-66 and accompanying
text (discussing the lack of
parental interests asserted).
376. Roe, 410 U.S. at 157.
377. Id. at 164.
378. Roe, at 158-62 ("[T]he word 'person,' as used in the Fourteenth
Amendment, does
not include the unborn ....
In short, the unborn have never been recognized in the law
as
persons in the whole sense.").
379. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1.2,(1994) (criminalizing intentional
homicide of an unborn
child). Accord People v. Davis, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 96, 99 (1993).
See also People v. Ford, 581
N.E.2d 1189, 1201-02 (III. App. Ct. 1991) (holding that the
Illinois criminal statute which
defined "unborn child" as an individual of the human species
from fertilization until birth was
not unconstitutional as it was unnecessary to prove that an
unborn child was a person or a
human being but only that whatever the entity was called,
it had life that was extinguished
because of defendant's acts). Compare id. at 1199 (holding
that statute was not in violation
of equal protection because, as between defendants and aborting
pregnant mothers, the two
classes were not similarly situated) with The Illinois Wrongful
Death Act, 740 ILCS 180/2.2
(1994) ("The state of gestation or development of a human being
when an injury is caused,
when an injury takes effect, or at death, shall not foreclose maintenance
of any action under
the law of this State arising from the death of a human being
caused by wrongful act, neglect
or default.").
380. See 740 ILCS 180/2.2 (1994); Seef v. Sutkus, 583 N.E.2d
510, 511 (111. 1991)
(finding parent could maintain a cause of action for loss of
society of a stillborn child);
Smith v. Mercy Hosp. and Medical Ctr., 560 N.E.2d 1164, 1173
(11. App. Ct. 1990) (holding
that the parents of a stillborn child were not required to
prove viability to sustain a valid
cause of action for wrongful death of the fetus); Endresz v. Freidberg,
248 N.E.2d 901, 903
(N.Y. App. Div. 1969) (holding that every human being has a
right "to begin life unimpaired
by physical or mental defects resulting from the negligence of
another"). But see Parham v.
Hughes, 441 U.S. 347 (1979) (rejecting a discrimination claim
by fathers who had not
legitimated their illegitimate children) (wrongful death cause
of action would only lie for
fathers who had previously legitimated their offspring). Cf.
In re Gloria C. v. William C.,
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2
in stark
strangers or by its own mother." These legal protections are
non-viable
the
for
contrast to the lack of fetal protections that were available
383
suggested that
unborn at the time of Roe v. Wade. In fact, it has been
area of torts
in 1973 fetal rights were not sufficiently developed in the
then in
penalties
criminal
strict
because they were not needed due to the
3 Consequently, because of new legal standards of
place for abortions.
be shown that
fetal protections available today in the area of torts, if it could
3ss against the natural father's interests-a mother was acting tortiously

issue an Order of Protection for
476 N.Y.S.2d 991 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1984) (allowing court to
("If a decedent has acknowla fetus); Illinois Probate Act of 1975, 755 ILCS 5/2-2 (1994)
or after his death a decedent
lifetime
his
during
if
edged paternity of an illegitimate person or
person is heir of his father
that
person,
illegitimate
an
of
has been adjudged to be the father
his father might have inherited,
and of any paternal ancestor and of any person from whom
if living.").
intentional homicide of an
381. In Illinois, a person who kills a fetus is guilty of the
murder, except that
first-degree
as
severe
as
almost
unborn, a charge which carries a penalty
v. Ford, 581
People
See
(1994).
5/9-1.2
ILCS
720
imposed.
be
the death penalty may not
statute).
N.E.2d 1189, 1200 (111.App. Ct. 1991) (upholding fetal homicide
1990) (allowing Petition
382. See In re Stefanel C., 157 A.D.2d 322 (N.Y. App. Div.
tested positive for
child
whose
mother
for Neglect to proceed against a cocaine-addicted
See generally In
pregnancy).
the
during
use
drug
to
admitted
cocaine at birth, when mother
D., 263 Cal. Rptr. 869 (Cal.
re Baby X., 293 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); In re Troy
(finding mother neglected
1979)
Ct. App. 1989); In re Male R., 422 N.Y.S.2d 819 (N.Y.
of the mother's drug use
result
the
as
child when it was born suffering of drug withdrawal
during pregnancy).
383. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 217-18 (1973):
actually present, it
The phenomenon of life takes time to develop, and until it is
be homicide,
hardly
would
formation
to
cannot be destroyed. Its interruption prior
has
prosecutor
No
....
such
as
it
regard
not
and as we have seen, society does
would
This
fetus.
a
of
life
of
taking
the
charging
indictment
ever returned a murder
be the case if the fetus constituted hinuan life.
to Keeler v. Superior Ct.
Id. (emphasis added). Justice Douglas, in his opinion above, cited
that a child had to be
proposition
the
for
1970),
(Cal.
of Amador Co., 470 P.2d 617, 620
ILCS 5/9-1.2 (1994)
720
Contra
sustained.
be
could
born alive before a homicide conviction
as
as severe first-degree murder
(the Illinois Feticide Statute which imposes a penalty almost
Gloria C. v. William C. 476
for the death of a fetus any time after conception); In re
of Protection for Gloria C.'s
Order
N.Y.S.2d 991 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1984) (granting a separate
fetus).
384. See supra note 361.
health problems, had to
385. For example, if a pregnant woman had pregnancy-related
education because of
or
employment
acquire
to
care for the child alone, or would be unable
not be malicious as these
a pending pregnancy, her reasons for aborting would probably
and its progeny. See Roe v.
reasons are all within the rationales furthered by Roe v. Wade
v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973). See also Planned Parenthood
to prevent the father from
aborting
was
she
2809 (1992). However, a woman's reasoning that
somehow showing that
her
without
all)
at
child
a
ever having custody (or from ever having
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rather than justifiably asserting her own privacy rights--strengthened interests
in the unborn 6 might allow states to protect
a father's fundamental
interests in his future child prior to viability. 387
3.

Changes in States' Powers and Interests

The third and perhaps most important change the
Court should consider
prior to deciding whether an injunction could be
issued in a paternal rights
case, is how the strength of the state's interests
have changed since past
paternal rights cases were decided.388 If, as Justice
O'Connor alluded to
in Casey, the holding in Roe v. Wade was in
error, 38 9 or--as suggested in
the two prior parts of this article--the Roe v. Wade
holding does not apply
to most married women as it did to those women
similarly situated to Ms.

the man was unfit would tend to show a malicious intent.
386. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2867 (Rehnquist,
part). In departing from a strict scrutiny standard C.J., concurring in part, dissenting in
and applying instead a rational basis
approach, the above concurring Justices declared:
We have stated above our belief that the Constitution
does not subject state
abortion regulations to heightened scrutiny. Accordingly,
we think that the correct
analysis is that set forth by the plurality opinion in
Webster. A woman's interest
in having an abortion is a form of liberty protected by
the Due Process Clause, but
States may regulate abortion procedures in ways rationally
related to a legitimate
state interest.

Id.

387. See Conn v. Conn, 526 N.E.2d 958, 961 (Ind.
1988) (describing the facts in the
lower court opinion at 525 N.E.2d 612 (Ind. App. Ct.
1988)). The court in Conn was required
to decide whether a wife could abort the unborn child
she and her husband conceived. Id.
Her husband wished to raise the child, and she originally
wished to bear the fetus to term and
place the child up for adoption. Conn at 961. Instead,
she decided to have an abortion if there
was any possibility that her estranged husband could obtain
custody. Id. See also Doe v. Doe,
314 N.E.2d 128, 130-32 (Mass. 1974) (deciding whether
a wife could be compelled to carry
her pregnancy to term if she felt the father was unfit
and she would not want him to have
custody because he previously stated that he would
refuse to pay child support if the child
were born). Cf Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339, 342-43
(Fla.
denied, 415 U.S. 958 (1974) (deciding whether a biological Dist. Ct. App. 1973), cert.
father who had been married
before and had other children could compel a girlfriend
he impregnated to carry the fetus to
term). Most of the above cases relied heavily upon the
holding
fathers' interests. Cf supra notes 286-95 and accompanying in Danforth to disallow the
text (describing the Danforth
error).
388. See infra notes 400-06 and accompanying text
(discussing (1) changes in the
standard of review for abortion legislation; (2) dismantling
of the trimester approach; and (3)
Justice O'Connor's allusion that Roe may have been
decided in error).
389. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791,
2810-11 (1992).
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Roe, 390 it is critical for one to predict what weight the state's interests
whether a man could ever obtain enforceable
would carry, to determine
39'
reproductive rights.
For example, in the situation where a pregnant woman would wish to
abort a fetus, but the natural father would wish to raise the child after birth,
only a state or federal court could determine--on a case-by-case basis--if the
father had a superseding interest in the fetus that is sufficient to warrant
3
enjoining the woman from aborting. 1 Similarly, such an injunction could
393
only be issued if the state had the authority to intervene in a woman's
abortion decision prior to viability. Presently, however, the Supreme Court
has held that the state, acting on its own behalf, may not interfere in the
to
woman's decision by statutorily banning non-therapeutic abortions prior
395 and
viability 3 4 (the original time frame established in Roe v. Wade
39
Would a restraining order
later reiterated by a plurality in Casey).
390. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 120 (1973).
its own
391. For instance, considering statements made in Danforth, if the state had
to a
authority
its
delegate
could
it
viability,
to
prior
abortions
interest in regulating some
J.,
(White,
(1976)
putative father. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 68, 93
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
the relative
392. Compare Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (1992) (balancing
with
context)
in-vitro
the
in
basis
case-by-case
a
on
interests
weights of the progenitors'
in the
Neither
dissenting).
J.,
(Pivarnek,
(1990)
960
958,
N.E.2d
526
Conn v. Conn,
assign a greater
Constitution, nor in Roe v. Wade can be found "a rule that the State must
to a father's
than
abortion,
by
life
human
potential
a
value to a mother's decision to cut off
Id.
child."
live
a
into
decision to let it mature
having
Incidentally, some may suggest that an injunction preventing a woman from
woman
the
that
and
an abortion would only be good in the state in which it was issued,
doctrine
would only need to cross state lines to violate the court's order. The Constitutional
same
the
injunction
the
give
to
states
neighboring
requires
of Full Faith and Credit, however,
U.S.
See
made.
was
decree
the
where
state
the
in
given
been
have
legal effect as it would
Acts,
public
the
to
State
CONST. art. IV, § 3. "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State." Id.
cannot
393. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 70 (1976) ("[W]e
ability
the
unilaterally
spouse
the
give
to
authority
constitutional
the
hold that the State has
right.").
that
lacks
to prohibit the wife from terminating her pregnancy, when the State itself
394. See supra notes 269 & 273 (discussing gestation for viability).
395. See supra notes 269 & 273.
J.,
396. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2798 (1992) (O'Connor,
in fetal
interest
State's
the
which
at
point
earliest
the
marks
("[V]iability
plurality opinion)
abortions.")
life is constitutionally adequate to justify a legislative ban on nontherapeutic
since
("Clearly,
69
at
U.S.
428
(emphasis added). See also Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
and
physician
the
when
stage,
first
the
during
abortion
the State cannot regulate or proscribe
person,
particular
any
to
authority
delegate
cannot
State
the
decision,
his patient make that
112 S. Ct.
even the spouse, to prevent abortion during that same period."). But see Casey,
of
regulation
prohibited
that
at 2816-17 (overruling those parts of Thornburgh and Akron I
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requiring a woman to carry a pregnancy to term be the same
as a statutory
ban on non-therapeutic abortions?397 The dissenting judge
in a parental
rights case believed it would not be.398 In that case he stated
the following:
We are not faced here with a state statute that mandates
the determination of every case by giving absolute veto
power to one party over the decision of the other regardless of the facts and circumstances. This case arises from
the attempt of a trial judge to make a decision involving
one of the issues . . . arising from and involved in the
marriage relationship of these two people .... A finding
that the wife conceives, even in the first trimester, fixes a
responsibility on the husband to care for that child in the
same manner he cares for those already born and in existence at the time of the dissolution of the marriage. It is
incomprehensible to me that this same trial court is foreclosed from even considering the question of whether the
wife should destroy this creation of both parties in the
marital relationship merely because she wants to. 399
This judge's opinion is further bolstered by changes in the
law in the
short time since his opinion was written. First, the law no longer
forbids all
government regulation of abortions during the first trimester. 4
00 Second,
abortion during the first trimester); Id. at 2819. Both the O'Connor
and Rehnquist opinions
found that "[nlot all governmental intrusion is of necessity
unwarranted." Id. In doing away
with the trimester framework first established in Roe v. Wade,
the Casey Court recognized
that beginning with Webster v. Reproductive Health Serv., 492
U.S. 490 (1989), prior cases
which constitutionally forbade "all governmental attempts to
influence a woman's decision"
were "incompatible with . . . [the] substantial state interest
in potential life throughout
pregnancy." Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820.
397. See supra note 308 (listing cases in which lower courts
previously considered the
issuance of a restraining order to be an impermissible state
action).
398. Conn v. Conn, 526 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. 1988) (Pivarnek,
J., dissenting).
399. Id. at 961-62.
400. Compare the following statement in Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at
2818 (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion) ("We abandon the trimester
framework ... as a rigid
prohibition on all previability regulation aimed at the protection
of fetal life ... [because]
it misconceives the nature of the pregnant woman's interest;
and ... undervalues the State's
interest in potential life .... ), with id., 112 S. Ct. at 2866-67
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring
in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). "Despite the
efforts of the joint opinion, the
undue burden standard presents nothing more workable than
the trimester framework which
it discards today.... A woman's interest in having an abortion
is a form of liberty protected
by the Due Process Clause, but States may regulate abortion
procedures in ways rationally
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throughout
the states now have a substantial interest in potential life
the
persuade
to
to attempt
pregnancy4 °t --an interest which allows the state
4°
standard
the
mother to choose childbirth over abortion. w Additionally,
in the abortion
used to determine whether or not a state regulation is valid °3
to an "undue
test
interest"
state
context has changed from a "compelling
4' Finally, although a pregnant woman might contend that a
burden" test.
to make the
restraining order against her would deprive her of her "liberty"
to viabiliultimate decision of whether to terminate her pregnancy prior
5 the woman may have consented" to the state's intervention by
ty,
fetus she
providing notice of her pregnancy to the biological father of the
is carrying.
to
Assuming, arguendo, that a state court would actually be authorized
what
fetus,
a
aborting
from
issue an order restraining a pregnant mother
related to a legitimate state interest." Id. (citations omitted).
401. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820.
Health, 462 U.S. 416,
402. Id. at 2821. Accord City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
over abortion
childbirth
444 n.38 (1983) ("[L]egislation to further an interest in preferring
abortion that
to
access
on
'restriction
was permissible ... only because it did not add any
was not already there.'").
legislative enactments
403. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (holding that
at stake). See also
interests
state
legitimate
the
only
express
to
drawn
must be narrowly
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
the abortion setting by
404. The undue burden test was first suggested to be used in
416, 462-63 (1983).
U.S.
462
Health,
Reprod.
for
Ctr.
Justice O'Connor in Akron v. Akron
regulation will be
the
decision,
abortion
woman's
the
on
burden
undue
If a regulation is an
constitutional.
deemed
be
invalidated. If the regulation does not pose an undue burden, it will
C.J.,
(Rehnquist,
(1992)
2867
2791,
Id. But see Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct.
is a
abortion
an
having
in
interest
woman's
("A
concurring in part and dissenting in part)
abortion
regulate
may
States
but
Clause,
Process
Due
the
by
form of liberty protected
procedures in ways rationally related to a legitimate state interest.").
("[A] State may not
405. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2821 (O'Connor, J., plurality)
pregnancy before
her
terminate
to
decision
ultimate
prohibit any woman from making the
("To view an
(1989)
n.4
124
110,
U.S.
491
D.,
Gerald
v.
H.
viability."). Compare Michael
upon other
effect
its
from
act which is assertedly the subject of a liberty interest in isolation
the case
where
gun
a
firing
in
people [is] ...like inquiring whether there is a liberty interest
392
note
supra
and
body.")
person's
another
at hand happens to involve its discharge into
took
opinion
majority
Court's
the
that
implores
which
(referring to Justice Pivarnek's dissent
Roe and Danforth). Conn
the resolution of the couple's situation "beyond the holdings" in
v. Conn, 526 N.E.2d at 958.
plurality
J.,
406. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v.Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2817 (O'Connor,
may
decision
her
make
to
viability
until
waited
has
opinion) (asserting that a woman who
child).
forming
the
of
behalf
on
intervening
state
the
to
be said to have "consented"
the state intervening into her
Analogously, a woman should be said to have consented to
received notice of her
already
has
he
abortion decision on behalf of the natural father if
society.
child's
future
his
in
pregnancy and he desires to protect his interests
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methods might be utilized to persuade a court that a man's rights have been
violated in such a way that an injunction would be warranted? An advocate
for the man may attempt to utilize two legal theories; a Balancing
Approach' and a Wrongful Termination Approach. 408 As a third alternative, if a pregnancy has not yet taken place, an advocate for the man
may
attempt to contractually protect his client with a pre-nuptial agreement.'
Prior to a state court accepting either of the first two approaches listed
above, the biological father would first have to receive notice of
his coprogenitor's intention to abort the fetus. 410 Voluntary or "constructive"
notice is a necessary prerequisite because, as discussed above, the Supreme
Court has affirmatively held that spousal notice 411 and consent 4 2
will
not statutorily be compelled of a man's pregnant wife. Nevertheless,
if a
woman voluntarily notifies her partner that she intends to abort a jointly
conceived fetus (or he obtains notice in some other way), it could be
argued
that the woman has consented 413 to state intervention into her decision
the natural father asserts an interest in what he has joined in conceiving.if
Thereafter, the interests to be balanced should be the woman's right
to
protect her maternal health and financial well-being, 1 4 against the father's
procreative and associational rights in his offspring. 5
E. PROPOSED CAUSES OF ACTION

1.

The Strengthened BalancingApproach

The Balancing Approach--by which the constitutional rights of two
individuals are balanced against each other to determine whose
rights
deserve greater priority4 1 6--remain s one of the most equitable approaches
407. See infra Part IV. E. 1.
408. See infra Part IV. E. 2.
409. See infra Part IV. E. 3.
410. See supra note 312 (discussing why a mandatory notice statute
is constitutionally
impermissible).
411. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2831 (1992).
412. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976).
413. Cf. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2817.

414. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162 (1973) (inferring financial considerations).

415. See supra note 19 (giving legal origin of procreation rights). See
also notes 23238 and accompanying text (describing associational rights). For equal
protection purposes,
compare to note 104 (discussing a woman's fundamental right not to
be compelled to abort

or be sterilized if she wishes to have the ability to procreate).

416. The courts balance rights in a variety of settings. In most constitutional
disputes,
state's interests are balanced against individuals' interests. In other state
and federal actions,
individual's rights are balanced against each other such as in the
areas of defamation,
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4 17 It is difficult to discern, however,
to deciding paternal rights cases.
whether a state action is unconstitutionally affecting both the man and the
418
of
woman in a paternal rights dispute, or whether a party's state cause
4' 9 For
action needs to be balanced against another's constitutional right.
a
example, the Supreme Court has already decided that if a state passes
their
over
power
veto
statute giving husbands an arbitrary all-encompassing
of
wive's abortion decisions, the state would generally be depriving women
420 Yet, the Supreme Court, to date, has not had the
their liberty interests.
opportunity to address whether those portions of their prior decisions which
deprive men of their
prohibited all regulation of abortions prior to viability,
42' Therefore, although
fundamental procreative and associational rights.
past prohibitions on state abortion regulations prior to viability prevented
state courts from issuing injunctions restraining pregnant women from
422 present decisions have not
aborting their husbands' future offspring,

invasion of privacy, etc.
emphasized
417. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972). The Supreme Court
each with
individuals
"two
but
in Eisenstadt that the married couple is not a single entity,
v. Casey,
Parenthood
Planned
also
See
Id.
makeup."
a separate intellectual and emotional
individuals,
protects
Constitution
("Tie
opinion)
plurality
J.,
112 S. Ct. at 2830 (O'Connor,
interference is
men and women alike, from unjustified state interference, even when that
law by
created
court
Wade
v.
Roe
enacted into law for the benefit of their spouses."). The
interference
state
any
without
pregnancy
her
granting a woman the absolute right to terminate
decision was
during the period from conception until viability. Although the purpose of that
man of his
the
to benefit the woman, its effect in paternal rights cases is to deprive
Cf
offspring.
developing
his
of
fundamental right to procreate and his right to the "society"
generally
regulation,
labor
state
a
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating
right requiring
limiting work hours, by declaring that the right to contract was a fundamental
v. New
Nebbia
Contra
sustain).
to
court
the
for
test
relationship
rational
more than a mere
nor
rights
York, 291 U.S. 502, 510 (1934) (overruling Lochner) ("But neither property
his
use
will
at
may
citizen
the
if
exist
contract rights are absolute; for government cannot
them
work
to
contract
of
freedom
his
exercise
or
property to the detriment of his fellows,
right
harm." (footnotes omitted)). Cf Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) ("The privacy
should
Court
involved . ..cannot be said to be absolute."). Accordingly, the Supreme
to
invalidate those portions of Danforth and Casey which have erroneously been utilized
interests.
procreational
their
of
deprive notified husbands
418. See, e.g., Axelrod, supra note 132, at 697-98 (discussing under what circumstances
against a man).
it might be argued that a state-funded abortion could constitute a state action
the balancing
describe
which
text
419. Compare infra note 441 and accompanying
cases.
defamation
approach utilized in
420. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976).
("I
421. See, e.g., Conn v. Conti, 526 N.E.2d 958, 961 (1988) (Pivarnek, J., dissenting)
Supreme
States
United
the
with
recognize the ultimate decision on issues such as this rests
the law as
Court. . . .[Whatever our reservations,] [o]ur duty consists only of applying
Court.").
Supreme
announced by the
a court
422. See, e.g., Doe v. Smith, 527 N.E.2d 177, 178 (Ind. 1988) ("Any issuance of
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ruled out that a man may enforce an injunction preventing his wife from

interfering with his paternal interests.423

To protect a man from an unconstitutional deprivation of his paternal
rights, a state court must be allowed to balance the parties' interests.42 4
It
may only do so if the man is able to achieve the following two
objectives:
(1) have the Supreme Court declare that the portions of Casey and
Danforth
which deal with regulation of the abortion decision prior to viability
are
unconstitutional deprivations of a man's liberty in paternal rights cases; 425
and (2) formulate a private cause of action against a pregnant women
who
unjustifiably seeks to abort a fetus in which her husband
asserts an
interest. 41 These two conditions must be met, otherwise a state court
never be able to issue an injunction 427 to prevent the harm a woman will
would
inflict upon her husband by aborting his offspring.4 a
Assuming a man asserting a paternal right could establish that
the
holdings in Casey and Danforth unconstitutionally deprive
him of his
injunction and the possible invocation of the court's contempt
power would sufficiently
constitute state action, which was proscribed by Danforth.").
Cf. Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2820 (1992) (Former cases which found
all governmental attempts
to influence a woman's decision prior to viability as being unwarranted
are "incompatible
with ... [the] substantial state interest in potential life throughout
pregnancy.").
423. See supra note 421 (recognizing that the end decision
lies with the Supreme
Court). See also supra notes 296-308 (giving examples of strongly
dissenting lower court
opinions which have tried to resolve the issue).
424. See, e.g., Conn v. Conn, 526 N.E.2d at 962 (Pivarnek,
J., dissenting) ("It is
incomprehensible to me that this same trial court is foreclosed
from even considering the
question of whether the wife should be permitted to destroy this
creation of both parties in
the marital relationship merely because she wants to.").
425. Id. at 958-59.
426. See Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869, 870 (Mich. 1980)
(allowing a husband a
cause of action against his wife for the negligent infliction
of pre-natal injuries to their
offspring). But see Przybyla v. Przybyla, 275 N.W.2d 112, 115
(Wis. Ct. App. 1978). In
Przybyla a state court refused to recognize that a woman who
engaged in constitutionally
protected behavior acted in an extreme and outrageous manner
regardless of her motives. Id.
But cf Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 455-56 (1976)(finding
that a defendant was
liable for committing a state tort despite a competing First Amendment
constitutional right).
427. See generally supra note 308 and accompanying text (regarding
paternal rights
cases which have failed because of the holding in Danforth).
428. See supra note 426 (referring to the Przybyla case). Also
note that a man in a
paternal rights case must probably utilize a private cause of action,
because--unlike the
actions in Roe, Danforth, Webster, and Casey--the actor is a private
individual and not the
state. See, e.g., DeShaney v. Winncbego County Dep't of Soc. Servs.,
489 U.S. 189, 195-96
(1989) (holding that the Due Process Clause does not confer a
right that the government will
protect a person from the acts of another individual) (duty only created
if the state makes the
individual more vulnerable by'its acts).
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states
fundamental rights, the portions of those decisions which prohibit
an
seeking
woman
a
of
path
from placing a substantial obstacle in the
42 9 A
invalidated.
abortion before the fetus attains viability would be
a private
husband could then argue for an extension of present laws to create
seeks to
cause of action against his pregnant wife if she unjustifiably
43' He could
interfere with his interests by terminating the pregnancy.
pursue two approaches--one in tort, the other in contract.
2.

Wrongful Termination of Pregnancy
origin
The woman's right to decide to terminate her pregnancy has its

in tort law. 43 ' There, upon the urgings of Mr.432Warren and Mr. Brandeis,
433

The multi-faceted tort
the tort of "invasion of privacy" was born.
against the
was considered primarily a "protection of private ''4individuals
of this tort was
unjustifiable infliction of mental pain and distress. ' Part
435 At the constimatters.
the right of privacy from intrusion into personal
436
from
tutional level, the privacy right was expanded to include privacy
decisionunwarranted governmental intrusion into certain types of personal
of
concept
the
in
"implicit
or
making in areas that were "fundamental"
7 The woman's right to decide whether to terminate her
43
ordered liberty."
438
the
pregnancy is rooted in one of the "fundamental" areas. However,
Illinois,
429. See Casey, 112 S.Ct. at 2820; Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69. Cf. Stanley v.
care, custody and
companionship,
the
in
parent
a
of
interest
("[Tlhe
(1972)
651
405 U.S. 645,
a momentum for respect
management of his or her children 'come(s) to this Court with
from shifting economic
merely
derive
which
lacking when appeal is made to liberties
countervailing
"powerful
a
have
to
state
the
required
court
arrangements.'"). The Stanley
Id.
right.
fundamental
man's
the
burden
validly
could
it
interest" before
reasons for utilizing a
430. See supra note 293-96 and accompanying text (describing
private cause of action).
the Rehnquist Court, 81
431. See generally Mark A. Racanelli, Reversals: Privacy and
GEO. L. J. 443 (1992).
193 (1890).
432. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
of a
misappropriation
(i)
factions:
four
433. The common-law tort is comprised of
of
disclosure
public
(3)
matters;
private
person's likeness; (2) unreasonable intrusion into
THE
KEETON,
&
PROSSER
generally,
See
eye.
public
the
in
light
private facts; and (4) false
LAW OF TORTS 849-69 (5th ed. 1984).
THE LAW OF TORTS §
434. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON
117, at 850 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter KEETON].
435. Id. at 854.
M. Beaney, The
436. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See William
(1966).
979
REV.
L.
Griswold Case and the Expanding Right to Privacy, WiSC.
Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713
437. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977); Paul v.
(1973).
113
(1976); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
to marriage, procreation,
438. The areas of fundamental rights include matters relating
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man's right to procreate 439 and a host of other family-related rights are
also protected by a fundamental privacy right. In addition, his decision to
procreate may be protected by other fundamental associational rights.' °
In other areas of tort law, the courts have devised means of balancing
private tort causes of action against fundamental constitutional rights."'
Because no constitutional right is "absolute,"" 2 the courts have sometimes
relied on tort and criminal law principles to place limits on constitutional
privileges." 3 It is here, in tort, that a man's rights become most evident.
In the defamation area, for instance, a person has a right not to be
harmed by the defamatory comments of another.' " Notwithstanding this
right, a reporter has the fundamental constitutional right of free press and
free speech when writing about a public figure or public event."45 Therecontraception, family relationships, child rearing and education. Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. at
152. Other areas of fundamental rights are those rights independently and explicitly
guaranteed by a constitutional provision other than the Equal Protection Clause.
439. Id.
440. Id.
441. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 511 (1984) (loss
of
constitutional First Amendment privilege requires a mental state of awareness of the
falsity).
See generally Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (finding that despite
a First
Amendment right to free press, defendant was liable for libelous statements) (defendant's
report was ambiguous thereby showing a mental state of recklessness); Anderson
v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (requiring plaintiff to allege and prove by clear
and
convincing evidence that defendant had knowingly or recklessly published defamatory
information about a public figure in order for plaintiff to overcome defendant's
First
Amendment privilege). But see generally Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders,
Inc.,
472 U.S. 749 (1985) (requiring a mental state of only negligence on the part of a
defamer
of a private person to overcome the defamer's constitutional First Amendment right
of free
speech or free press).
442. "Even the broadest reading of Roe, however, has not suggested that there
is a
constitutional right to abortion on demand." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.Ct.
2791,
2825 (1992) (O'Connor, J., plurality opinion). See also id. at 2826 ("Rather,
the right
protected by Roe is a right to decide to terminate a pregnancy free of undue interference
by
the State."); Conn v. Conn. 526 N.E.2d 958 (Ind. 1988) (Pivarnek, J.,
dissenting). "At least
up to now, no right has been determined to be absolute. Every right must yield and
respond
to the rights of others and to the stability of society, in the marriage relationship
and all
others." Id. at 962.
443. See supra note 441 (describing the Supreme Court's holdings as to the mental
states required to overcome a defamer's First Amendment right to freedom of speech
and
freedom of press).
444. See KEETON, supra note 434. "[D]efamation is an invasion of the interest
in
reputation and good name." Id. at 771.
445. "Congress shall make no law respecting establishment of religion, or prohibiting
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right
of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances."
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fore, in some instances, the reporter's defamatory comments may be privileged."' The privilege, however, is limited."' Tort law has modified the
defamer's privilege when certain defamatory comments are made with the8
actor's knowledge of their falsehood or reckless disregard of their truth,"
9
tending to indicate the publisher's injurious intent." It is at that point that
4
the defamer loses the constitutional privilege.
Analogously, a woman's right to privately decide to terminate her
pregnancy should only be protected as long as the decision is not intended
4 st
to be injurious to another person's rights. For example, if a pregnant
woman makes the decision to abort only after consulting her physician and
without notifying anyone else, she should be protected in her private
decision-making.4 52 One might compare the woman's condition at this
U.S. CONST. amend. 1.
446. See generally New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (privileging
defendant's remarks that are not knowingly or recklessly false).
447. See generally Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (requiring less than
but
the knowing or reckless standard of mental state when a private individual is involved,
to
needed
states
mental
(describing
441
requiring proof of damages). See also supra note
rights).
overcome a defamer's constitutional
448. Id.
449. See supra note 441, providing examples of the mental states required to overcome
a First Amendment privilege.
450. ld.
451. Warren and Brandeis thought that the privileges which applied to defamation
note
would apply equally to the tort of invasion of privacy. See Warren & Brandeis, supra
is
pregnancy
her
terminate
to
432. Accordingly, because a woman's constitutional privilege
privacy
to
privilege
defamation
the
of
scope
the
grounded in the privacy area, if one applies
rights, Warren and Brandeis' comments suggest that the woman's privacy right should be
with
outweighed by a man's privacy right not to have another person unreasonably interfere
would
privilege
the
of
his procreational and associational interests. Similarly, the scope
require the man to prove that certain mental states exist on the part of a pregnant woman
of
who aborts his developing child. Thus, utilizing the rationale used for the tort of invasion
distressand
pain
mental
of
infliction
unjustifiable
the
of
free
be
to
right
the
privacy--namely,
if
-the woman's right to terminate her pregnancy would only be constitutionally privileged
father
the
upon
harm
inflict
to
intent
wilful
her actions did not show a negligent, reckless or
the
of the developing fetus. Of course, maternal health concerns would further privilege
negate
completely
would
incest
and
rape
whereas
necessity,
private
of
matter
a
as
woman
the pregnant woman's duty to perform on the presumed implied contract to procreate for
reasons of duress, unconscionability or undue influence. See supra notes 67-68 (excusing
performance on a contract or negating its existence on the basis of undue influence, duress
or unconscionability); Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (Eng. 1884) (justifying
a group of stranded mariners' actions in consuming a child in order to spare their own lives).
452. The abortion decision is a medical decision and the basic responsibility for the
and
decision rests with the physician, taking into consideration the mother's various health
(1973).
166
153,
113,
U.S.
410
Wade,
social needs. See Roe v.
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point to the condition of a pregnant woman who conceived only days before
she was killed by a negligent driver. It is unlikely that the mother, the father
or the physician would know of her pregnancy. Therefore, although in
theory the father would have had a cause of action for wrongful death, in
fact, he would never have known of the pregnancy and therefore would have
no loss of "society." Similarly, a putative father with no actual or constructive notice of having shared in the creation of an offspring would know of
no loss of society, and consequently, would have no cause of action for
Wrongful Termination of Pregnancy. Without the father having notice, the
wife would not have unjustifiably inflicted mental pain and distress upon
453
him.
To continue the analogy further, just as a person has a right not to be
defamed, so too a putative father has a right not to have the "society" of his
developing child taken away from him by the unreasonable acts of
others.454 Typically, this right is protected by the tort of wrongful
death. 4"5 However, when the death is accomplished by the mother aborting
the fetus prior to viability, the act, much like the right of free speech, is
constitutionally privileged by the woman's right to decide to terminate her
pregnancy. 4 Therefore, just as the fundamental right of free speech loses
its privileged status when the publisher's words are so untruthful as to be
malicious or reckless toward the person of whom the defamer speaks, 457
so too should the pregnant woman's right to decide to have an abortion be
limited by the reasonableness of her actions as set forth by the original
premises underlying Roe v. Wade.458 Hence, a woman's acts which go
453. Although it may be argued that a man loses the society of his offspring regardless
of whether he receives notice of a pending abortion, much like with defamation, the
upshot
of the privilege lies in the tortfeaser's mental state or lack of constitutional justification,
not
in the end result of the tort.
454. See Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Med. Ctr., 512 N.E.2d 538 (N.Y.
1987). In Martinez, genetic counselors and a medical center were liable for damages suffered
by a pregnant mother who was negligently advised to abort a one-month-old fetus.
The
mother felt justified in aborting the fetus believing it would have been severely deformed.
However, she suffered great emotional harm when she discovered that the abortion
was
unnecessary. Id. at 538.
Although the duty of reasonable care and the acts of the counselors in Martinez were
directed towards the pregnant mother, id., equal protection dictates that the same emotional
harm could result from the breach of a duty of reasonable care towards a biological
father.
455. See supra note 306 (describing the Illinois feticide and wrongful death statutes
which allow for a cause of action for the destruction of a pre-viable fetus).
456. See generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992).
457. Supra note 441 (listing cases which set out the requisite mental states required to
overcome a First Amendment Privilege in the defamation area).
458. See supra note 246 for a suggested scope of the privilege. Martinez, however,
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beyond Roe's premises should constitute a Wrongful Termination of
Pregnancy.5 9
To present a prima facie case of Wrongful Termination of Pregnancy,
the putative father should prove the elements required of the pertinent
wrongful death statute in the state involved.' Here, it would be important
that the state in which the man seeks to sue have a wrongful death statute
that protects fetal life prior to viability.4' Provided these conditions were
met, the man should be capable of prevailing if he is successful in arguing
for an extension of wrongful death law to the wrongful termination of a
pregnancy. 2
For example, beginning with the element of duty, one state justice in
a dissenting opinion asserted that a married woman who originally intended
to carry a child to term should have had a duty to do so if the natural father
3
has declared an interest in raising the child himself.4 The scope of the
would suggest that even a negligent termination of a pregnancy may be actionable. Martinez,
512 N.E.2d 538.
459. This argument assumes one is able to convince a court to reasonably extend the
law relating to wrongful death to a wrongful termination of pregnancy. See generally supra
note 379. See also KEETON, supra note 444, at 946, 952 (describing the general causes of
action covered by wrongful death statutes and the damages recoverable).
460. See STUART SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH (2d ed. 1975), Appendix
A, listing all statutes. See also John C. Wunsch, Parental Recoveryfor Loss of Society of the
Unborn: The Plaintiffs Perspective, 77 ILL. B.J. 538 (1989).
461. See supra note 460. In Illinois, so long as a physician legally performs an abortion
and the woman gives informed consent, he may not be prosecuted for wrongful death. See
740 ILCS 180/2.2 (1994). But note that this statute fails to address what duty, if any, is owed
to a male progenitor.
462. KEETON, supra note 434, at 164-65 (describing elements of a negligence cause of
action as consisting of. (1) a duty to conform to a standard of conduct for the protection of
others against unreasonable risks; (2) breach for failing to conform to the standard; (3) a
reasonably close causal connection between the accused tortfeasor's conduct and the
plaintiff's harm; and (4) actual loss or damages to the plaintiff's interests). In the State of
Illinois, a man would most likely have to utilize an intentional tort theory rather than one for
negligence. See Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 360 (I1. 1988) (refusing to
recognize a tort 4ction against a mother for unintentional infliction of prenatal injuries). But
see Rights of Married Persons Act, 750 ILCS 65/1 (1994) (allowing spouses to sue one
another for tortious acts committed during the marriage) (overruling Act prior to 1988 in
which suits against spouses were barred under the doctrine of interspousal immunity).
463. In one paternal rights case, a dissenting Justice Hennessey would have found that
the "wife has a duty in these circumstances to refrain from any intentional interference" as
a matter of justice to the husband and for the moral force of the pronouncement. Doe v. Doe,
dissenting). See Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d
314 N.E.2d 128, 134 (Mass. 1974) (Hennessey, J.,
member of one who is negligently,
family
a
close
to
duty
a
(creating
1968)
912, 921 (Cal.
572 N.E.2d 1073, 1076 (Iil. App.
McDonald's,
v.
Martin
Cf.
harmed).
tortiously
otherwise
or
Ct. 1991) (finding liability for harm which results from a voluntary undertaking). Erie R. Co.
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pregnant woman's duty, however, would only be to avoid an unreasonable
risk of harm to the progenitor asserting a paternal right.' Thus, if because
of the pregnancy, a woman's own life were in danger, a decision to
terminate the pregnancy would not be unreasonable. ' 0 Furthermore, if she
had been raped, 466 the child was not his, 7 or she had some other reasonable justification for interfering with his associational interests in the
developing child, she would have no duty to maintain the status quo.' If,
however, her only reasons for aborting a fetus were to deprive her husband
of a child, her acts would create an unreasonable risk of harm to him. 4 9
Therefore, in such a case, she should have a duty not to engage in any
v. Stewart, 40 F.2d 855. 857 (6th Cir. 1930) (holding that by voluntarily warning persons
driving automobiles of the danger of oncoming trains, a volunteer train watchman undertook
an affirmative duty to protect crossers thereby subjecting him to, liability for harm to a
crosser who relied on him).
464. See generally KEE'ON, supra note 434, at 280-93 (discussing the scope of a
defendant's duty as only extending to foreseeable consequences that are the natural and
probable result of her actions, although consequences which are related in time and space to
an incident or ones resulting in the same hazard as the hazard risked also fall within the
scope). Most importantly, harm must be to a foreseeable plaintiff. See Palsgraf v. Long Island
Rail Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928) (requiring a duty only to a foreseeable plaintiff).
465. Compare Przybyla v. Przybyla, 275 N.W.2d 112 (Wis. Ct. App. 1978) (examining
a woman's behavior under an intentional tort theory) with Martinez, 512 N.E.2d 538 (N.Y.
1987) (extending an independent duty to the parent of a negligently aborted offspring).
466. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2826-28 (1992).
467. Id. at 2828.
468. See also Ryan & Plutzer, When Married Women Have Abortions: Spousal
Notificationand Marital Interaction, 51 J. MARR. & FAM. 41, 44 (1989). It could likely be
argued that since the child would not be his, he would not have standing under the wrongful
death statute. See, e.g., supra note 444, at 947-49. Nonetheless, if the pregnant woman had
at some point entertained the thought of bearing the child and the husband agreed to care for
it as his own, Michael H. may give a right to the husband even in a situation where he is not
the biological father. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
469. A specialist in the effects of abortion on men, relates that men are often left with
"role conflict, excessive guilt, depression" and the end of a relationship with
his partner as
the result of an abortion in cases where the father wanted the child. See Vincent Rue, Ph.D.
Forgotten Fathers; Men and Abortion, LIFE CYCLE BOOKS (1986) at 1. Aside from these
personal experiences, his harm could be measured in mental anguish and loss of society
damages if the wrongful death statute in the jurisdiction allows for such damages. See
KEETON, supra note 434, at 452-54; Flagert v. Smith, 367 N.W.2d 188, 189 (S.D. 1985)
(recovery for loss of companionship and society regardless of age of decedent and despite
the fact that pain and suffering damages are forbidden); Maloney v. Kaminski, 368 N.W.2d
447, 458 (Neb. 1985) (Thcre is "no requirement that there be evidence of dollar value of the
companionship"). Cf Dunn v. Rose Way Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830, 831 (Iowa 1983) (allowing
"actual loss of services, companionship and society" resulting from injury
or death of "an
unborn viable child").

NORTHERN IWLNOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

220

[VOL. 15

conduct which would interfere with or470destroy the "society" the natural
father has in his developing child's life.
The second element of the tort of wrongful termination of pregnancy
would be breach. 47' Breach of a woman's duty could easily be established
by showing that she unreasonably aborted a fetus despite a duty not to harm
the developing child. 7 Since evidence of a duty not to harm the potentiality of the child could best be established by an injunction forbidding a
pregnant woman from harming it; a woman's violation of an injunction,
absent any mitigating circumstances, should be sufficient evidence of a
breach.473
In addition to a breach, the father would have to prove that he
74
sustained foreseeable injurie 4 and that the injuries were caused by the
475
woman's breach of a duty owed to him. Causation, although difficult
to prove, would be no more difficult to prove than in a wrongful death
case.

476

Finally, after establishing the first three elements of his cause of action,
the man would have to establish that he was actually harmed as the
77
proximate result of the woman's negligence. One of the typical damages
' 478
The "societal" harm the
in a wrongful death case is loss of "society.
similar to the harm he
be
would
experience
to
father could be expected
470. Supra note 469.
471. See KEETON, supra note 462 (listing elements of a negligent wrongful death cause
of action).
472. A breach of duty would likely be privileged for some of the reasons presented in
Roe unless the Supreme Court indicated, or individual legislatures enacted, specific guidelines
detailing under what circumstances a woman's rights would need to be balanced against a
man's.
473. See Stallman v. Youngquist, 531 N.E.2d 355, 360 (I1. 1988) (refusing to recognize
a tort action against a woman for unintentional infliction of prenatal injuries). Cf Grodin v.
Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (finding a woman had a duty toward her
spouse for negligent prenatal harm to their child).
474. See Jones v. Smith, 278 So. 2d 339, 340 (Fla. 1973) (complaint alleged present and
future symptoms of depression); Przybyla v. Przybyla, 275 N.W.2d 113 (Wis. Ct. App. 1978)
(alleging in complaint that husband suffered "great emotional anguish and mental distress");
dissenting) (stating that the
Doe v. Doe, 314 N.E.2d 128, 135 (Mass. 1974) (Reardon, J.,
"loss suffered by the husband is dramatically and utterly irreversible and ... the deprivation
can be gauged only by the most sensitive and profound human faculties"). Cf.supra notes
469-70 and accompanying text regarding types of damages recoverable.
475. See KEETON, supra note 434, at 263-319 (outlining the legal requirements needed
to prove causation).
476. See Smith v. Mercy Hosp., 560 N.E.2d 1164, 1174 (Il1.App. Ct. 1990).
477. Cf.supra note 470 (providing examples of what constitutes "actual loss" when a
fetus is destroyed).
478. Illinois Wrongful Death Act, 740 ILCS 180/2.2 (1994).
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would have experienced had his unborn child been wrongfully killed by an
intoxicated driver,4 79 but the harm would be foreseeably worse. s°
In the case of a drunk driver, the father could always rationalize that
his child was accidently killed by a careless person. In the case of a woman
who maliciously decides to abort the man's forming child, the woman's act
would be intentional. No amount of rationalization would relieve his
pain.481
Provided the above elements could be pleaded and proven, and a man
could successfully argue for an extension of the wrongful death statute, he
should be able to sustain a private cause of action against the mother of his
developing child for a wrongful termination of pregnancy. 482 The limitation of this approach is that it provides the man with damages only after the
termination of his unborn child has already taken place. It does not prevent
the termination itself.483 Prevention of the wrongful act might best be
accomplished by utilizing one of two other theories. First, if a pregnancy has
already taken place, a putative father may pursue an action against
waste. 41 Second, if a couple has not yet married, but desire to have
children in the future, the man may consider entering into a pre-nuptial
agreement with his future spouse.485
479. See generally supra note 380 (citing examples of cases which allow for "society"
damages for fetal harm).
480. Purposeful termination of a pregnancy without justification could probably be
viewed as intentional rather than negligent conduct. Intentional conduct typically
brings
higher damages if a court seeks to punish the wrongdoer's behavior. See generally Scott
v.

Donald, 165 U.S. 58 (1897).

481. See supra note 474 (describing types of harm most men experience when a child
they desperately wanted to raise is aborted). If a woman's actions are privileged, the
man
may experience the same loss of society as he would have had her actions not been
privileged, but he would be entitled to no recovery for his pain. A similar situation occurs
when a defamed person is harmed by a publisher whose conduct is privileged. See, e.g.,
N.Y.
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
482. Cf Person v. Behnke, 611 N.E.2d 1350, 1353 (111.App. Ct. 1993) (extending
wrongful death recoveries to legal malpractice actions which result in a temporary loss
of
child custody or visitation).
483. Accordingly, there is no cause of action without damages. See discussion at supra
note 239-58 (suggesting a definition of the father's interest as one of property rather
than
"society").
484. Cf Baker v. Weedon, 262 So. 2d 641, 644 (Miss. 1972) (discussing action against
waste and "best interest of all parties" rule); Edwin H. Vail, Jr., Damages for Loss of
Use
When Chattel is Destroyed, 33 SO. CAL. L. REV. 451 (1960) (discussing conversion
damages); Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 217 (Mo. App. Ct. 1975)
("A
well-ordered society cannot tolerate the waste and destruction of resources when such
acts
directly affect important interests of other members of that society").
485. See infra note 488. See also Uniform Pre-Marital Agreement Act. 9 A.U.L.A.
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Pre-Nuptial Agreements

Private parties are typically free to contract for most goods and services
however they wish.48 6 Provided the parties have willingly entered into an
agreement, and the agreement is not illegal or void as against public policy,
48 7
the contract will usually be valid and enforceable. The question here is,
whether a man could contract to marry a woman in exchange for her
88
promise to bear any children she conceived by him within the marriage.
Such an agreement would, in effect, be requesting the woman to
contractually waive her constitutional rights. Although no such agreement
has ever been ruled upon by the Supreme Court, a similar constitutional
waiver of rights--although parental rather than procreational in nature--has
489 In most cases, the courts
been written into some surrogacy contracts.
have generally opposed such contracts as being contrary to public policy.4' 9 However, two cases in particular may have a bearing on whether
a woman could waive her constitutional right to decide to terminate her
pregnancy.49'
In one of these cases, the woman gave her decision to abort as
consideration for a contract, 492 while in the second case, the woman
contractually waived her constitutional right to parent a child she gave birth

Supp. 379 (1986) (allowing for the enforceability of antenuptial agreements without the
consideration required for other types of contracts).
486. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (finding a fundamental right "of
the individual to contract"). But see generally Nebbia v. New York, 291, U.S. 502 (1934)
(overruling Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)). "But neither property rights nor
contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his
property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them
harm." Id. at 510.
487. See, e.g., Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993).
488. See Bergan v. Bergan, No. 89-1003, slip op. at 7 (Cir. Ct. S.D. 1989) (explaining
that the existence of an alleged pre-nuptial agreement was the court's original reason for
issuing a temporary restraining order).
489. Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal. 1993) (holding a surrogate mother's
contractual agreement created a valid waiver of her constitutional right to parent the child
she bore). "The argument that a woman cannot knowingly and intelligently agree to gestate
and deliver a baby for intending parents carries overtones of the reasoning that for centuries
prevented women from attaining equal economic and professional status under the law." Id.
at 785.
490. See Doe v. Kelley, 307 N.W.2d 438,441 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (holding surrogacy
agreement violates state public policy if money or other consideration is passed).
491. See infra notes 494-95.
492. L.G. v. F.G.H., 729 S.W.2d 634 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
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In the first case, a Missouri court held that a woman's abortion
constituted valid consideration for a contract she entered into with her father
in which he agreed to retain her in his will. 49 In the second case, a
California court upheld a waiver provision in a surrogacy contract in which
a surrogate mother agreed to waive her parental rights to a child she would
later give birth to. 495 These two holdings indicate that some courts would
probably enforce a prenuptial agreement entered into by parties of equal
bargaining power. Despite a valid contract, however, a pregnant mother
could still utilize the traditional affirmative defenses of duress, undue
influence, and fraud if the circumstances merited such defenses. 4% In
addition, she might seek to avoid performing the contract by claiming it
would be unconscionable to require her to go through labor.497
F. ENFORCEMENT AND PROPOSED THEORIES OF RECOVERY

No right is worth discussing if it cannot legally be enforced. Although,
concededly, enforcement of the men's reproductive rights proposed in this
article creates problems, none defies a solution.
The more problematic of men's rights to enforce would be the right to
beget a child which, as described earlier, should be viewed as a cluster of
privacy and associational rights. 8 Moreover, this right would only apply
under certain circumstances and would require that the man obtain a court
order or other injunction enjoining the woman from having an abortion. 4 9
Once obtained, enforcement of the order would be the next hurdle. It
is always possible that a woman could be physically confined to prevent her
from obtaining an abortion. 5°° Although such a suggestion from the outset
would appear to be violative of her liberty,501 the state does not hesitate
to confine other members of society who are harmful to themselves or

493. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 776.
494. See LG., 729 S.W.2d 634.

495. See Johnson, 851 P.2d at 778 (holding biological parents were legal parents of a
child born to a surrogate).
496. See supra notes 66-67.
497. See supra note 68.

498. See supra notes 232-58.
499. See supra notes 121-33.

500. See generally United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (prison detainees);
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (involuntary commitment).
501. A woman in such a setting would most likely claim false imprisonment. A court
would have to determine if the state, in enforcing a man's associational and procreative
interests, would be justified in falsely imprisoning the woman as a matter of public or private
necessity (necessary to prevent the extinguishing of life). See generally infra note 503.
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others in criminal and mental health settings.' Although criminals and
psychiatric patients are not required to go through the rigors of labor and
delivery, it could be argued that confinement may be justified by the
3
necessity of preserving a potential life.
Pragmatically, it is highly unlikely that a hospital, prison or mental
institution could prevent a woman from self-aborting if she was determined
not to bear a child.5" Furthermore, the costs of twenty-four hour surveillance of a pregnant woman for a period of several months would be
prohibitive. 50 5 Therefore, enforcement of a man's procreative rights in this
manner would be impractical. Accordingly, a court should look more
for violating a court order, than towards actual
towards providing penalties
5 °6
order.
the
of
enforcement
If a woman would choose to disobey a court's restraining order despite
any quid pro quo or other guarantee the court or her spouse would provide,
0 7 States vary in the amount
the man should be entitled to tort damages.
50 8
of protection afforded to life prior to birth or viability. If, however, a
state has a wrongful death statute that allows for a cause of action against
one who wrongfully causes the death of a non-viable fetus, a biological
father should be allowed to seek tort damages such as "loss of society" for
the fetus's wrongful death.'0 9
It may also be possible to bring an action for negligent or intentional
infliction of emotional distress for the wilful termination of a biological
5 0 Although this approach has not
father's potential future offspring.
502. See supra note 500.
503. See Regina v. Dudley and Stephens, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (Eng. 1884); Surocco v. Geary,
3 Cal. 60 (1853).
504. Even immediately prior to Roe v. Wade, pregnant women were never prosecuted
or penalized for self-aborting. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157 (1973).
505. A conservative estimate of the average cost of incarceration per inmate, per day
is $60.00. See Jim Benivenga, Serving Time in a Computer 'Cell', CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Dec. 17, 1991, at 12. Thus, it would cost approximately $10,450 for six months of
confinement. Other sources estimate the cost as being as much as $25,000 to $40,000 per
inmate, per year. See Anna Quindlen, A Corrections System That Doesn't Correct, CHI.
TRIB., Mar. 17, 1992, at 17.
506. See parts IV. E. i and ii, relating to a balancing approach and a wrongful
termination of pregnancy tort. See also Heck v. Schupp, 68 N.E.2d 464, 466 (I11.1946)
(requiring under the Illinois Constitution, Article 2, § 19, that every person be given a
remedy in the law for all injuries and wrongs which he may receive in his person, property
or reputation).
507. See supra notes 470 and 506.
508. See supra note 460 for a source listing most wrongful death statutes.
509. See supra note 470 (describing types of recoveries for death of a fetus).
510. See Przybyla v. Przybyla, 275 N.W.2d 112 (Wis. Ct. App. 1978).
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worked in at least one prior case,"1 ' that case was decided before the
trimester framework was dismantled in Casey.
A third tort approach would be to attempt to sue a woman who violates
a court order for alienation of affections."' This approach, however, is
likely to fail for two reasons. First, not only has the tort itself generally
disappeared in most jurisdictions, but only two states have allowed the tort
to be extended to relationships between parents and children. 3 Second,
it would be impossible to prove that there were any affections between the
father and offspring that were alienated." 4
In addition to the above relationship-dependent torts, a putative father
may try to pursue property-like remedies depending on the stage of the
pregnancy.5 15 For instance, following from the reasoning in several in-vitro
cases, the fetus could be viewed as property. 6 A property classification
would be especially helpful to a man in a jurisdiction that does not
recognize a wrongful death cause of action for pre-viable fetuses.517
Accordingly, a woman who is under court order not to abort could possibly

511. Id. (holding that behavior protected by the United States Constitution cannot
constitute conduct that is extreme and outrageous). The court in Przybyla relied upon the
holding in Danforth to find reasonable a wife's abortion without her spouse's consent during
the first trimester. Id. at 114. Nonetheless, a finding by the Supreme Court that the holding
in Danforth is an unconstitutional deprivation of a man's fundamental right to procreate (at
least where paternal rights are asserted) would likely alter the future outcome of a case like
Przybyla.
512. See generally Stode v. Gleason, 510 P.2d 250 (Wash. Ct. App. 1973).
513. See generally KEETON, supra note 434, § 124, at 915-29. See also Johnson v.
Luhman, 71 N.E.2d 810 (III. App. Ct. 1947); Miller v. Monsen, 37 N.W.2d 543 (Minn.
1949).
514. See Dymek v. Nyquist, 469 N.E.2d 659, 666 (111.1984) (recognizing a cause of
action for parental loss of a minor child's society and companionship when the child's
mother intentionally and directly interferes with the parent-child relationship between a child
and his father; rejecting, however, a claim for alienation of affections).
515. As noted earlier, not all states provide for a wrongful death cause of action for
harm to a fetus prior to viability.
516. See York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 424-25 (E.D. Va. 1989) (assuming that a preembryo was property, the court held that a laboratory was under a duty of reasonable care
as a bailor). See also Del Zio v. Columbia Presbyterian Med. Ctr., No. 74-3558 (S.D.N.Y.
filed Apr. 12, 1978) (awarding biological mother $50,000 in tort damages for laboratory's
wilful destruction of non-conceived eggs and sperm in petri dish). Cf. Hecht v. Kane, 20 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 275 (Cal. 1993) (holding that deceased man's frozen sperm was "property" in which
girlfriend had a,20% interest upon the man's death). Cf Flores & Knight-Ridder, supra note
245 (reporting of a wife who had her newly deceased husband's sperm surgically removed
for future insemination).
517. See supra note 460 (sources detailing state wrongful death statutes).
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be viewed as a bailor,5 1s thereby being under a duty to take reasonable
care of the fetus and its surroundings." 9 A failure to exercise reasonable
care could result in a cause of action for conversion of what, in essence, was
5 20 A property-like
declared to be the putative father's future interest.
theory could best be pursued in conjunction with the already-mentioned
action against waste of the father's future interests.52'
In applying these theories, if one took a breach of contract approach to
requiring a woman to bear a child she either impliedly-in-law agreed to
create by being married, or expressly agreed to carry to term under a prenuptial agreement, some writers have suggested that an injunction could not
be issued because to do so would violate the Thirteenth Amendment
prohibition against involuntary servitude. 522 Although there is legal support
which would prohibit a court from compelling an employee to perform,
under a service contract he has chosen to breach, 5" the carrying of a fetus
to term would not be a pure service contract."2 Rather, it would be a
contract for part service, part child. Thus, if remedies at law were found to
be insufficient to compensate the man for his damages, a court of equity
should be able to order specific performance of the contract by5 issuing an
25
injunction requiring the woman to carry her pregnancy to term.
Any one of the above recovery theories might be used to enforce a
man's procreative rights. Were a fetus considered to be property, property
remedies would apply. Were a fetus considered to be a person, criminal and
tort law should apply. Were the fetus considered to be an interest--which
seems to be the most appropriate category for paternal rights purposes--tort
law and possibly property law would apply.

518. Cf. York, 717 F. Supp. 421.
519. See id. at 425 (finding duty to "account for a thing as the property of another that
creates the bailment"). ("The essential nature of a bailment relationship imposes on the bailee
... an absolute obligation to return the subject matter of the bailment to the bailor.").
520. Id. at 427 (refusing to dismiss parents' cause of action in detinue).
521. See generally supra note 484 (providing examples of actions against waste).
522. See Loretta J. Ross, Why Not Use the 13th and 14th Amendments to Achieve
Reproductive Freedom? in REFLECTIONS AFTER CASEY 17 (Dorothy M. Zellner & Nancy
Scerco eds. 1993).
523. See, e.g., Block v. Hillel Torah North Suburban Day School, 426 N.E.2d 976, 977
(I11.App. Ct. 1980).
524. For instance, it could be argued that a contract to custom build a luxury home is
a service contract. Nonetheless, the contract may be specifically enforced because of the
uniqueness of the end-product being produced. See Bielecki v. Painting Plus, Inc., 637
N.E.2d 1054, 1062 (III. App. Ct. 1994).
525. See supra note 61 (providing example of when, due to uniqueness of the subject
matter, specific performance is appropriate).
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Concededly, it is not desirable to consider future children to be

property because parental rights are determined more by the fitness of the
parent than by any possessory right a parent may have by virtue of being a
progenitor. 26 Nevertheless, a property-like remedy may provide a means

a man could use to discourage his co-progenitor from destroying his forming

child.

G. PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

Perhaps the most important reason for recognizing men's reproductive

rights and appropriate means of enforcing those rights lies in the ways in
which our society has changed. No longer is the largest portion of our
population made up of young teenagers as it was in the midst of the Sexual
Revolution. 27 Certainly, unwanted teenage pregnancies have always been
and will probably continue to be a societal problem. 2 However, teenage
pregnancies are a problem for young men as well as young women, and
either both or neither should be allowed to waive their parental obligations. 2 To allow otherwise is to discriminate against men solely on the
basis of their gender.'"

526. See In re Baby M., 525 A.2d 1128, 1132 (N.J. Super. C1. Ch. Div. 1987) (stating
the courts must choose the child's welfare over the parents' rights).
527. See supra notes 330 and 339 (regarding teenage pregnancy and the sexual
revolution). See also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165 (1973) (articulating the Court's
concern about "dealing with the profound problems of the present day").
528. Id. See Johnson. supra note 205 (discussing some of the problems associated with
unwed teenage motherhood).
529. E.g., supra note 103 (detailing the story of a well-liked and otherwise well-behaved
teenage boy who allegedly attempted to have a fetus he was part of forming destroyed by
having his girlfriend shot in the stomach during a feigned burglary attempt). As a police
officer involved in the case put it, "In his mind, I think he just ran out of options .... "
MILLS & FOUNTAIN, supra note 103, Wilmette Suspect Had Big Dreams, at 1. According to
the boy's father, "[H]e is a 19-year-old boy who just wasn't ready to be a father." Id.
530. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (applying a "strict scrutiny"
standard to a state regulation which discriminated on the basis of sex for the sole reason of
administrative convenience); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 74 (1971) (holding that the
mandatory choice of giving members of either sex preference over members of the other, is
unlawful if based solely on gender). Accord Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-200 (1976)
(finding that a statute, which made differentiations between the sexes based on stereotypes
rather than significant statistical information, violated equal protection). Cf Washington v.
Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (requiring purposeful discrimination when asserting claims
of discriminatory impact).
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Today, abortions are an option for all women,"' not just single

adolescents. 5 2 Roe v. Wade dealt specifically with an unwed mother,
5 33
where no parental rights were asserted by a biological father. In a
society wherein the bulk of the population is nearer to middle-age than to

teen-age,534 and many members of society are experiencing a decline in
their reproductive capacities,535 parental considerations should take on
paramount importance when parental rights are being asserted as a reason
for limiting certain abortions.
There is little question that the recognition and enforcement of men's
reproductive rights would have a profound effect on society. Therefore, this
effect must be viewed in light of general public policy and what is in the
best interests of the mother, the father, the future child and the general
public.53 6 It is probably in the best interests of the mother to allow her to
retain the privacy of deciding whether she should terminate her pregnancy.5 37 This is true for a number of reasons. She may have been the victim
of crime or abuse.538 She may have engaged in an illicit affair that may
profoundly affect the stability of her marriage or her future life or custody
prospects in the event of divorce.539 Or, perhaps she and her physician
know that the fetus is profoundly deformed, or that her health is in grave
danger. 5' Each of these reasons is a private concern that primarily affects

the woman. 4 '

531. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2807 (1992). But see id. at
2832 (upholding parental consent provision as constitutional).
532. See id. at 2831 ("Women do not lose their constitutionally protected liberty when
they marry."). But see id. at 2832 (affording lesser rights to minors).
533. See supra notes 365-67 and accompanying text (regarding lack of parental interests
asserted in Roe v. Wade).
534. See U.S. Bureau of Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1993 (113th
ed. Wash. D.C. 1993) at 21.
535. See, e.g., Madeline Chinnici, Understanding Male Infertility, 92 Sci. Dig. 74 (July
1984) (describing the causes of what appears to be an increase in male infertility).
536. See KEETON, supra note 434: "It is a simple matter to say that the interests of
individuals are to be weighed against one another in the light of those of the general public,
but far more difficult to say where the public interest may lie." Id. at 17. "Ultimately the law
must coincide with public opinion." Id. at 18.
537. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2826-28.
538. Id.
539. Id.
540. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165-66 (1973).
541. Particularly in cases of rape and in those cases relating to pregnancies fathered
outside the marriage, a husband would have less of a proprietary interest if his sperm was
not involved. In addition, marital abuse would clearly entitle a woman to heightened privacy
protection under Casey. 112 S. Ct. at 2826-28.
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However, once the woman's pregnancy becomes known to the
biological father, it is arguable that her decision to terminate the pregnancy

is no longer private and that she has consented to having the state intervene

on behalf of the putative father should he wish to raise the child. 2 Such
consent could then allow a court to balance the interests of the two
parties." Alternatively, her disclosure of the pregnancy to the father may

have placed the man at risk of psychological harm if he has strong reasons

for desiring that the fetus come to full term." As a result of her disclosure, she may have created a duty to forebear aborting.' 5
Different policy considerations are involved when a state court must
decide whether to enjoin a woman from having an abortion than would be
involved with the "male abortion option." This is true because when a man
asserts that his right to procreate is superior to that of the woman's to

terminate her pregnancy, a future child is at stake and the woman's body is

involved. 5" It is worth noting, however, that by restraining a woman from
having an abortion, a state judge would not be denying her the right to
refuse medical treatment established in Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of
Health. 7 Neither would the state or one of its officers be invasively
entering into the realm of the woman's body. 5" More analogously, the

542. Cf. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2817.
543. Accordingly, no longer would the state be delegating a right it did not have, but
more appropriately, as in parental consent and notice provisions, the husband would have a
right of his own entitled to protection. See Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 6768 (1976).
544. See, e.g., Martinez v. Long Island Jewish Hillside Med. Ctr., 512 N.E.2d 538, 539
(N.Y. 1987) (allowing mother recovery in tort for genetic counselor's negligence in advising
the mother to abort an otherwise healthy fetus) (mother's recovery was for breach of duty
to her, not to the fetus, and the rationale was based upon her deep convictions that abortion
is a "sin" unless justified). See also Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869, 870 (Mich. Ct. App.
1980) (allowing husband a cause of action against his wife for alleged pre-natal injuries she
negligently inflicted upon their child).
545. See supra note 463 (arguing for a duty where one has created an increased risk of
harm). Cf DeShaney v. Winnebago Dcp't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (finding there
could have been a duty for the state to protect a private individual if the state's actions made
the plaintiff more vulnerable to harm).
546. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807 ("That these sacrifices have from the beginning of
the human race been endured by women with a pride that ennobles her in the eyes of others
and gives to the infant a bond of love cannot alone be grounds for the state to insist she
make the sacrifice.") ("[In some critical respects the abortion decision is of the same
character as the decision to use contraception."). But see id. at 2859 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("Unlike marriage, procreation and
contraception, abortion 'involves the purposeful termination of potential life.'").
547. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
548. See In re Baby Boy Doe, No. 93-JA-6017 (Cook Co. Juv. Ct. 1993), affd, 632
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court would be ordering the status quo549 so that one party with control
550
over an interest would not destroy or waste the value of a unique item
jointly owned by both parties.
In the balancing scenario, the central policy concerns would more
directly affect the man. 5 ' For example, the concern in Roe of empowering
women so as to allow them to equally participate in society and employment552 would not be affected by requiring the woman to bear the child
if the quid pro quo conditions were met. If the man undertook all of the
financial obligations and provided for child care after birth, the woman
53
would not be burdened with those obligations (although it is possible
that her education or employment would be temporarily delayed). In
addition, any burdens she would encounter in the way of lost wages or lost
54
time at work could be added to her financial reimbursement.
Significantly, the policy concerns of not allowing a qualified man the
right to prevent a pregnant woman from aborting his future child could be
calamitous to the man involved and to society as well. For the man,
especially a married man, he may have a compelling interest in raising that
5
particular child. He may have a deep conviction in not remarrying, " or
N.E.2d 326 (Iii. App. Ct. 1994), emergency cert. denied, No. 93-A-503 (Dec. 18, 1993), cert.

denied, No. 93-76560 (S. Ct. 1994) (holding that the mother of a viable fetus, which the
mother desired to bear to full term and deliver naturally, could not be compelled to undergo
a caesarian section to improve the likelihood that the child would be born alive or without
defects if the mother's decision was based upon the First Amendment freedom of religion
and her right to refuse medical treatment). Note, however, that this was a balancing of the
mother's interests and those of the state in generally protecting the potentiality of life. In
addition, in Baby Boy Doe, the father's interests coincided with those of the mother. See
Daniel J.Drazen, The Birth of Baby Doe, LIBERTY, Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 29.
549. See supra note 231 (setting forth requirements for an injunction to preserve the
status quo).
550. See supra note 484 (describing action against waste for property interests). See also
supra notes 239-58 (describing possible proprietary rights to a spouse's reproductive
capacity).
551. See supra notes 96, 267 (discussing the interests Roe seeks to protect).
552. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2808 (1992).
553. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973): Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52, 93 (1976); Conn v. Conn, 526 N.E.2d 958, 961 (Ind. 1988).
554. See generally Part II. B of this comment.
555. If a man is absolutely opposed to his child being aborted for religious reasons,
would the holdings in Roe and its progeny act as a government encouraged or a government
endorsed deprivation of a man's First Amendment Freedom of Religion? Cf.supra note 104;
App. Ct. 1994), cert. denied, No. 93-7576560 (S.
In re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E.2d 326 (111.
Ct. 1994) (refusing to allow a doctor to compel a pregnant woman, who was asserting her
right to freedom of religion, to undergo a caesarian section); Estate of Brooks v. Brooks, 205
N.E.2d 435, 442 (III. 1965) (stating that a person's religious liberty is among the rights "most
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he may be of an age where he is less likely to attract a new mate. Moreover,
he may have special inheritable traits such as genius or unique talent that
risk forever being lost if his forming child is aborted. 5 6 Furthermore, he
may be the last survivor in a line of family members who have been killed
off by past acts of genocide,557 or he himself may in the meantime have
become impotent or sterile.55 s Even when a man has not become sterile,
repeated abortion of his offspring has the same effect as castration--an act
clearly in violation of his fundamental right to procreate. 59
Regardless of the fact the one abortion will not necessarily prevent a
man from producing children in the future, a man's reproductive rights
should lie as much in protecting his associational interests as in protecting
his virility."W In particular, a man's interests in an individual human life
cannot be so deprecated by suggesting that the interests may be replaced
with another human life. 561 To allow a woman to abort the forming child
of a man who has one or more of the above compelling reasons for
begetting his child would place a significant burden upon him. If he is still
able to procreate, he may be relegated to the risks and costs of remarriage,
surrogacy or adoption. 62 Additionally, as the risk of contracting AIDS

valued by civilized man"). An individual's free exercise of religion may be
limited only
.where such exercise endangers, clearly and presently, the public
health, welfare or morals."
Id.
556. See Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2840 ("[P]otential human lives might include
the
occasional Mozart or Curie.").
557. In re Baby M., 525 A.2d 1128 (N.J. 1987). Mr. Stern, the biological father
in the
surrogacy agreement, based much of the importance of his custody claim on the
fact that "his
parents were the sole surviving members of his family to escape the Holocaust."
Id. at 1138.
558. Cf. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992).
559. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). See also supra note
104.
560. See generally Part IV. A of this comment.
561. See Simmons v. University of Chi. Hosp. and Clinics, 617 N.E.2d 278
(111. App.
Ct. 1993). In speaking of the notion that a parent may replace the loss of one
child with the
birth of a new one, the court said:
In order to accept this argument, one must first accept the notion that the
loss
suffered by a parent upon the death of a child is somehow ameliorated with
the
birth of a subsequent child, a notion we categorically reject ....
If defendant's
argument on this issue were accepted, surviving parents in a wrongful death
claim
would be required to engage in the unseemly spectacle of disparaging the societal
value of their afterborn children in an effort to minimize the offset which
the
defendants claim by those children's very existence.
Id. at 283.
562. See generally In re Doe, 627 N.E.2d 648 (I11.App. Ct. 1993); In re Baby
M., 525
A.2d 1128 (N.J. 1987); Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993); In re
Baby Clausen,
502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993).
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for him
important
5 64
increases in the child-bearing population, it may bevirus.
AIDS
the
of
free
is
to preserve an offspring he knows
Society would likewise be detrimentally impacted if fit and willing men
were not allowed to beget their forming children.65The state would lose the
the
economic growth incidental to raising a child. It would also lose
help
to
eventual purchase power which a future individual would produce

5
sustain economic growth. " Most importantly, in a nation like ours, with
67
a reverse demographic curve, society risks losing a productive taxpayer

and to
desperately needed to fund the growing entitlements for the elderly,
younger
share in the tax burden falling upon an increasingly overtaxed
population.3
V. CONCLUSION

Although men have a constitutional right to decide whether to beget a
child, 5 9 past Supreme Court decisions pertaining to abortion have rento
563. Reported cases of AIDS have increased from 7,354 in the years of 1981-1984
report
to
hesitancy
patient's
and
244,929 today. Because of the disease's lack of symptoms
the disease, actual cases are estimated to be much higher than reported. See U.S. BUREAU
134 (113th ed.)
THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1993,
OF

1994,
Wash. D.C. (1993). See also Connie Lauerman, Vital Signs, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 16,
reported
women
of
group
Tempo at 5 ("Women of reproductive age are the fastest growing
to the Center for Disease Control as persons infected with HIV.").
it was
564. See CLEMENTS, supra note 330, at 6. In a recent survey on sexual habits,
who
someone
know
they
respondents--26%--say
all
of
quarter
a
than
"[miore
reported that
their
that
insist
is HIV positive and/or has AIDS." Id. 65% of those men ages 18-24 would
and
partners be tested for HIV prior to contemplating pregnancy. Id. Cf John D. Arras, AIDS
355
353,
Q.
MILLBANK
68
Trembling,
and
Reproductive Decisions: Having Children in Fear
any
through
infection
HIV
perinatal
actual
of
risk
the
that
(1990) ("Current studies indicate
percent.").
30
and
percent
20
between
somewhere
lies
given pregnancy
also
565. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2840 (1992) ("The state may
the
from
benefit
would
society
believing
population
have a broader interest in expanding the
citizens.").
services of additional productive
566. Id.
and a
567. Typically, population curves contain a larger number of younger persons
more
have
presently
we
however,
States,
smaller number of older persons. In the United
age
to
birth
from
years
all
in
than
bracket
age
year
forty-four
to
persons in the twenty
STATES:
UNITED
THE
OF
ABSTRACT
STATISTICAL
CENSUS,
THE
OF
BUREAU
U.S.
twenty. See
1994 14 (114th ed. 1994).
568. See generally John E. Chaptoon, The Clinton Tax Plan: The Tax Policy Pendulum
package
Swings Back, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 449 (1993) ("President Clinton's revenue
income
taxpayers'
of
share
the
increasing
toward
back
pendulum
policy
tax
the
will swing
disincentives
provide
will
claimed by the government.") ("Mounting layers of additional taxes
to economic growth and without economic growth the tax base will shrink.").
569. Supra notes 138-39.
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dered men's reproductive rights worthless by overempowering women with
a monopoly over all decisions related to procreation from the time of
implantation until viability. 70 In more recent years, however, the Court
has made several changes related to abortion restrictions. It has eliminated
the trimester framework,57 ' strengthened states' interests to apply to the
whole period of pregnancy,572 and lessened the standard of review required
to uphold restrictions on abortion legislation from a "compelling state
interest" to an "undue burden test. 5 73 Together, these changes make it
more likely today that a state court will be able to enforce men's rights.
Therefore, what once was a man's right in theory alone may in the future
become a man's right in fact.
Our Constitution requires that the government treat similarly situated
persons equally, 574 and dissimilarly situated persons differently. 575 Notably, when it comes to pregnancy, men and women are in various respects
both similar and dissimilar. As potential parents, putative fathers and
pregnant women are the same. As one being pregnant and the other not,
putative fathers and pregnant women are obviously different. Therefore, in
decisions related to parental rights and obligations--as opposed to those
dealing only with pregnancy--men and women should be treated alike.
An examination of child support laws, however, discloses that women
are required to provide monetary support for only those children they choose
to bear, while men are required to pay monetary support for both those
children they choose to beget and those they do not. 576 The "male abortion
option" would allow a single man to terminate his parental rights and
obligations in a manner that is comparatively equal to that of a single
577
woman.
At the other end of the reproductive spectrum, when it comes to a
man's right to procreate, equal protection could be guaranteed if the states
had the power to issue injunctions restraining women from aborting their
partners' offspring when a woman acts outside of the privilege sought to be
570. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 71 (1976); Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2830 (1992).
571. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2818-21. "Wle abandon the trimester framework as a rigid
prohibition on all pre-viability regulation aimed at the protection of fetal life." ld. at
2818.
572. See supra notes 396 and 400 (explaining why the states' interests apply throughout
pregnancy).
573. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2820-21.
574. LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1438 (Foundation Press, 2d
ed. 1988).
575. Id.
576. 750 ILCS 45/1.1 (1994).
577. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2809 (1992).
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protected in Roe." 8 Men's rights could be further secured if our legal
system provided a man with a means of enforcement or appropriate tort
9
damages for a violation of his rights."
To address the criticisms of those who would disagree with giving a
putative father any rights at all because a pregnant woman has an absolute
right to "bodily integrity," such criticisms fail to recognize that the right to
do with one's body whatever one pleases was rejected in Roe v. Wade and
5
is only questionably protected in later cases. ss Moreover, such a purported
right contains logical inconsistencies if asserting the right on behalf of a
woman requires the extinguishment of all present and future bodily integrity
overcome
for a fetus. 58' Even though this inconsistency has been cleverly582
'
once a
by constitutionally defining a fetus as being a "non-person,"
parental interest is asserted in the fetus, tort law, criminal law and inheritance law create "person-like" duties and remedies that should give a man
83
the ability to protect his interests in his future child.
As for the argument that it would be unfair for the state to temporarily
burden a pregnant woman by requiring her to carry an on-going pregnancy
5
to term in order to protect her husband's interests, " the emphasis should
be on weighing the relative harms and not on avoiding all inconvenience for
the woman. If a pregnant woman is healthy and is otherwise compensated
for her efforts, her temporary deprivation should be warranted as a means
of preventing her husband's more compelling permanent deprivation. A

578. Id. at 2840.

579. See Conn v. Conn, 526 N.E.2d 958, 961-62 .(Ind. 1988).
580. See supra notes 265 & 267. But see Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2830. Cf id. at 2810

(referring to the bodily integrity line of cases with the modifying phrase "whether or not
mistaken").
581. Under Cruzan a person has a right to refuse medical treatment. If, according to
modern wrongful death laws, every human being has a right "to begin life unimpaired by
physical or mental defects resulting from the negligence of another," Endrez v. Freiburg, 248
N.E.2d 901, 903 (N.Y. 1966), may a fetus in whom a biological father is asserting a parental
interest refuse medical treatment as a means of asserting its right to be born without
impairment?
582. See supra note 378 (quoting the Supreme Court at the time of Roe as declaring that
"the unborn have never been recognized in the law as persons in the whole sense").
583. See supra notes 379-80.

1990) (refusing to compel a pair
584. See Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 1326 (111.
however, deals with the
Curran,
half-sibling).
a
to
marrow
bone
their
of twins to donate
rights. The halffundamental
competing
with
not
treatment,
medical
refuse
to
right
twins'
sibling (unlike a putative father) had no fundamental right to receive its sisters' bone marrow,
and the girls had no duty to their half-sibling. Id.
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temporary deprivation would especially be warranted if the father's interests
were not only his, but those of society as well. 8 5
The law has long recognized that under appropriate circumstances the
government may compel us to use our bodies in ways that are related to
promoting the common good. Immunization laws, 51 forced blood transfusions, 87 termination of medical treatment,8 8 quarantines, 58 9 military
service' g° and prohibitions against incest, 591 sodomy, 92 alcohol and
585. See generally Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2840 (1992), for
states' interests in societal goals which may be favored by men's interests in paternal rights
cases. Also, for those who would claim that it is discriminatory to compel a woman to carry
a fetus to term because no man could ever be required to do the same, it is not discriminatory to treat dissimilarly situated persons differently. See supra notes 574-75. Because
of
biological differences, pregnant women and male progenitors are not similarly situated when
it comes to carrying a child to term. Cf Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 78 (1981).
Therefore, they cannot be treated completely equally.
Nonetheless, in another setting, similar physical burdens are placed on men. Only
men must register for the armed forces. Id. Only men may be drafted and required to serve
in ground combat positions. See 10 U.S.C. § 113(4) (1994); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S.
57 (1981). Their bodies may be legally utilized for the common good solely on the basis
of
physical attributes. Once in the military, an enlisted man performing his duties may not
recover damages for negligent or intentional acts inflicted upon him by the federal
government. See Jaffee v. United States, 592 F.2d 712, cert. denied, 441 U.S. 961 (1982),
affirmed, 663 F.2d 1226 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 972 (1979); Feres v. United
States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). He may be told how to walk, what to eat, what to wear, and
where to fight. E.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986). If required, he must risk
life or limb for the public good. See Kohn v. United States, 680 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1982)
(finding that parents had a cause of action against the service for their emotional distress
resulting from the negligent handling of their son's death, but the military had no liability
for the son's death itself). The military is liable for neither a deprivation of life nor liberty.
Id. For men, military service is an obligation required for the good of society. "[T]he names
of more than 58,000 men are on the wall of the Vietnam Memorial in Washington--and those
of eight women." Supra note 185, at 56.
586. See Jacobsen v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 26 (1905); Illinois School Code, 105
ILCS 5/27-8.1 (1994) (requiring health examinations and immunizations); Illinois College
Immunization Act, 110 ILCS 20/3 (1994); Illinois Communicable Diseases Prevention
Act,
410 ILCS 315/2 (1994).
587. See generally People ex rel. Wallace v. Labrenz, 104 N.E.2d 769 (Ii. 1952).
588. See In re C.A., 603 N.E.2d 1171, 1178 (III. App. Ct. 1992) (allowing guardian ad
litem to issue a "do not resuscitate" order on behalf of a ward of the state).
589. See Illinois Dep't of Pub. Health Act, 20 ILCS 23052 (1994) (granting the
Department of Public Health "supreme authority in matters of quarantine").
590. See generally Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). See also Goldman v.
Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 510 (1986) (forbidding a military enlisted man from wearing
a
yarmulke despite his First Amendment freedom of religion); Keegan v. United States, 325
U.S. 478, 479 (1945).
591. See Illinois Criminal Code, 720 ILCS 5/11-11 (1994) (prohibiting sexual relations

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

drug use593 are all laws that restrict the unfettered use of our bodies. In
particular, the law forbids us to use our bodies in ways that would be
5
harmful to other individuals or to society. A woman, who unjustifiably
chooses to abort a fetus contrary to the wishes of a fit father who chooses
to raise the child himself, is analogous to a woman who wields her body
595
of the most intimate
like a sharp instrument to permanently sever one 596
parts of the man's life--the "society" of his offspring.
Not only does justice demand that the sexes be treated fairly in their
ability to decide to become parents, it demands that they be able to equally
avoid the burdens of parenthood if birth control fails. What's good for the
goose, should be good for the gander. Anything less is hypocrisy.
The time has come for our legal system to recognize that men too
should have reproductive rights.
MARY A. ToTz

within families).
592. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195 (1986) (upholding a state sodomy
statute).
593. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 759-60, 764 (1966) (allowing the state
to present evidence obtained by a physician who extracted blood from an unwilling patient,
hospitalized after driving while intoxicated, and holding that neither the patient's Fourteenth
nor Fifth Amendment rights were violated). Accord 625 ILCS 5/11-501.6 (1994) (requiring
mandatory blood testing of drivers involved in motor vehicle accidents which result in
personal injury or death, provided there is probable cause to indicate a driver was impaired).
594. See generally O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (regarding mental
patients); United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) (regarding prison detainees).
595. E.g., Paige Cunningham, Is Abortion A Women's Issue?; Pro-life, 5 UPDATE 6, 46
(1981) (stating that "the abortion procedure is ... a radical invasion ... [,] a mutilation of
the woman's body and a denial of her nature").
596. See Simmons v. University of Chicago Hosp. and Clinic, 617 N.E.2d 278, 283
(Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (describing the "society" of a wrongfully killed fetus). "We are speaking
about the most distinct and precious commodity known, an individual human life, respect for
which goes to 'the heart of our legal system and, broader still, our civilization."' Id. at 283
(emphasis added).

